Dilemmas of State-Led Nation Building in Ukraine

Edited by Taras Kuzio and Paul D’Anieri
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and Paul D’Anieri
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Introduction: Debating the Assumptions of State-Led Nation Building in Ukraine

Paul D’Anieri

In the decade since Ukraine attained independence from the Soviet Union, questions of national identity have dominated the study of Ukrainian politics and society. This focus has been justified for several different reasons. First, it seemed clear to observers of Ukraine that ethnic, linguistic, and regional divisions in the country called into question its ability to persist as a unified independent state. Second, the relationship between regional, linguistic, and ethnic identities in Ukraine was unclear and needed to be better understood. Such study promised a better understanding not only of the situation in Ukraine but also of national identity formation more broadly. Third, for the Ukrainian government and for those who would influence it, there were serious policy questions and political disputes over what sort of policies concerning language and national identity the new state should adopt.

Despite the considerable debate on the nature of cleavages in Ukraine, scholars on various sides of the debate seem to share the assumption that Ukraine’s identity cleavages constitute a potential source of societal conflict and hence endanger the new state in some way. Dominique Arel and David Laitin, on one side, have seen Ukraine’s Russian/Ukrainian language divide as a likely source of conflict. Hence some scholars have advocated state policies explicitly embracing the Russian language, as a way of avoiding alienation of Russophone Ukrainians. An opposing school of thought, epitomized by the work of Taras Kuzio, sharply disagrees with the notion that Ukraine should accept the post-Soviet linguistic status quo. In Kuzio’s view, accepting that status quo is dangerous, because it is an obstacle to building a stable and unified nation-state and an obstacle to generating the political consensus needed to undertake economic and political reform. Moreover, accepting the status quo is morally repugnant to some, who see that as endorsing the de-Ukrainianization policies of the Tsars and the Soviets. These opposing views share two overarching assumptions. First, national identity matters immensely to contemporary Ukrainian politics.
Second, state policies can profoundly influence national identity, for better or worse.

Thus, beyond debates over the actual state of identity politics in Ukraine and beyond normative preferences for various programs, there is an underlying agreement that the state has an essential role to play in identity politics in Ukraine. That role, however, has been assumed much more often than it has been examined, such that a number of crucial questions have been given much less treatment than they merit. The goal of this volume is to begin to address systematically the role of the state in Ukrainian identity politics. The chapters in this volume have a range of perspectives and contend with a variety of issues, but all are connected to the fundamental but underresearched questions concerning the state’s role in national identity formation.

While these chapters cover a variety of specific topics, they all grapple with the question of state-led promotion of national identity in Ukraine. Rather than beginning with a single unifying perspective and then elaborating it, this volume begins only with a common set of questions. Rather than seeking to produce a single coherent viewpoint, the chapters express a series of profound disagreements and contradictions. We leave it for the reader and for future research to judge the merit of the various contentions advanced in these chapters. More important than arriving at a unified conclusion, however, is establishing these issues as questions to be debated theoretically and studied empirically, instead of as assumptions to be made casually and left unexamined.

Within this broad question about the state’s role in identity politics, several constituent questions need to be dealt with. First, is it true, as often assumed, that overcoming Ukraine’s current cleavages is a prerequisite for holding the country together or for reforming it? Second, how have the legacies of history constrained the ability of the state to tackle such a project, and what lessons can be learned from Tsarist and Soviet efforts to alter Ukrainian national identity? Third, what are the natures of the cleavages that need to be overcome, and what sort of national identity might provide the most solid foundation for the construction of an overarching Ukrainian national identity? Finally, and most importantly, how has the Ukrainian state sought to build national identity over the last ten years, and what have been the results?

These are big questions, and the chapters in this volume certainly will not end discussion of them. But the chapters in this volume do seek to push the debate forward. Despite all the discussion of identity divisions in Ukraine, there has been little systematic attempt to evaluate the premises of such policies or to evaluate the results. After ten years of these policies, such an evaluation is overdue. The findings will be relevant well beyond Ukraine. In all of the other societies in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere that are divided on questions of national identity, it is important to examine the implications of these kinds of divisions for the survival and prosperity of their states. The rest of this introduction shall explore these four basic questions in greater detail and show how they relate to the rest of the book.
THE THREAT OF IDENTITY DIFFERENCES AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE

The first section of the book examines how Ukrainian national identity arrived at its current state and addresses the implications of the historical legacy for nation building today. These chapters focus on linking events in the past to the policy problems of today, and while much has been written about the Russian and Soviet legacy in Ukraine, crucial questions have been neglected. First among them is the question of establishing a status quo, a state of affairs that can be considered normal for Ukrainian national identity.

It is widely asserted that Ukraine’s domestic divisions—regional, ethnic, and linguistic—undermine various fundamental state goals. To the extent that this is true, it is easy to conclude that the state should do something about it. Most profoundly, many have argued that the country simply does not cohere and is prone to fragmenting along the lines of one cleavage or another. Raised most provocatively by William Zimmerman’s article title “Is Ukraine a Political Community?” the notion that Ukraine is likely to fragment, probably with significant violence, is shared from academic circles to the CIA. The argument is relatively straightforward. If many of the country’s citizens consider themselves Russian, national self-determination implies that they might seek to be governed by a Russian state rather than a Ukrainian one. This is even more likely, many conclude, to the extent that the Ukrainian state adopts an ethnic notion of Ukrainian national identity that excludes those who define themselves as ethnically Russian. Equally problematic, in this view, are efforts to force Russian speakers to speak Ukrainian instead.

This notion is critiqued by Taras Kuzio, who is a partisan of a very different notion of Ukrainian national identity. From Kuzio’s perspective, the danger is not that Russians will seek to secede from Ukraine, a tendency for which we see very little evidence, but rather that Russians will remain in Ukraine but continue to maintain distance from the Ukrainian national identity. Along with Alexander Motyl, Kuzio asserts that only a political community can reach the consensus and commitment to undertake the changes that Ukraine so desperately needs, and that such a community cannot succeed until damage done in the past is undone. The notion of a Ukrainian national identity, Kuzio fears, is undermined by the continued use of the Russian language in Ukraine, and more broadly by the prevalence of Russian literature, media, and culture in Ukraine, a subject discussed further by Mykola Riabchuk.

Kuzio disagrees with those who criticize as “illiberal” efforts to promote a single homogeneous national identity, asserting that critics are simply uninformed about the reality of national identity construction throughout history. Few states, Kuzio points out, are ethnically homogeneous, all have ethnic as well as civic components to their national identities, and all of the successful ones have at some time promoted a specific national identity through state policies. For Ukraine to do the same is normal, Kuzio argues, and historically justified. In short, then, Kuzio’s chapter provides a clear statement of the view that state promotion of a Ukrainian national identity is important to Ukraine’s future development.
THE HISTORICAL LEGACY

As Georgii Kasianov shows, there tends to be an assumption that Ukrainian national identity has some teleological end-point, and that only artificial interference has prevented that end-point from being attained. If Kuzio and others are to contend that affirmative action is justifiable to overcome the discrimination that Ukrainian language and culture suffered in the past, then it is essential to generate some notion of what situation would obtain had not that discrimination taken place. Hence the search for a historical Ukrainian "state of nature" from which to infer the goal of present policy. The highlighting of Russian and Soviet efforts to undermine Ukrainian language, as well as the search for the roots of the Ukrainian nationality, forge not only the justification for today's nation-building efforts, but also the content, as Jan Janmaat's chapter shows.

But the discussion of Tsarist and Soviet language and identity policy has a more fundamental connection to the problems of contemporary Ukraine. If we want to know something about how state-led efforts to shift linguistic and national identity work in practice, the Tsarist and Soviet efforts could provide valuable insight. Two conclusions seem possible based on a cursory examination, and both should be considered by today's nation builders. First, as the chapter by Riabchuk emphasizes, such policies were in part successful: by being able to provide certain incentives, Soviet authorities induced many to abandon the Ukrainian language and a Ukrainian identity. Moreover, through Tsarist and Soviet times, the stigmatization of Ukrainian as a peasant language has at least in part taken on a life of its own. In that sense, state efforts to nationalize worked (though to the disadvantage of Ukrainian).

What is equally striking, however, about Tsarist and Soviet nationalization efforts is how incompletely they succeeded given the resources put into them. From the time of the Ems Ukaz, and even earlier, the Tsarist government implemented extremely repressive policies to eradicate the Ukrainian language, and used autocratic methods to enforce those policies. Yet the Ukrainian language and national identity were not eradicated, and in some cases may have strengthened in response to the repression (an outcome that is not surprising according to the literature on protest and repression). Similarly, Stalinist policies after 1930 provided powerful economic incentives to speak Russian and physically eliminated a great number of Ukrainian speakers. While physical repression waned after Stalin's death, substantial economic incentives continued to prompt Ukrainian speakers to adopt Russian. But while many did, many others did not. It is worth asking how the Ukrainian state today, which is much weaker than its predecessors, much more democratic, much less able to repress, and much less able to provide economic incentives, is going to promote a shift potentially more substantial than what could be accomplished by two of the most repressive regimes in history.
WHICH VERSION OF UKRAINIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY SHOULD BE PROMOTED?

Apart from the question of how to promote a Ukrainian national identity is the question of what type of Ukrainian national identity the state should be promoting. This issue touches on the broader debate over the nature of identity patterns in Ukraine, which has received a great deal of attention. It also is connected to normative concerns concerning liberalism and historical justice.

To many authors and observers, it is obvious how the Ukrainian national identity should be defined. It should be defined in terms of Ukrainian ethnicity and language, and in distinction from Russian ethnicity and language. This is made clear in Kuzio’s chapter. An opposing view is that the Ukrainian language is not any more widely spoken than Russian in Ukraine, and that a substantial minority of Ukrainian citizens define themselves as ethnically Russian. From this perspective, some advocate a “hands off” policy that would tolerate Russian as well as Ukrainian. To the liberal argument in favor of toleration of ethnic and linguistic pluralism (and hence acceptance of the Russian language, perhaps even as an official language), two responses are made. First is the argument, discussed earlier, that a single identity is required for the state to thrive, and that construction of such an identity is the historical norm. Second is an argument concerning historical justice: For the Ukrainian state to now adopt a liberal policy that freezes in place the results of past Russification efforts is to reward past oppression and to ensure its success. On the contrary, it is argued, historical justice requires that the oppression be reversed.

At some point, arguments over the proper content of Ukrainian national identity become circular: Those who see Ukraine as a naturally mono-ethnic and mono-lingual society tend to support establishing such a Ukraine as state policy. Those who see Ukraine as naturally bi-ethnic and bilingual argue for that view. In the end, these are political questions, which can be studied by scholars but not in any way resolved by them. Scholarship can, however, investigate the empirical situation in Ukraine and offer some indications concerning what type of national identity might be successfully constructed in Ukraine (as well as what sort of national identity may be difficult or impossible to construct).

The second section of the book is in many respects the most significant, because it seeks to investigate several related issues on which assertions are common but empirically investigations are rare. Craig Weller’s chapter leads us to question the validity of a basic assumption in much of the literature—that ethnic difference will lead to conflict and undermine reform. Relying on data from three nationwide surveys, Weller finds that Ukrainians have remarkably low expectations of ethnic conflict. He finds low expectations of conflict even among groups one might expect to be most aggrieved, such as Russian speakers and residents of Crimea, on the one hand, and Ukrainian speakers from western Ukraine, on the other. Another finding perhaps indicates why: ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians in Ukraine do not perceive themselves to be very different from one another, and even when they do, they do not see this difference as a source of conflict. To the extent Weller’s findings are correct, we must wonder whether much of the concern over ethnic differences is overblown. This notion
is consistent with a casual observation of politics in Ukraine, which reveals many reasons more important than national identity to explain the utter lack of reform in the country.

The chapters by Stephen Shulman and Lowell Barrington both investigate national identity through the lens of foreign policy. Since much of the debate on Ukrainian national identity concerns connections with Russia—in identity as well in economy and politics—it makes sense that popular attitudes toward Russia would reflect perceptions of national identity.

Barrington’s concern above all is to sort out the three cleavages often identified in Ukraine: linguistic, ethnic, and regional cleavages. His research represents the progress that has been made since the early 1990s, when most researchers tended to assume that those three issues were simply different manifestations of a single cleavage. By showing that regional cleavages in Ukraine are more salient than ethnic or linguistic cleavages, Barrington’s research raises some difficult questions. First, it makes us wonder whether, in identifying the problems of Ukrainian national identity as problems of ethnicity and language, we have not missed the most important component of the problem. Perhaps, for example, the discussions of history should focus less on linguistic repression than on geographic division to identify the most powerful legacy of the past. More practically, if the barrier to a coherent Ukrainian national identity is regional rather than linguistic or ethnic, we must wonder whether government policies, both actual and suggested, to build a single identity by closing language and ethnicity gaps are misguided. If the problem is regional, how will language policies fix it?

For advocates of a Ukrainian national identity based on an ethnic and linguistic definition of Ukraine, and based on the distinctions between Ukrainians and Russians, Stephen Shulman’s chapter raises even more provocative questions. Shulman, also using survey data on attitudes toward relations with Russia, shows that there is a tension between the key components of the typical Ukrainian nation-building agenda. If the goal is to define Ukrainian national identity in such a way that it creates political consensus (on which reform can then be built), Shulman argues, then that identity should not be defined in a way that emphasizes the distinction between Ukrainians and Russians or tends to exclude ethnic Russians and Russophones. Instead, Shulman finds that the easiest national identity to establish, given the current distribution of attitudes, would be an “East Slavic” identity focused on the closeness rather than the distinctiveness of Ukrainians and Russians. Rather than seeing national identity as something that must overcome historical injustices, Shulman takes the past as given, and asks where consensus today can most easily be built. If Shulman is correct, those who believe both that Ukraine needs a cohesive national identity and that this identity should emphasize the differences between Ukraine and Russia may face agonizing tradeoffs, for Shulman’s research implies that an effort to establish a Western-oriented national identity will be less likely to succeed than one aimed at an East Slavic identity.
NATION BUILDING IN PRACTICE

If much of the debate concerning the promotion of Ukrainian national identity has occurred in the abstract, these chapters investigate specific efforts to advance Ukrainian national identity and evaluate the question of what sort of identity will be easiest to build. Advocates of “Ukrainianization” or “affirmative action” for the Ukrainian language and of a particular “Ukrainian national historiography” seem to take it for granted that such efforts will succeed over time. Similarly, opponents of such plans seem to think that these efforts will inevitably lead to conflict. Both of these propositions should be subjected to empirical scrutiny rather than assumed, and this section of the book takes up that task.

Andrew Fesiak’s chapter on nation building in the military and Jan Janmaat’s chapter on textbook changes get to the heart of the matter. The programs to increase Ukrainian national consciousness in the military, which Fesiak evaluates, represent one type of approach to nationalization: given a relatively captive audience, focused education efforts are used to readjust attitudes and even identities of the individuals involved. Janmaat investigates the longer-term route to increasing national identity, the broad inculcation of a view of Ukrainian history that emphasizes the deep historical roots of the Ukrainian nation and the distinctness of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples. Interestingly, both studies find mixed results. Fesiak finds that in many instances the military program has increased tensions rather than reducing them, supplying some credence to the “backlash” hypothesis advanced by opponents of Ukrainianization. Similarly, Janmaat shows how difficult it is to build a history curriculum that promotes Ukrainian nationhood and statehood without presenting Russia as an “other,” and hence alienating precisely that portion of the Ukrainian citizenry that the program seeks to engage. These two issue studies are not necessarily definitive, but they highlight the difficulties involved in state-led programs to promote national identity in Ukraine.

SUMMARY

In different ways, all of these chapters weigh in on crucial questions concerning the role of the state in promoting Ukrainian national identity. Some assert both the need for state-led national identity development and the practicality. Others question one or another of those suppositions. Still others accept the idea in theory, but question whether the particular national identity being promoted by the Ukrainian state will find a base of support in society broad enough to ensure the program’s success. By raising these questions, and by seeking to answer them, these chapters seek to take a substantial step forward in the study of national identity in post-Soviet Ukraine. To this point, empirical work has focused largely on identifying and characterizing public attitudes on Ukrainian national identity. The potential for state policies to influence those attitudes has been widely suggested but not thoroughly investigated. These questions, however, are of vital importance both for the future of Ukraine and for scholars’ understanding of the process of nation building. This volume aims to begin that crucial discussion.
NOTES


The Nation-Building Project in Ukraine and Identity: Toward a Consensus

Taras Kuzio

This chapter has two arguments. First, the promotion of a Ukrainian national identity through a nation-building project is necessary, and normal and can be undertaken in a liberal manner without conflict. Treatment of national identity and the nation-building project in Ukraine is often inconsistent, and what is often described negatively in Ukraine ("nationalizing state") can be defined in a positive manner or sidestepped elsewhere ("nation building"). Second, the four components of the nation-building project are a unitary state, identity, language, and historiography. I critically engage the published literature on contemporary Ukraine in each of these four areas by placing the discussion within a theoretical and comparative perspective.

The chapter is divided into two sections. An outline of the nation-building project and its four areas are placed within the first section of the chapter. The second section outlines five areas where elite consensus has emerged with regard to Ukraine's nation-building project. These are state and institution building, borders and territorial integrity, federalism and regionalism, pragmatic state nationalism, national integration and foreign policy. Most other scholars in this field have tended to stress disunity, not consensus. In contrast, this chapter argues that in the second half of the 1990s Ukrainian elites reached a consensus on the three areas of the nation-building project outlined in the first section of the chapter.

THE NATION-BUILDING PROJECT

Nation building in Ukraine has to overcome over two centuries of colonial rule. Nation and state building are usually synonymous processes: "It might be argued that state building and nation-building can be separated only conceptually but that both processes have gone and are going hand in hand." These two factors should be treated as distinct processes while recognizing that they are also interlinked through the armed forces and the media, historical myths and
symbols, national anthems and folk culture. The state may create institutions, such as a Ministry of Education, but the curricula it will direct schools and higher education to teach will be reflected in the nation-building priorities of the state leadership.

The two processes of state and nation building are going hand in hand (together with democratization and marketization) in Ukraine. Yet, simultaneous state and nation building is a difficult task for the following reasons:

First, Ukraine inherited a "quasi-state" from the former USSR. This state and the institutions it incorporated were insufficient to run a modern state. Ukraine's inheritance of a quasi state gave it a better launching pad for state and nation building than in 1917 but by the late 1990s, nearly a decade after the USSR disintegrated, Ukraine is still a "weak state" and exhibits elements of immature stateness.

Second, postcolonial states, such as Ukraine, did not inherit modern nations. As Robert Jackson pointed out in relation to former Western colonies, "very few new states are 'nations' either by long history or common ethnicity or successful constitutional integration." Some scholars, using the model of Rogers Brubaker (see later), have been reluctant to place Ukraine's post-Soviet transition within a postcolonial framework. One can argue that such a framework would make affirmative action a perfectly natural and just course of events.

Third, Ukraine did not inherit a uniform level of national consciousness throughout its territory. Due to the different history of Western Ukraine, a modern nation was allowed to develop in the Austrian era prior to 1918, a factor which was helped along from 1918 to the 1950s by war and conflict with "others" (Poles, Hungarians, Romanians, and Soviets). In Eastern and Southern Ukraine, on the other hand, modern nation building was suppressed by the state on two occasions, first in the late Tsarist era and again in the 1930s. A modern Ukrainian national consciousness does not therefore exist in Eastern and Southern Ukraine.

Nation building in post-Soviet Ukraine therefore must undertake two processes. First, nation building must occur in areas where this had previously not been allowed (Eastern and Southern Ukraine). Second, an overarching political community must be developed that unites all of the inhabitants within independent Ukraine. Scholars remain divided over whether such a political community is emerging in Ukraine. Nation building has never been evenly undertaken (as it is not in Ukraine). Thus, "different sectors of the polity at any one time are in different stages of the passage." The media, education system, and armed forces are important vehicles for the inculcation of mass values during this process (see the chapters by Jan Janmaat and Andrew Fesiak). The role and place of women in the nation-building project are usually ignored, but nation builders, while they support national and human rights, are not always sensitive to the liberation of women from traditional roles and duties.

Nation building in Ukraine is taking place unevenly at three levels:

- **Micro level**: In regions where national consciousness is low (e.g., Eastern and Southern Ukraine) the revival of Ukrainian identity, culture, and language is an uneven
process that seeks to partly overcome the colonial legacy. As in most postcolonial states (e.g., Ireland), it is unlikely to completely remove this legacy.

- **Macro level**: A new Ukrainian political community is being created that exhibits loyalty to the state’s borders, institutions, constitution, political system, and other citizens within the civic nation. Such an overarching community identity can coexist with both regional differences and polyethnic rights in the private sphere.

- **International level**: Ukraine is both accepted as an independent state (all of Ukraine’s borders were legally codified by 1999) and regarded as different to “others” (principally Russia). A new Ukrainian national identity on this level competes with allegiances in some regions (e.g., the Donbas and Crimea) to both the East Slavic and Soviet cultural-political spaces (see the chapter by Stephen Shulman).

### Unitary State

I have argued elsewhere that the debate in Ukraine on federalism has been a “non-debate” and support for it has been again highly exaggerated by Western scholars. The majority of Ukraine’s elites reject both “extremes”—federalism (favored by some sections of the left) or a unitary state (favored by nationalists)—as not suited to Ukraine’s period of transition. Instead, they favor what is enshrined in the constitution (for example, in article 140): a devolved unitary state that lies midway between these unitary and federal proposals. This centrist policy acknowledges Ukraine’s inherited regional diversity while, at the same time, rejecting a federal option which would simply freeze it and prevent state and nation building to remove some (but not all) of the colonial legacy. During the Kravchuk era the most radical supporter of federalism was the Labor Party, which had strong links to what were termed the Red Directors based in Donetsk.”

Ukrainian scholars and officials see the introduction of federalism when the state and civic nation are still weak as preventing the consolidation that Ukrainian leaders proclaim as a goal. A 1993 study by the influential National Institute of Strategic Studies declared that federalism “is the way to ruin of Ukrainian statehood.” The study linked those in favor of federalism to the left who desire a return to the totalitarian past and an end to Ukrainian statehood. In other studies it is negatively assessed as likely to lead to the growth of regional clans, as premature and as leading to the creation of “regionocracies.”

The former mayor of Kharkiv, Yevgeny Kushnariov, who went on to become head of the Presidential Administration in 1997–1999, did not support any autonomous status for Slobidska Ukraine, the old name for the Kharkiv region, or a federal Ukraine.

A close correlation of views has emerged between those within Ukraine and Western scholars. Such as Andrew Wilson and Gwendolyn Sasse, who seek to define federalism in Ukraine as a liberal solution to Ukraine’s regionalism by preventing “nationalizing policies.” This would freeze the inherited postcolonial status quo, as the de jure recognition of the existence of the specific ethnolinguistic, economic, and cultural nature of the territory of Ukraine.” Vladimir Grynev, leader of the Russophile Inter-Regional Bloc of Reforms party, does not
conceal that his support for federalism is to prevent the creation of "any kind of state ideology," including an overarching national identity. In other words, federalism would freeze Ukraine's inherited postcolonial situation.\textsuperscript{17}

Federalism, in Sasse's view, "is de facto inscribed in Ukraine's regional diversity" and the Crimean autonomous region "perforates" the unitary state. Although Ukraine lacks federal structures, this "does not preclude the existence of a 'federalized society', which is the basis of every regionalism and expresses itself through different economic, political, social, cultural, religious, national or historical interests and institutions." Ukraine is not unique in possessing a unitary state which is "perforated." France, the archetypal unitary nation-state, has granted Corsica a degree of autonomy in a bid to thwart its separatist movement.

However, there is little evidence indicating that federalism has widespread support in Ukraine.\textsuperscript{19} In a February 2000 poll by SOCIS-Gallup, the number of supporters of a bicameral parliament (which, because its members would be the governors of regions, is seen as a step toward federalism) proved to be only 39% with 25% resolutely against and a large number (34%) who could not answer the question. Those opposed to a bicameral parliament believed that it would lead to the growth of separatism and a weakening of central government.\textsuperscript{20} On the eve of the 16 April 2000 referendum two polls gave figures of only 45% and 39% in favor of a bicameral Rada.\textsuperscript{21} The high support of 82% allegedly given to this question in the 16 April 2000 referendum cannot be portrayed as conclusive support for bicameralism due to highly biased media coverage and strong suspicion of ballot rigging.

In most studies of interethnic questions in contemporary Ukraine the focus has been on ethnic Russians. Few studies have dealt with smaller minorities, such as Poles, Romanians, and Hungarians. Jewish-Ukrainian relations have also been dealt with by only a small number of studies, perhaps because of the rare occurrence of anti-Semitism and the small number of Jews remaining in Ukraine.\textsuperscript{22}

Ukraine's policies, stability, and good interethnic relations have been noted by scholars and government officials alike but few have sought to analyze why predictions of conflict have not materialized (see the chapter by Craig Weller).\textsuperscript{23} This is despite the fact that from 1991 to 1995 Western scholarly and journalistic studies argued that Ukraine was likely to face widespread interethnic conflict up to, and including, civil war and separatism.\textsuperscript{24}

Yet, the lack of interethnic discord was reflected in a poll conducted by SOCIS-Gallup and the Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences, which asked, "Are there in Ukraine nationalities toward whom you harbor antipathy or negative feelings?" Fifty-one percent replied that there were none and another 31% were apathetic toward the entire question. Only 15% admitted that there were such nationalities (3% could not answer).\textsuperscript{25}

As is noted later in this chapter, the strategic outlines of the nationality policies of the Kravchuk era have been continued without any negative impact upon Ukraine's stability or interethnic relations. On the contrary, ethnic relations have remained stable, are good, and are improving. In polls between 1994 and 1999 conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, interethnic relations
were not seen as a problem by those polled (see Table 2.1). SOCIS-Gallup also found that there was little public perception of discrimination against Russians in Ukraine that, if it existed, could be the basis for poor interethnic relations (see Table 2.2).

Table 2.1  
Which of the Ukrainian Problems Concerns You Most (Interethnic Relations)? (In percentages)

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Table 2.2  
Have You Witnessed Discrimination against Russians? (In percentages)

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Several questions about interethnic relations in Ukraine arise, given the view that federalism is necessary to avert conflict:

- Despite all the predictions by scholars, policy makers, and journalists, interethnic conflict has not occurred. Why has Ukraine not proved to be fertile ground for ethnic strife?
- Why has mobilization along ethnic lines not taken place among either Russians or Ukrainians?26
- Why did Crimean separatism collapse so quickly in early 1995? Was Crimean separatism ever that powerful a force?27
- What is the role of the Crimean Tatars in the Crimean conflict?28
- Why did separatism only occur in Crimea?
- Why did Ukraine’s national democratic and national communist leaders promote internationally acclaimed nationality policies?
• To what degree can those defined as ethnic Russians in the 1989 Soviet census be regarded as such?^{29}

Identity

All civic states require the creation of a public (societal) culture or an overarching national identity to which all citizens are expected to pay homage, at least in the public sphere. This societal-public culture or national identity draws on the political culture of the dominant ethnic group and its symbols, historiography, myths, ceremonies, language, and folk culture. When a state becomes an independent entity, such an overarching identity is usually absent; hence, the necessity of undertaking nation building to forge a societal culture that will seek to provide the ethnocultural solidarity that all civic states need. This will define the “we” in contrast to “others.”^{30}

Pure civic states, where citizens would only pay patriotic homage to institutions, the rule of law, the constitution, and the territory exist only in theory. In practice, pure civic states are insufficient to create the solidity that liberal democracies require for societal trust. The ethnocultural core of the state and the national identity that is developed from it give the state the depth that otherwise would be lacking. Such an identity, or in Miller’s words “nationality,” does not have to be tantamount to cultural homogenization. Nevertheless, a pluralistic state that tolerates different cultures and languages in the private sphere and respects cultural groups would still require the creation of an overarching identity that provides solidarity (e.g., multicultural policies in Canada and Australia take place alongside the promotion of overarching Canadian and Australian identities within the public domain).

National identity refers then to a variety of factors which unite a population within a given territory. These factors are similar to those discussed earlier when defining nations and include:

• a sense of a political community
• common institutions
• a single code of rights and duties
• a united economy
• a demarcated bounded space with which the citizens feel they belong (the “homeland”)
• common mass public culture
• shared historical memory and common ancestry
• shared religion
• common language^{31}

These nine elements of national identity include both state (e.g., common institutions, legislation) and national factors, thereby reflecting how liberal democracies are composed of both civic and ethnocultural attributes. The factors that we would describe as part of the state, such as the judiciary, a demarcated boundary, and institutions, can be established relatively quickly (although their
public acceptance, functional efficiency, and ability to implement policies can take far longer). Many of these state functions were established in Ukraine during the 1990s. By the end of the decade Ukraine had two constitutions (Ukrainian and Crimean), recognized borders, and emerging institutions. Nevertheless, Ukraine still remains a “weak state,” and state and institution building are an ongoing process.32

Language

Many Western scholars are especially critical of the demands of nationalists in Ukraine to prioritize its “core, indigenous peoples” (ethnic Ukrainians). In their view, national democrats hold contradictory policies whereby they back civic liberalism as well as ethnic supremacy. However, nation and state building in Europe has always prioritized the “core” culture and language and hence the ethnic supremacy of the core ethnic group. There are no pure civic states because all inclusive liberal democracies exhibit a mixture of both civic and ethnic elements. Western Europe’s civic nations are, at the same time, based on the cultures, traditions, and languages of the dominant, core ethnic group. The problem that Western scholars fail to grapple with in dividing nationalism into civic (liberal) and ethnic (illiberal) varieties is that historically both have sought to homogenize internally and differentiate their societies externally during their nation- and state-building projects.

Critics of the official recognition of a core, titular nation (ethnic Ukrainians) and the legal codification of only one state language (Ukrainian) idealize the civic West through a “mixture of self-congratulation and wishful thinking.” The Western-civic/ Eastern-ethnic dichotomy “itself reflects a considerable dose of ethnocentrism”33 Liberal democracies have been realized only within national communities, with a shared culture and memories and where civil society and the civic nation are coterminal. Scholars who view Ukraine as a “nationalizing state” have pointed to Western “civicness” as a better non-nationalizing alternative without understanding the very essence of liberal democratic “civic states,” which are themselves nationalizing.

As a supporter of the inherited status quo and in opposition to affirmative action, Wilson consciously does not use the term Russification in his study. Use of Russification, which in his view is a loaded term, “assumes loyalty to Ukrainian language and culture which may not have existed. Many Russophone Ukrainians have indeed been deprived of access to their native language and culture; others have always existed in a Russophone environment.” Therefore, the term Russification was avoided by Wilson, “because it implies a prior loyalty to Ukrainian language and culture which may not necessarily have existed.”34

Whether one uses the term Russification or not, it is nevertheless beyond a shadow of a doubt that both the Tsarist Russian and Soviet regimes have used homogenizing policies that favored the Russian language. During the Tsarist era Ukrainians and Belarusians were not treated as separate ethnic groups from “Great Russians.” Homogenizing policies in these two territories were therefore perceived by the majority of Russian political parties as the elevation of provincial, backward peoples to the higher language and culture of what was the core
Great Russian ethnic group within the Rus'kij (Russian) nation. In this manner, Ukrainians and Belarusians were merely perceived analogously to Bretons or Alsatians who should be homogenized in favor of the core French national identity and language.

It is somewhat inconsistent for Western scholars to argue against affirmative action in favor of Ukrainian language and culture while promoting the same policies as liberals in Western democracies or other postcolonial or post-apartheid states (e.g., South Africa). Russification was a policy consciously carried out by the Soviet authorities, particularly during the Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev eras, following the near total annihilation of the Ukrainian intelligentsia in the 1930s and 1940s. The policy of Russification by the Soviet authorities affected the Belarusians and Ukrainians to a degree greater than other non-Russians of the former USSR. If Ukrainians and Belarusians could be assimilated into Russians this would accomplish two factors. First, Russians would maintain their majority in the USSR in the face of the rising Muslim populations. Second, the three eastern Slavic peoples would form the core of the emerging Soviet nation around which the non-Slavs would be expected to coalesce.

Given that undermining the Ukrainian language was a key part of efforts to eradicate Ukrainian national identity, it makes sense that affirmative action in favor of Ukrainian language and culture would be therefore a key policy for any Ukrainian leadership in an independent state committed to building a state-nation.

Historiography

Historiography, myths, and legends have long been recognized as important to nation building. As Anthony Smith argues, “The modern nation, to become truly a ‘nation’, requires the unifying myths, symbols and memories of pre-modern ethnie.” Civic states are founded on ethnocultural core(s) which include national histories. Anthropologists are more willing than historians or political scientists to point out “that history is not a product of the past but a response to requirements of the present.” Anthropologists, such as Catherine Wanner, see the use of history and myths as a normal process common to all civic states.

Scholars working on these themes in Ukraine have often treated them as a peculiar, unnecessary phenomenon which have only been introduced because of the intransigence of Ukrainophone “nationalists.” Three problems arise in this question. First, this argument fails to explain why history and myths are common to all civic states. As the Council of Europe has complained, “virtually all political systems have used history for their own ends and have imposed both their version of historical facts and their defense of the good and bad figures of history.” An objective history may be what historians should strive to write but, in reality, objective history is as much a myth as states being wholly civic. Second, the argument against “nationalist historiography” ignores the continuity in the introduction of a national history, myths and legends between the Kravchuk and Kuchma eras. Third, opposition to the introduction of such a his-
tory comes not from a linguistic group (i.e., Russophones) but from an ideologi-
cal perspective (i.e., communists) who see it as undermining Soviet myths and
identity (which, of course, it is meant to do).

History and myth making is important to state-nation builders for three
reasons. First, regime change usually involves some "form of confrontation with
national history." This process is inevitably painful because not only the ancien
regime is rejected but also its "national experience" (i.e., Soviet identity). Tsar-
ist nationality policies denied that Ukrainians constituted a separate ethnic
group; they were merely a Little Russian regional group of Russians. The entire
Ukrainian past was usurped by Great Russians. Soviet nationality policies also
monopolized the past on behalf of Russians (i.e., the Kyiv Rus' legacy was
transferred to Muscovy and then Russia). Ukrainians were portrayed as a nation
that came into existence by chance (i.e., due to the Tatars, Lithuanians, and
Poles having broken up "Russian" unity); hence, their only goal was to reunit
with Russians at the first available opportunity. In both Tsarist and Soviet histo-
riography Ukrainians had no future (and little of a usable past). As Kolsto and
Jønnaast have concluded, a Russophile historiography could not be continued in
an independent state because such states always attempt to trace their historical
roots as far back as possible in history in order to provide a basis for their le-
gitimation in the present and future. The revival of national historiography in
Ukraine therefore plays a central role in debunking these Tsarist and Soviet na-
tionality policies which denied Ukrainians a past, present, or future.

Second, it is impossible, David Miller believes, for an overarching national
identity to be established without some recourse to myth making. The process
of forgetting is as important as that of remembering. Liberal democracies tradition-
ally homogenized their citizens around shared values, symbols, myths, and
ideas which were incorporated into the public culture of the state. It is through
golden ages, symbols, ceremonies, and myths that nations are created and cele-
brated. During this process of deconstructing the old myths and historiography
and reconstructing new ones, increased pride in one's identity among the majority
ethnic group (i.e., the titular nation) may be offset by anguish among national
minorities.

Third, historians and politicians in all states, including Ukraine, "have taken
great pains to demonstrate that their nations are really very old, although they
were usually created in the nineteenth century." Politicians, literati, academics,
and journalists become archaeologists in the quest to legitimize their state by
showing that they have a long history of struggle and statehood and to prove that
their territory was always controlled by their ethnic (i.e., the right of first settle-
ment). From the nineteenth century archaeologists and nation builders have
proved to be uneasy allies who both had an interest in tracing their country's
history, "back into the mists of the prehistoric past."

In the Ukrainian case this aspect of history making is important in two ways.
The chapter by Georgii Kasianov divides Ukrainian historians into two groups,
one which he defines as primordialists because they seek to trace Ukrainians as
an ethnie or nation as far back as possible into the premodern era. These histori-
ans claim that Ukrainians have always held title to the lands located within their
boundaries. Second, Ukrainian history making allows them to assert themselves as an “old nation” vis-à-vis Russians, whom Tsarist and Soviet nationality policies had depicted as the “elder brother” of the eastern Slavs. Who “owns” the medieval state of Kyiv Rus’ is therefore crucial in defining the national identity of Ukrainians and Russians. Consequently, the Ukrainian question plays a vitally important defining role in Russian national identity.

ELITE CONSENSUS AND THE NATION-BUILDING PROJECT

The majority of scholars have stressed problems and difficulties within Ukraine’s state-nation-building project. Undoubtedly, this approach has merits because it has highlighted many of the fundamental legacies that Ukraine has to overcome in building a coherent, consolidated state-nation. Nevertheless, it largely ignores the growing consensus among Ukraine’s elites about the parameters of the state-nation-building project.

This section points to five areas where the Ukrainian elites have reached a consensus within nation building. These five areas include: state and institution building, borders and territorial integrity, federalism and regionalism, civic state nationalism, and national integration. Consensus at the mass level is still far from secured, and this section of this chapter therefore only focuses on consensus at the elite level.

Some scholars have written of such a consensus emerging from Ukraine’s Tsarist and Soviet legacies that force it to adopt a nation-building strategy that lies between the two extremes of the homogenizing French nation-state model of Latvia and Estonia, on the one hand, and the Russian nationalizing state of Belarus, on the other. Such a middle path is the result of the strength of national consciousness (which prevents Ukraine from becoming another Belarus) and linguistic divisions within Ukraine’s titular nation (which prevent it from becoming Latvia or Estonia). Scholars have dubbed this the Ukrainian consociational nation-building model or a Creole amalgam of Ukrainophone-Russophone identities (see the chapter by Mykola Riabchuk in this volume). Riabchuk defines this Creole mishanyna as follows:

In political terms, it is quite “Ukrainian,” that is, quite supportive of state independence, territorial integrity, and many historical myths and symbols, shared with Ukrainophones. In cultural and linguistic terms, though, it is rather “Russian” in nature, that is, unsympathetic to Ukrainophones . . . and strongly biased against Ukrainian culture and language. Unlike “true” Russian nationalists, they never completely deny Ukrainian culture and language. Their approach is rather “archaeological” they recognize that the Ukrainian language is beautiful but it has disappeared and will never be revived.

Riabchuk may be too pessimistic about the cultural component of the emerging Ukrainian state-nation. Without an ethnocultural component the Ukrainian state would be hard pressed to define itself as different from Russia; after all, this is precisely why Belarus is finding it difficult to maintain itself as an independent state. As Weiner points out, in postcolonial states the norm is to adopt a
mixture of policies (i.e., mishanyna?) which balance uniformity with compromise.54

Although Riabchuk is correct to argue that Ukraine's Creolic elites prefer elements of a cultural (but certainly not economic!) laissez-faire, this is not tantamount to freezing the inherited postcolonial status quo. As this chapter points out, a state-nation-building project is underway in Ukraine that is disturbing the inherited status quo. Because it cannot go as fast as the cultural intelligentsia would like does not mean that it is not progressing. This is precisely why the state-nation-building project is still criticized by those who do advocate the preservation of the status quo (e.g., communists and cosmopolitan liberals, such as the Inter-Regional Bloc of Reforms). Therefore, the fact that Ukraine's state-nation-building project is a Creolic compromise borne out of its inherited postcolonial legacy does not imply that the project preserves the status quo.55

We now turn to the five elements of this state-nation-building project where elite consensus has emerged.

1. **State Building:** All political forces within Ukraine support state and institution building. Even Unionist parties, such as the communists and the progressive socialists, would not accept the transformation of Ukraine into a gubernia within the Russian Federation. Ironically, their wish to support both sovereignty and a new union is similar to the confederation of Soviet sovereign states that national communists in Ukraine supported prior to 24 August 1991. During the 1990s Unionist forces had therefore evolved from imperial to the national (sovereign) communism of pre-August 1991 national communists. This evolution of Unionist political parties toward pre-August 1991 national communism is likely to continue in the new millennium as the possibility of reviving the USSR over time becomes increasingly unrealistic.

2. **Borders and Territorial Integrity:** Votes in the Rada in response to either territorial claims on the Crimea or against separatist tendencies by Crimea leaders have always been passed by more than two thirds of deputies (i.e., a constitutional majority). Such a majority consensus is rare in Ukrainian parliamentary politics. Ukraine's leaders (i.e., Russophone Kuchma as much as Ukrainophone Kravchuk) have always adopted a tough, nonviolent line on the Crimea through the use of economic, judicial, military, and political pressure. In Eastern Ukraine, separatism has not manifested itself in any manner whatsoever (including in elections) and Russian nationalists have been unable to find fertile ground for support in Ukraine. In the Crimea, where separatism existed for a brief period, it rapidly disintegrated after 1995 because Russian ethnic nationalism is a "minority faith" in Ukraine. The largest party on the peninsula, the communists, always backed Ukraine's territorial integrity and were instrumental in adopting the nonseparatist Crimean constitution in October 1998 (ratified by the Rada in December). After the adoption of the June 1996 Ukrainian constitution, Crimean regional parties had to re-register either as all-Ukrainian ones or as regional branches of existing Ukrainian parties. This undercut them and forced formerly separatist parties to defend Russian speakers and Unionist, pan-eastern Slavic policies, but not separatism (for example, the Russia Bloc became the Union party). Support for separatism was further undercut after the Russian executive recognized Ukraine's borders in May 1997, a recognition ratified by the lower and upper houses of the Russian parliament in December 1998 and February 1999, respectively.
3. Federalism and Regionalism: Ukraine’s elites—including those on the left—hold a broad consensus against federalism, because it would prevent national consolidation and policy implementation by the center in the regions. Kuchma’s backing for a bicameral Rada is not tantamount to backing federalism, because it would not actually devolve power from Kyiv. Poland, Ireland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom all have bicameral parliaments but are not federalist. During the discussion over a new constitution between 1994 and 1996 center-right and extreme right-wing parties also backed a bicameral parliament with regional decentralization. At the same time, Ukraine’s elites also recognize Ukraine’s regional diversity and the reality of Crimean autonomy. Elite consensus therefore supports the current centrist policy of rejecting both federalism and a unitary state in favor of a decentralized unitary state.

4. Civic Nationalism: Ukrainian independence was achieved through a combination of pressure from the bottom up by national democrats and top down by national communists. Since 1992 civic nationalism has evolved into a widespread phenomenon throughout Ukraine’s elites. This has occurred through the spread of the national idea from national democrats to centrists (where many of the former national communists, such as Kravchuk and Kuchma, ended up) and then gradually into the moderate left (for example, the Socialists) political spectrum. The defeat of Kravchuk in 1994 was not therefore a defeat for nationalism because Kravchuk and Kuchma have both been state or civic nationalists. State civic nationalist ideology is common to the ruling elites of all civic states, including Ukraine.

5. Nation building and Consolidation: This is the most difficult area for Ukraine’s elites to have reached a consensus as it touches upon how the national idea is to be defined and what is being built in Ukraine. Under Kuchma, the nation-building project was not halted—as it was under President Alyaksandr Lukashenka in Belarus after 1994. The 1996 constitution and 1997 national security doctrine continued to outline nation building as a state objective. The 1996 Ukrainian and 1998 Crimean constitutions also signaled a watershed of no going back to the USSR; something symbolically confirmed when Soviet passports became invalid in January 1998. Ukraine’s nation building project seeks to strike a balance between the Baltic nation-building and Belarusian nation-rejecting paths. This centrist path between two polar opposite projects thereby leads to dissatisfaction on the part of both national democrats (who support a faster state-nation-building project) and pro-Russian forces, such as the Inter-Regional Bloc of Reforms (who support the maintenance of the inherited postcolonial status quo). The more abrasive nationality policies of the Kravchuk era were “pragmatized” (i.e., moderated) in the Kuchma era because Russophone Ukrainians would not accept a radical and swift nation-building project. Ukraine’s national symbols have not been challenged by any political forces, except the extreme left.

The language question did not influence the outcome of either the 1998 parliamentary or 1999 presidential elections. There is declining support for Russian to become a second state language (with virtually no support, again except on the extreme left, for Russians to be a second titular nation). The Russian language has been removed from education and public life in Western Ukraine, where nationality policies resemble those implemented in the Baltic states. Elsewhere in Ukraine it is unlikely that the Russian language will become “foreign.” Ukrainianization of the education system has continued under Kuchma
and has spread to most regions, except the Donbas and the Crimea. Between the 1990–1991 and 1997–1998 school years the proportion of school children instructed in Ukrainian rose from 47.9 to 62.8%. Meanwhile, the proportion of pupils instructed in Russian declined from 51.4 to 31.7%. In pre-schools, 25.3% of children are taught in Russian and in higher education 35% of students are taught in Russian. In higher education the proportion of students instructed in Ukrainian rose from 36.8% (1992–1993) to 51.2% (1995–1996). The Ukrainian authorities continue to uphold the view that the proportion of pupils educated in a language should approximate the proportion of the corresponding ethnic group within the population. In December 1999 the Constitutional Court issued a ruling that explained the language provisions of the 1996 constitution (such as state administrators using Ukrainian) as applying throughout Ukrainian territory. In January 2000 the Ukrainian Presidential Council on Language Policy Issues approved a government program, “On Additional Measures to Expand the Use of Ukrainian as the State Language,” which came into force in a government program in June of that year. It called for all officials to be checked for their Ukrainian language proficiency, for the de-Russification of the sports and cultural spheres, and for the use of taxation to regulate the import of publications. The following month Ivan Drach, the well-known former head of Rukh and head of the Congress of Ukrainian Intellectuals, was appointed chairman of the State Committee on Information Policy, Television, and Radio. The new language program would be monitored throughout the regions in order to halt “the hindering and localizing of the process of promoting the state status of Ukrainian.”

Ukrainian elites agree that an independent state needs a state language as an attribute of identity, pointing to Belarus as an example of a country that lost its independence because of a weak national consciousness. Nevertheless, as in all postcolonial states, Ukraine will never be able to completely remove the colonial linguistic legacy of Russification and bilingualism. Outside Western Ukraine use and acceptance of the Ukrainian language will grow, but it will not remove Russian from Eastern and Southern Ukraine (just as English was never removed from Ireland). Whereas the Russian language has lost out in Western Ukraine to Ukrainian the Ukrainian-Russian language contest over public and private space will continue in the remainder of the country.

Despite concerns by some that a “nationalist historiography” (i.e., the Mykhailo Hrushevskyi schema) would not be accepted by Russophones, the chapter by Jan Janmaat shows to what extent the same historiography is taught throughout Ukraine’s education system. Meanwhile, Georgii Kaskanov outlines the weak influence of Russophile historiography on contemporary Ukrainian national history making.

There is also consensus on the provision of polyethnic rights and inclusive citizenship, which are backed by all political parties except the extreme right. Support for polyethnic rights by national democrats makes them more liberal (and not nationalist) than standard center-right parties in liberal democracies who usually argue that rights should be provided on an individual—not a group—basis. National democrats always backed the national revival of minori-
ties. The problem in this field has always rested not on national minorities as such, but on the Russian question. Should Russians be treated as a national minority (in the manner, for example, of Poles or Jews), or are they a second titular ethnic group? The Russian question is made all the more difficult by the fact that not all the 12 million “ethnic Russians” from the 1989 Soviet census are really “Russians.” Upward of half of them are from mixed marriages and may re-identify themselves as “Ukrainian” (Ukrainian internal and foreign passports do not have an ethnic entry, unlike their Soviet counterparts).

CONCLUSION

The first section of this chapter argued that the Ukrainian nation-building project is an important aspect of its post-Soviet transition and that when placed within a theoretical or comparative perspective it is a normal process. This section discussed four aspects of the nation-building project—a unitary state, identity, language and historiography.

The second section argues that during the Kuchma era of the second half of the 1990s Ukraine’s elites established a consensus on state-nation building and thereby stabilized the domestic political environment. This consensus in state-nation building in five strategically important areas—state and institution building, borders and territorial integrity, federalism and regionalism, civic state nationalism, and national integration—strengthened after Ukraine entered the new millennium. In Kuchma’s inauguration speech he defined his defeat of the communist candidate in the second round of the November 1999 presidential elections as a second referendum on Ukrainian independence. In the new millennium state-nation building will continue to play a vitally important role in Ukraine’s quadruple transition from Soviet rule to a modern state-nation.

NOTES


11. See the views of the influential oligarch close to President Kuchma in O. M. Volkov, *Poliytchna Ideolohiya* (Kyiv: Stylos, 1999), p. 129.


19. Victor Chudowsky points out that “by the time of the Constitutional vote in 1996, Ukrainian federalism was a dead issue, as most elites seemed to agree that a strong central government was necessary to carry out reforms and maintain control over areas such as Crimea.” See his *Ukrainian Foreign Policy in the Kuchma Era*, Ph.D. diss. University of Connecticut, 1998, chap. 6.


24. Wilson’s volume, published in 1997, also argued that the continuation of nationalizing policies would lead to conflict between Ukrainophones and Russophones. See Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism*.


34. Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, pp. 214, 256.


42. See Jan G. Janmaat, *Nation-Building in Post-Soviet Ukraine: Educational Policy and the Response of the Russian-Speaking Population* (Amsterdam: Netherlands Geo-


44. Miller, On Nationality.


47. Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism, p. 72.


50. This is based on a talk presented by the author entitled "Nation and State Building in Ukraine: Progress and the Emerging Consensus," given at the Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington DC, 9 November 1999.


52. See Arunas Juska, "Ethno-political transformation in the states of the former USSR," Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 22, no. 3 (May 1999), pp. 524–553; and Mykola Riabchuk, "Queen Without a Court: On the Current state of Ukrainian Culture," unpublished paper in the possession of the author; and "Behind the Talks on 'Ukrainianization': Laissez Faire or Affirmative Action?" in Kis and Makaryk, eds., Towards a New Ukraine II, pp. 135–142.

53. Riabchuk, "Behind the Talks on 'Ukrainianization,' " p. 139.


55. Ibid., p. 140.

56. The Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN) proposed a draft constitution in late 1994 prepared by its experts. The draft constitution envisaged Ukraine as a presidential-parliamentary republic where the president was to have been head of the executive
with the right to dissolve parliament. The Supreme Council would have become the National Assembly elected on a proportional system and divided into two houses (Upper Senate and Lower House of Representatives). The current territorial system would have been transformed into seventy-five "lands" which would obtain wide self-government. See Shliakh Peremohy, 22 October 1994. Clearly, KUN did not regard a bicameral parliament as introducing federalism, which nationalist groups, such as KUN, traditionally abhor.

57. By their very nature, national communists were pragmatists as they deserted communism, leaving it in the hands of ideological, imperial communists. Hence, the ideological rigidity of the revived Communist Party of Ukraine after October 1993.


60. J. G. Jammie, "Language Politics in Education and the Response of the Russians in Ukraine," Nationalities Papers, vol. 27, no. 3 (September 1999), pp. 475, 478. Roman Solchanyk gives official figures showing a decline from 76.6% to 34% (higher education), 50% to 34% (school) and 48.8% to 25.3% (pre-school) in students taught in the Russian language between the 1990–1991 and 1998–1999 school years (The Ukrainian Weekly, 5 March 2000).

61. V. Kremens', Dmytro Tabachnyk, and Vasyl' Tkachenko, Ukraina: Alternatyvy Postupu. Krytyka Istorychnoho Dosvidu (Kyiv: Arc-Ukraine, 1996), pp. 756–757. The January 2000 program "On Additional Measures to Expand the Use of Ukrainian as the State Language" proposes "bringing the system of educational institutions into line with the ethnic composition of the population" (RFE/RL Poland, Belarus, Ukraine Report, 15 February 2000).


63. Holos Ukrainy, 2 December 1999.
Rewriting and Rethinking: Contemporary Historiography and Nation Building in Ukraine*

Georgii Kasianov

Since the early 1990s the number of works devoted to the Ukrainian nation and every conceivable aspect of its existence has multiplied at a catastrophic rate. Increasingly, philosophers, historians, ethnographers, literary specialists, archaeologists, political scientists, economists, and others are being drawn into the creation or “revival” of a new “imagined community” that claims the desired title of a European nation. The basic questions pertaining to research on the history of Ukrainian nation formation are: “How, when, and where?” Since Ukrainian society has cast off the ideological uniformity of the Soviet period, while the variety of research topics has broadened considerably, one might expect the answers to these questions to be rather diverse.

In fact, however, we hear the voices of representatives of various disciplines—pitched at various intellectual and cultural levels and, indeed, belonging to different generations—blending into a rather harmonious chorus. This chorus is ever more resolutely intoning a motif familiar to us from the development of patriotic historiography, especially in periods of national self-assertion. Discordant notes are heard only when intellectual interests, specific areas of research (thematic, geographic or chronological), or external (generally Western) influences clash with the immutable rigidity of patriotic discourse or challenge the generally accepted canon that has rather precipitately and mechanistically displaced the official Soviet stereotype.

This chapter concerns the efforts of contemporary Ukrainian historians to rethink the development of the Ukrainian nation within the general context of the “nationalization” of Ukrainian history that has been going on for the last decade. As we shall see, whatever the subjective intentions and desires of these historians, objectively their efforts have become ensnared in the current political and ideo-

*This chapter was written at Monash University (Melbourne, Australia) during the author's tenure as a Ukrainian Studies Foundation of Australia Visiting Scholar. The chapter was translated by Myroslav Yurkevich.
logical agenda, most notably the problem of establishing the historical right of the Ukrainian people to a state of its own and the need to develop arguments legitimizing the existence of the present-day Ukrainian nation and state. Accordingly, the rethinking of Ukrainian history all too often culminates in a reversion to the methodological principles of the past: history is rewritten according to the classical dogmas of patriotic historiography as practiced in the nineteenth century. The following analysis of the scholarly and methodological aspects of this subject, attempts to show how the scholarly discourse is changing and how these changes are conditioned by cognitive developments and the shifting political situation. The way in which the scholarly discussion is beginning to feed back into politics and society is a separate question worth exploring in its own right.

In this discussion, the competing images of the nation currently taking shape in Ukrainian social science are presented in terms of a debate between "primordialists" or "perennialists" on the one side and "modernists" on the other. These labels are of course employed merely for analytical convenience.

THE "PRIMORDIALIST" ACCOUNT

As was only to be expected, the primordialist account of the formation of the Ukrainian nation has become the most popular one in current scholarly treatments (at the level of popular history and school curricula, it is simply taken for granted). The problem of the development of the Ukrainian nation is generally analyzed in the context of ethnogenetic or "ethnicist" conceptions based on the linkage of "ethnos, people, and nation," with the first term understood as generative and usually identified with the second and even the third. Here, for example, is a rather typical formulation:

A people in its capacity as an ethnos brings together within itself all the features that define it as a distinct society possessing a set of stable characteristics developed over the course of history. Accordingly, ethnoses are peoples either at the tribal stage of development or at the national stage, i.e., when an ethnos becomes a people/nation. Thus, "ethnos" is a generative concept for any stage of the civilizational development of one people or another. Considered as a nation, a people is characterized—aside from such properties as language, character, etc., inherent in its anterior stages of historical development—by national consciousness and a stable political order that gives expression to its national interests.¹

The axiomatic account of nation formation (or, more precisely, ethnonation formation) runs generally as follows: Ukrainians (as an ethnos/people and/or as a potential nation) have existed since the most ancient times. In the period of Kyiv Rus', they gave rise to an ethnocultural (in other accounts, an ethnosophical or even ethnopolitical) society that subsequently attempted to constitute itself as a political or sovereign national entity (mainly in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries). Following a period of latent existence within imperial structures, that entity underwent a national renaissance in the nineteenth century, resulting in the formation of the "modern Ukrainian nation." To be sure, the latter term implies the previous
existence of a premodern Ukrainian nation with which, in turn, the concept of a Ukrainian people is sometimes identified.

Let us note that this analytical scheme generally resembles the account of nation formation elaborated by Western "ethnicists" (and moderate "primordialists"), most notably Anthony Smith, John A. Armstrong, and Paul Brass, which may be reduced to the following basic axioms:

1. Nations are not created ex nihilo, but are formed on the basis of ethnic associations, whether real, constructed, or invented.
2. Ethnogenesis is associated with nation formation by means of certain elements of cultural continuity (symbols, myths, traditions).
3. These elements of cultural continuity undergo qualitative change, particularly during the period of nation formation, when they acquire instrumental significance.

On the analytical level, however, the concepts of *ethnos*, *ethnic group*, and *ethnogenesis* are usually distinguished from the concepts of *nation* and *nation formation*.

The similarity in the approaches of Ukrainian and Western analysts may be explained either by the use of the latter's theoretical constructs by the former (still a rarity, as access to Western social-science literature remains limited in Ukraine) or by the circumstance that the analysis of similar phenomena evokes similar associations. Even so, there are considerable disparities in these approaches that often reduce such analogies to purely formal terms.

Present-day Ukrainian social scientists who profess the primordialist, ethnogenetic account of nation formation generally do not acknowledge that a nation may be constructed or invented, considering it a natural formation. Some insist on an unbroken anthropological and biological continuity in the process of ethnonational development. The notion of the "organic nature" of elements of cultural continuity is quite popular, and in some accounts it turns into a complete rejection of the "instrumentalist" approach. As noted earlier, the concepts of *ethnos*, *people*, and *nation* are quite often identified with one another. Finally, the element of continuity in ethnonational formation is exaggerated or absolutized, so that the Ukrainian people as an ethnically autochthonous body is empowered to claim many centuries or even many millennia of unbroken existence on a particular territory. The primordialist accounts have the further advantage of making it possible to concentrate primarily on cultural factors of ethnogenesis and nation formation or even on anthropological and biological factors, an important consideration when the nation lacks a history of sovereign statehood.

Let us cite some specific examples. The first of them may be characterized as a sociobiological variant of primordialism. The archaeologist Leonid Zalizniak maintains that present-day Ukrainians are genetically linked with the population of Southern Rus', unlike most Belarusians and Russians, who belong to another anthropological type. According to basic defining criteria of ethnicity (culture, language, ethnic territory, mentality, self-
identification, anthropological type, etc.), Ukrainians of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries were direct genetic descendants of the population of Southern Rus' of the tenth to fourteenth centuries. The Rus' of the middle Dnipro region, Volhynia, Galicia, and Podilia were proto-Ukrainians according to ethnic criteria. (emphasis added)²

This “ethnocultural continuity” is of course intended to establish a subsequent historical link with the national renaissance of the nineteenth century, twentieth-century Ukrainian statehood, and so on.

A culturalist variant of primordialism (or, to employ Smith’s term, perennialism) is advanced by Anatolii Ponomariov. According to him, the Ukrainian ethnus was transformed into a nation by means of protracted historical evolution. This process was reflected most particularly in changes of names that the ethnus applied to itself. “The stage of the formation of the Ukrainian ethnus,” writes Ponomariov, “is associated with the ethonym ‘Rus’, while that of the formation of the Ukrainian nation is associated with the name ‘Ukrainians.’” In chronological terms, the first stage encompasses the historical period up to the twelfth century, while the second begins in the twelfth century, that is, “from the time when the ethnus established a state.”³

Of fundamental importance to nation formation, notes the author, is the subjective factor. Among the principal elements of the nation that constitute its foundation and manifest its inner essence are national interests, which “are set in motion by the maturing of a national idea around which an ethnus crystallizes.” The existence of a national idea is manifested by the rise of national consciousness among the people, “which may find expression in a heightened interest in national roots, ethnic history, and native language.” This becomes the basis for the formation of a “national culture” and a nation-state, which, for some reason, Ponomariov terms an external attribute.

On this basis, Ponomariov goes on to advance the following “conception of nation formation” (let us note that he identifies the concept of “ethnogenesis” with that of “nation formation”):

Ukrainian ethnogenesis should be sought in the Kyivan Rus’ strata. However, the process of nation formation was interrupted at that time and resumed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. On a wave of national enthusiasm, catalyzed by the Steppe, which threatened Ukrainians with physical extinction, Polish national subjugation, and internal treason, all the characteristics of the Ukrainian nation, concocted on Cossack soil, took shape. . . . To be sure, the geographic borders of the genetic process that gave rise to Ukrainians expanded rapidly, for the national idea took hold of the entire population of Ukraine, as did the national spirit, which was basically common to all Ukrainians (all emphases added).⁴

Over time, writes Ponomariov, the process of nation formation “matured” in the course of several stages known as the cultural and national renaissance: “Having begun in the sixteenth century as a military and political renaissance, it developed toward the end of the nineteenth century in the sphere of culture and spirituality and in the 1920s as a wave of national enthusiasm that encompassed every important sphere in the life of the Ukrainian ethnus.”⁵
We have taken the liberty of quoting at such length for the sole purpose of demonstrating the obvious terminological underdevelopment that results in a chaotic accumulation of categories pertaining to a variety of analytical levels. The archaization of the term national, the identification of nation formation with ethnogenesis (along with concurrent efforts to distinguish one from the other); the lack of criteria for the definition of these and other terms (it remains unclear in what sense the author employs the concepts of national spirit, national enthusiasm, and even national itself)—all these are not merely flaws in the approach of a particular author, but a reflection of the general state of social science in Ukraine. Our main interest, however, lies elsewhere: Ponomariov attempts to solve the problem of continuity and discontinuity in Ukrainian nation formation by referring mainly to subjective factors, which indeed have been and still remain most useful for that purpose. In this instance, Ponomariov typifies the approach most commonly adopted in current Ukrainian social-science research.

Finally, it is worth mentioning yet another variant of primordialism/perennialism that may provisionally be termed the politico-genetic account of Ukrainian nation formation. In the opinion of the L’viv historian Iaroslav Dashkevych, a nation called Rus’ already existed in the period of Kyiv Rus’. “The process of the formation of Rus’ as a political and ethnic nation in the ninth and tenth centuries,” he asserts, “corresponds to the principles of ethnicity that are advanced by ethnoscience with respect to nations—in the period after the French Revolution, to be sure.”\(^6\) In this account, Kyiv Rus’ is regarded as a “state/empire with a multi-ethnic population.” This empire, continues Dashkevych, was established by the elite of a single political nation that was initially formed on the basis of several ethnic elements. Of these, the one that prevailed was the “initial East Slavic substratum, which was thus transformed into a superstratum that assimilated Normans and Iranians, adopting the name of Rus’ for its national state/empire and creating an already homogeneous nation, not only in political but also in ethnic terms, bearing the same name.”\(^7\)

Dashkevych defines ethnonational unity by means of the following parameters:

1. **Sociocultural unity** (a single pagan pantheon, and subsequently a common Christian religion “of the Slavic rite with a single ritual Church Slavonic language, which also played a unifying role as the language of a single Rus’ literature” and as the language of the elite;
2. **Unity of historical and contemporary experience** (the struggle with the Steppe and its tradition; territorial conquest from the ninth to the eleventh century);
3. **The notion of a common origin**;
4. **Collective identity** (a distinction between “one’s own” and “foreigners” established, according to Dashkevych, on the basis of ethnic and religious characteristics) and even “a highly developed feeling of national consciousness and national pride;”
5. **A feeling of solidarity** (most notably within the elite of the “political nation”).

To these elements, Dashkevych adds the factor of politics and statehood (the existence of a state with a more or less established border and a center in Kyiv),
the socioeconomic factor (a particular form of social stratification specific to Kyiv-Rus'), and the formation of "regional markets" (clearly, what is meant is something along the lines of unity of economic life, but here the author expresses himself incomprehensibly); and the cultural and ideological factor (the existence of a single Rus' culture).  

In commenting on this account of nation formation, let us note its obvious resemblances to the scheme put forward by Smith in his Ethnic Origins of Nations: we find an "ethnic nucleus" of the lateral type—Rus', around which the nation coalesces; the "bureaucratic incorporation" of subject ethnoses proceeds under the aegis of the state. This also has its resemblance to Ivan L. Rudnytsky's analytical scheme of narod (people) and natsiia (nation) as successive formations. Let us return nevertheless to Dashkevych's own argument. If one takes his views to their logical conclusion, then Kyiv Rus' witnessed the development of processes similar to those of the formation of "nations before nationalism" in France, England and Spain. This leads to another conclusion: the history or roots of Ukrainians as a nation go back to the times of Kyiv Rus' itself.

If the views of the L'viv historian are taken to constitute a hypothesis based on the theoretical constructions of Smith and Rudnytsky, then that hypothesis is interesting, if hardly novel in theoretical terms, and clearly gratifying to patriotic sentiments. If one attends to Dashkevych's specific arguments, then obvious methodological flaws and contradictory conclusions become apparent. In the first place, the nation is once again identified with the ethnos and the state (although not in every case), and the term is of course archaized, as is the concept of the ethnic and political nation. Secondly, doubts arise concerning Dashkevych's arguments about the existence in the Rus' nation of some of the unifying elements on his list: the "notion of a common origin," "collective identity," "national consciousness" (an obvious anachronism), and a "feeling of solidarity." Even if all these subjective factors are ascribed to the political and intellectual elite of Kyiv Rus' (the political nation), it is difficult to establish their existence beyond reasonable doubt. Finally, we encounter once again the underdevelopment of categories and concepts: the interchangeability of different terms has already been mentioned, and we may also note that the nation-state and the state/empire seem to be equivalent notions in Dashkevych's usage, which seems methodologically unacceptable.

Solidarity with Dashkevych's views is expressed by another L'viv historian, Iaroslav Isaievych, although the latter refers directly to Smith's Ethnic Origins of Nations as the theoretical source of his views. Pointing out that ethnic groups (Isaievych uses the term etniia as a calque of ethnie) and nations at an early stage of development exhibit a number of common characteristics, including symbols, self-concepts, and notions of the future, Isaievych draws the following conclusion: the assertion that modern nations are so different from the ethnic formations of earlier times that the same term cannot be employed for ancient and modern societies is not so undeniable. . . . [S]ince the beginnings of statehood, since the appearance of ethnic consciousness, one may discern certain traits of self-identification that were perpetuated throughout the following 1,000 or 1,500 years. . . . I am rather persuaded by the view that the principal
factor in nation formation were [sic] events of millennial antiquity, and not the political movement of the late nineteenth century, which fostered consolidation but by no means initiated it.  

The primordialist accounts of Ukrainian history produced in recent years can certainly be considered classical examples of the formation or, more precisely (taking into account the achievements of pre-Soviet historiography), the renewal of the national(ist) historical myth. Its basic constituents may be defined as follows:

1. The absolutization and even the canonization of historical (cultural, linguistic, at times even biological or political) continuity in the development of the nation (which is most often identified with the ethnos in this connection);
2. The presence of a “territorial syndrome”: the historical boundaries of the ethnic (national) territory are extended as far as possible and the “autochthonous” roots of the people and nation and the stability of their ethnic territory are stressed in every possible way;
3. The absolutization of the stability of certain “genetic traits” (biological, anthropological, cultural) of the ethnos and nation;
4. The desire to extend the history of one's own ethnos and nation as far into the past as possible;
5. The unconditional identification of the ethnos and nation with a certain language that is also supposed to have existed since the most ancient times;
6. Prior claims to the exclusive possession of the “joint historical legacy” of the Slavic peoples (i.e., Kyivan Rus')—the “cradle syndrome.”

As the Russian scholar Viktor Shnirelman persuasively argues, these and other characteristics of historical myths of ethnogenesis are common to the East Slavic peoples. In that context, the official thesis of Soviet historiography on the “common historical destiny of the fraternal Slavic peoples,” an irksome myth in the Neopanslavist style, turns into an ironic paradox and an intellectual farce: myths incorporating common features are now exploited as evidence of separate identity.

Nevertheless, in contemporary Ukrainian primordialist mythologems an unbiased analyst of the problem will readily discern features in common with analogous historical accounts of the so-called “continuous” nations (in Hugh Seton-Watson’s terminology) or “historic” nations (to employ Hegel’s term). As is well known, every national historiography undergoes a period of formation of national myths, a considerable portion of which becomes an inalienable element of national consciousness, long established in the pages of school textbooks. The only difference here is that Ukrainian historiography once again finds itself obliged to engage in such myth making at the end of the twentieth century, while the “historic” nations managed to accomplish it in the second half of the nineteenth.

The Modernist “Alternative”

Given the undoubted dominance of primordialist accounts of Ukrainian nation formation, the accomplishments of those scholars whom we shall provisionally describe as modernists is somewhat more modest in quantity, but more interesting
intellectually. Let us note that the modernist camp is more international, as it consists largely of Western scholars, who are less preoccupied with substantiating the historical rights of the Ukrainian nation.

The development of the modernist trend in contemporary Ukrainian historiography was attended by circumstances of a rather particular kind. In the Ukrainian SSR, works dealing with any aspect of Ukrainian nation formation were necessarily based on orthodox Marxist methodology. Thus, in purely formal terms, they may be classified as modernist. The growth of the nation was associated with the transition from feudalism to capitalism, the rise of the bourgeoisie, specific socio-economic developments, class struggle, and so on. Given that in the years immediately following Ukraine’s attainment of formal independence most historians remained strictly within the confines of orthodox Marxist discourse (other modes were simply unknown and inaccessible to them at the time), any work devoted to nation formation was precast—formally, at least—in a modernist tonality.

The first work to concern itself directly with the making of the Ukrainian nation is symptomatic in this respect. Valerii Smolii and Oleksandr Hurzhii13 note that their monograph employs “the traditional conceptual framework accepted by most of the country’s scholars. The authors depart from the premise that nationality is the product of the feudal mode of production and that it is characterized by such features as a common language, territory, economy and culture, as well as by evidence of particular types of economic ties and ethnic consciousness. In the process of transition from the feudal to the capitalist order, these features crystallize and become more strongly marked, acquiring broader qualitative content, that is to say, nationality develops into the higher form of ethnosocial community that constitutes a nation.”14

As we see, this analytical scheme is the traditional one inherited from Soviet Ukrainian historiography: it is based on a class-conscious approach, entailing principles of economic determinism along with elements of “formative teleology,” as well as the standard definition of the “nation obligatory for any scholar whose intellectual formation included a course in scientific communism.” The theme, by contrast, is nontraditional: the development of the Ukrainian nation is posed as a historical problem in its own right (moreover, the authors refer to their predecessor, Kost Huslysty, who attempted in the late 1960s to investigate the problem of Ukrainian nation formation within the framework of official methodology). The fact that “official” historians were now addressing themselves to this problem was unusual as well: in some measure this was a reply to the parascholarly versions that began to multiply on a catastrophic scale as Ukraine embarked on an independent existence. Novel elements were also apparent in some of the authors’ approaches. In particular, they formally acknowledged the multifaceted and contradictory nature of the economic and social developments that contributed to the making of the nation, a process the authors deemed “complex and protracted.” It was therefore inappropriate, in their judgment, to specify a period of time within which that process fluctuated. Yet that did not prevent them from venturing to establish chronological limits and concluding that the Ukrainian nation took form in several stages extending from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, or, to
employ terms then still unfamiliar to most Ukrainian historians, the early modern and modern era.

The most significant account of Ukrainian history written under the patent influence of the Western modernist concepts of nation formation is Narys istoryi Ukrainy (An Outline of Ukrainian History) by the L'viv historian Jaroslav Hrytsak (the subtitle of his book, The Formation of the Modern Ukrainian Nation, is rather eloquent). Basing himself on an analytical distinction introduced long ago by Ivan L. Rudnytsky, Hrytsak considers that one may speak of the existence of two types of nations, pre-modern and modern (the failure to grasp this accounts, in Hrytsak’s view, for the misunderstandings between primordialists and modernists). Accordingly, when it comes to the formation of the modern Ukrainian nation, it is crucial to analyze developments of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, while the pre-modern or early modern nation pertains to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Hrytsak proposes an account of national history in which elements of the primordialist or perennialist versions may be reconciled with the modernist view. Ukrainian history, considered precisely as the history of the nation’s development, fits perfectly into the West European context at a certain point.

In Hrytsak's view, the formation of modern nations in Europe (including the Ukrainian nation) had its origins in the period that saw “the gradual transformation of agrarian society, with its low level of literacy and mobility, into industrial society, which was educated and mobile, with broad political rights and economic freedom for all its members, not only for the elite.” Hrytsak maintains that the formation of the modern Ukrainian nation proceeded in synchrony with analogous developments in Western Europe, that is, beginning as early as the sixteenth century. The religious movements and Cossack wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were Ukrainian analogues of general European trends: “the ecclesiastical movements and Cossack wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are Ukrainian analogues of the West European process that gave rise to a new form of collective identity (national consciousness), and the national renaissance of the nineteenth century was a transformation that corresponded to new conditions and to the spread of that consciousness among the masses.” Accordingly, the national renaissance of the nineteenth century consisted in the transformation and mass dissemination of that form of consciousness under new conditions. Thus the starting line in the development of the Ukrainian nation is pushed back to the early modern period, which, naturally enough, aligns the Ukrainian nation with the historic nations, legitimizing its claims to the possession of a national history.

Let us note that the author is unambiguous in formulating the operational principles on which his conception is based. First of all, the history of the Ukrainian nation is to be regarded as an integral part of the universal (or all-European) historical process. The history of Eastern Europe (and thus of Ukraine), asserts Hrytsak, “does, after all, conform to the periodization of world history as a whole.” Secondly, Hrytsak revises the notion of the “backwardness” and “non-historicity” of the Ukrainian nation: Eastern Europe, including Ukraine, was “among the first”
regions that set out to overtake the "developed" West and replicate its technical and social achievements.

The idea of backdating the origins of Ukrainian "national" history to the so-called early modern period has become highly popular precisely among those scholars who seek a compromise between primordialism, so familiar, attractive and reassuring to any Ukrainian historian, and modernism, so unaccustomed and repulsive to the "true patriot." Those scholars have invented (more precisely, borrowed) the philosopher's stone that makes it possible to turn intellectual lead into vastly more agreeable gold (as yet, no one is particularly concerned to determine whether it is pure gold).

Let us cite the most outstanding example of the way in which the thesis of Ukrainian nation formation in the early modern period has been embodied in actual research or, rather, reinterpretation. The historians Valerii Smolii and Valerii Stepankov have formulated the concept of a seventeenth-century "Ukrainian National revolution." The capitalization of the word national is itself a clear indication of the authors' ideological aspirations. As lack of space precludes lengthy citation, the essence of their conceptual framework may be reduced to the following points:

1. A national revolution took place in Ukraine in the mid-seventeenth century (more precisely, between the years 1648 and 1676);
2. That revolution gave rise to the formation of a nation-state that perished, but whose remnants continued to exist into the 1780s;
3. In the course of the revolution, there arose the "idea of a nation-state," which became "an unwritten testament for successive generations of Ukrainians in the struggle for independence;"\(^\text{18}\)
4. The "idea of a nation-state" provided the stimulus for the formation of a new political elite and for the development of national consciousness, most notably an "ideology of elitist nationalism;" it "aroused the will of the nation to self-assertion and self-expression in the form of an independent sovereign state;"\(^\text{19}\)
5. The Ukrainian national revolution of the seventeenth century was analogous to the revolutions that took place in the Netherlands, England, Germany, and France in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; hence it was an event of all-European significance and thus an integral part of European history.

As we see, these quasi-modernist formulations (the term early modern is unknown to these authors, as is the standard terminology of modernist historiography in general) evince an overt attempt to "archaize" the terms nation, national, and nationalism. Unlike some of their Western colleagues (e.g., Frank Sysyn and Teresa Chyńczewska-Hennel), who apply the term "nation" only to certain elite strata of the seventeenth century, Smoli and Stepankov fall prey to the (by now traditional) confusion of "nation" (natsiia) with "people" (narod) and employ the former term with reference to the masses, considering national consciousness to have been a mass phenomenon in the seventeenth-century Ukrainian lands. Smoli notes that "unlike the nobility of the Commonwealth, which considered itself alone the Polish political people [narod; the intended reference is probably to the politi-
cal nation] Cossackdom viewed itself as constituting only a portion of the Ukrainian people, which also included the nobility, clergy, burghers, and even peasants. The authors' subsequent discussion makes it apparent that they consider these strata and social orders to have constituted a nation complete with a national elite.

In Stepankov's view, the Ukrainian masses were already imbued with a "sense of nationalism" in the seventeenth century; indeed, citing Dashkevych, he goes so far as to posit the existence of an ideological level of national consciousness. Noting Dashkevych's thesis that "nations rose to the struggle for national liberation—ordinary peasant masses without an elite ideology, but with an entirely nationalistic attitude to their national oppressors," Stepankov concludes that "national consciousness was nourished by feelings of hatred for Polish rule," thus clearly following Dashkevych in identifying nationalism with xenophobia.

In some respects, to be sure, these scholars are unoriginal and merely continue the traditions of the early twentieth century, when the activists of the national renaissance of the day wrote about the "Ukrainian national movement of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries," the "Ukrainian national and cultural movement of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries," and so on (being true positivists, however, they were not so bold as to discover nationalism among seventeenth-century Ukrainians). In this case, of course, the problem is not merely one of the inappropriate use of terms or their archaization. Unlike Hrytsak and the "true" modernists, Smolii and Stepankov regard the events of the seventeenth century as evidence not of the beginnings of Ukrainian nation formation, but of the nation's existence as a fait accompli. Unfortunately, Smolii and Stepankov do not explain what they mean by the term nation and semantically related terms. In context, as we have seen, it would appear that they tend toward the identification of nation with people characteristic of Ukrainian primordialists and ethnicists.

It is equally apparent that Smolii and Stepankov are favorably inclined toward the notion of continuity (in every sense of the word) in Ukrainian nation formation. Hence they find themselves in the modernist camp not because they consider the Ukrainian nation a modern or early modern phenomenon, but as a result of déformation professionnelle, so to speak, given their specialization in seventeenth-century history.

A TACIT UNDERSTANDING

There was never any reason to expect an outright intellectual confrontation between the Ukrainian primordialists/perennialists and modernists, since differentiation between them presupposes a society accustomed to intellectual pluralism (Ukrainian intellectual space is still dominated by the habit of erecting monistic structures). In Ukraine today, modernists of every stripe invariably seek compromise with the primordialists/perennialists, if only because of the unchallenged dominance of the ethnocentric approach to interpreting the origins of the Ukrainian nation, to say nothing of the pressure of political circumstance, lack of meth-
odological awareness, the drastic underdevelopment of the social sciences in Ukraine, and so on. Significantly, it is the West that has become the principal supplier of modernist dissidents to the Ukrainian social-science community. The authors of the best-known modernist accounts and interpretations of Ukrainian nation formation either are based at Western universities (George Grabowicz, Andreas Kappeler, Roman Szporluk) or, if they reside in Ukraine, have taken over the corresponding analytical frameworks from Western social science. The same applies to practitioners of the early modern approach (Sysyn, Zenon Kohut, Chynowet'ska-Hennel), many of whose works in fact appear to represent a compromise between the adherents of the primordial past and modernity.

Granted, one might cite an instance of direct and rather heated confrontation between representatives of these divergent trends. The Second International Congress of Ukrainian Studies, which took place in L'vov in August 1993, featured a roundtable discussion on “The Formation of the Ukrainian Nation: History and Interpretation.” Symptomatically enough, those Ukrainian participants who favored the modernist tendency or criticized primordial/perennialism (primarily for its teleological subtext) were decidedly in the minority (Hrytsak and Oleksii Tolochko), and were supported by colleagues from the West.23 The efforts of Tolochko, a specialist in medieval history (who would therefore seem destined to find his niche in the primordialist camp), to draw attention to episodes of discontinuity in Ukrainian nation formation and to the intellectual attractiveness of such an approach met with concerted opposition from partisans of millennial continuity in tracing the existence of the Ukrainian ethnus/nation.

The polemic following upon Mark von Hagen's essay “Does Ukraine Have a History?” may be construed as an echo of the L'vov debate, though in a different context.24 For present purposes, a remark by the Ukrainian academician Isaievich is especially significant. Responding to von Hagen's perfectly sound observation that in present-day Ukraine the leading principle of historiography is “an overly nationalistic rewriting of the past that posits a sovereign, national state as a teleological outcome of history,” Isaievych poses the equally apt question, “Is not a teleological approach typical for any patriotic textbook of any national history?”25 Isaievych goes on to account for the natural dominance of ethno-genetic approaches to the problem of Ukrainian nation formation by citing specific features of that process (lengthy periods of statelessness, stability of ethnic territory, cultural continuity) and the historical material that is available to modern historians as a result. True enough, Isaievych attributes a teleological approach only to textbooks of Ukrainian history, but the examples cited above make it abundantly clear that most scholarly treatments of the subject suffer from the same flaw.

Perhaps the ideal instance of complete agreement between the primordialists/perennialists and the modernists is the concept of national renaissance, which has not yet undergone revision. The thesis that the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries witnessed a national renaissance in the Ukrainian lands is universally accepted. The latest academic series intended to present a new view of Ukrainian history to a mass audience includes a volume on the national renaissance, and its exposition follows the classical scheme of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
The very term *national renaissance*, an obvious borrowing from the Italian *Risorgimento* that was widely used in Ukrainian political writing of the early twentieth century, has been adopted as an analytical category in current scholarly discourse. Yet its cognitive burden remains the same as it was a century ago: if the nation underwent a renaissance in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, then it clearly must have existed earlier.

The judicious modernist Hrytsak also makes use of this term, though with a number of nuances. Unlike most Ukrainian historians, who have revived the concept of the national renaissance on the strength of its use in the classical Ukrainian historiography of the 1900s and 1920s, Hrytsak predates his view of the renaissance on an analytical distinction between modern and premodern nations. Moreover, Hrytsak eschews the classical populist tradition, drawing instead on the analytical scheme advanced by the Czech historian Miroslav Hroch. Hrytsak acknowledges the instrumentalist context of the Ukrainian national renaissance, distancing himself from the generally accepted organicism of that phenomenon, although he does not question that it was historically determined. Understandably enough, the cognitive utility of the term also is not put into question.

The only systematically revisionist account of the Ukrainian national renaissance produced to date is Szporluk's article "Ukraine: From an Imperial Periphery to a Sovereign State." Here, the term *national renaissance* is itself replaced by *nation-building*, and the notion of a Ukrainian project, that is, a consciously created image of the nation, is advanced. There is, however, no attempt to negate the organic elements deliberately employed by the Ukrainian intelligentsia for the realization of its project.

It may thus be asserted that there is something in the nature of a tacit understanding among the representatives of various approaches to the analysis of Ukrainian nation formation. Under its terms, certain ideas and concepts are simply accepted as given without further analysis. Consciously or not, most Ukrainian historians incline toward the organic version of nation formation, in which the rise of the Ukrainian nation is seen as an objective necessity and a manifestation of historical justice, and all that impeded it is dismissed as mere happenstance. Similarly, the continuity of ethnic/national history is presented as natural, while episodes of discontinuity, if noted at all, are regarded as accidental consequences of external factors.

**CONCLUSION**

On the basis of our previous citations from the works of practicing Ukrainian social scientists, we may now formulate a summary response to the question, "How, when, and where did the Ukrainian nation take shape?" This in turn will give us an idea of how the social sciences are creating a new image, or restoring an old one, of the Ukrainian "imagined community." The answer to the first part of the question is as follows: the development of the nation was a process of organic evolution, but its organicity was compromised by external factors and obstacles
(foreign intervention and rule, assimilation, elite "treason," etc.). The prevailing conviction is that the Ukrainian nation developed on the basis of a homogeneous ethnic nucleus and related ethnic and subethnic groups that existed from ancient or even prehistoric times, retaining certain constant cultural traits throughout the centuries while resisting external ethnic influences and assimilation, as well as maintaining their specific character, geographic base, and "nation-creating potential." The existence of this nucleus and its ancillary components ensured continuity in the millennial formation (and, at some points, the very existence) of the Ukrainian nation. If some scholars accept the view that nationality or national consciousness can be constructed (but not artificially), ethnicity is nonetheless considered a wholly organic natural component.

Although the answer to the question where is less unanimous, it also presents no great diversity of ideas. Whether consciously or not, most scholars seek to fit the Ukrainian nation into the European geopolitical and historical space in order to show that Ukrainians constitute a European nation. On one hand, this is clear evidence of the provincial or postcolonial status of Ukraine, which was formerly a province of Moscow and now has prospects of becoming a province of Europe (in other words, Ukraine is at once a western province of the East and an eastern province of the West). On the other hand, this approach manifests the characteristic aspiration of so-called non-historic nations and their attendant national movements to attain full membership in the world community and establish their cultural and historical legitimacy. Understandably, one of the dominant nationalist myths is that of centuries-old or millennial territorial continuity in the history of the Ukrainian ethnos/people/nation. Moreover, unlike in the past, Ukraine's location at the crossroads of culture can now be cited as a positive factor, and not as one that traditionally led to cultural and political assimilation.

Deviations from this pattern usually take the form of a rather common stereotype, "Ukraine between East and West," which admittedly offers a much broader scope for interesting interpretations. Some scholars with a penchant for postmodern wit deliberately scoff at this analytical matrix, placing Ukraine "between one thing and another."

Finally, the question when reveals a concerted general effort to push the historical origins of the Ukrainian nation as far into the past as possible, to establish the starting point of Ukrainian nation formation as early as possible, and to present the history of the nation as a natural continuation of the history of the ethnos.

Whether directly or indirectly, all this is meant to confirm the historical necessity of the emergence of independent Ukraine, thereby legitimizing the right of the Ukrainian nation to statehood and to a place of honor in world civilization. This "legitimation syndrome" should not, of course, be taken literally and treated merely as an expression of the current demands of political and cultural elites. The subjective factors that lead Ukrainian social scientists to draw certain conclusions and not others may be of various kinds, ranging from a conscious desire to respond to current political imperatives all the way to the search for true, objective history. It is also worth taking into account that the national history of Ukraine was treated for decades as the history of a people striving at all costs to rid itself of its national
characteristics and merge with a new historical community, the Soviet people. Understandably, the taboo on national history in the Soviet period has prompted a compensating reaction in independent Ukraine: in the works of social scientists, the millennial dream of reunification has been transformed into a no less ancient desire for independence.

Finally, let us note the influence of yet another factor, that of historical rehabilitation, on the social sciences. The restoration to intellectual respectability of the names of eminent historians, ethnographers, and anthropologists of the past and the canonization of certain figures has led to the enshrinement of their views. Citing Hrushevsky has become widely accepted as a way of clinching an argument, and his views are often employed as the basis of new conceptions. Accordingly, Ukraine is witnessing the intellectual renaissance of accounts of nation formation now almost a century old, originally generated by the same need for legitimacy.

To be sure, when it comes to evaluating the efforts of contemporary Ukrainian social science in the sphere of nation building, there is little point in moralizing and offering superficial criticism of its methodological backwardness and political engagement. Backwardness is, after all, a highly relative term. It requires no more than one generation of students to enrich Ukrainian social-science methodology with new approaches and theories. It should be recalled in this connection that many "new" achievements in Western (or, let us say, Anglo-Saxon) sociology, which has traditionally been regarded as a source of new methods of research on problems of nations and nationalism, have amounted to nothing more than the reinterpretation of neglected concepts. But that is a subject in itself. It is also worth noting that certain "backward" or "antiquarian" approaches to nation formation currently popular in Ukrainian social science seem extraordinarily pertinent to Western sociology itself as it undergoes a rather sweeping revision of modernist notions and a true resurgence of primordialist or perennialist accounts of nation formation.

At present, then, Ukrainian social science is quite intensively engaged in the process of nation building, which is the decisive factor in shaping the account of national history that now holds sway. As noted above, this tendency is strengthened by a number of specific intellectual, philosophical, and historical circumstances affecting the outlook of Ukrainian social scientists. The ever more frequent debates occurring among them30 show that some scholars have already gone beyond the confines of patriotic discourse as such, raising the prospect of a greater variety of approaches to the problem of creating the national image, and thus to ways of shaping that image in current discussion.

NOTES
4. Ibid., p. 179.
5. Ibid.
7. Ibid., pp. 11–12.
15. Ibid.
17. Ibid., p. 15.
19. Ibid.
22. See “Ukrains’ke pytannia” in Ukrains’ke pytannia, comp. Mykola Tymoshyk (Kyiv: V-vo im. Oleny Telihy, 1997), pp. 64–70. This is a Ukrainian translation of Mykhailo Hrushevskiy’s brochure Ukrainskii vopros, published on the eve of World War I. See also M. Hrushevskiy, Kul’turo-natsional’nyi rukh na Ukraini v XVI–XVII vitii (Kyiv and Lviv: n.p., 1912).


30. I shall note only a few of them: a discussion initiated by Iaroslav Hrytsak in L’viv in the spring of 1998 on postmodern historical accounts; a debate on nationalism in contemporary Ukraine at the Kyiv Mohyla Academy in the winter of 1999; and a discussion at the Fourth International Congress of Ukrainian Studies (Odesa, summer 1999), in the course of which patriotic discourse in historiography was criticized by a number of speakers (who, of course, found themselves in the minority).
Culture and Cultural Politics in Ukraine: A Postcolonial Perspective

Mykola Riabchuk

The collapse of the Soviet empire brought with it a large number of problems which resemble both those of some other postcommunist countries of Eastern Europe and those of the more numerous postcolonial countries of the developing world. In Ukraine, the ultimate results of this social, political, cultural, and economic experiment are hardly predictable.

Ukraine is undertaking a difficult triple transition—from a dictatorship to a democracy, from a command economy to a free market, and from an empire to statehood. Kuzio, however, points to an additional transitional process that further complicates the entire endeavor: "evolution from a country possessing an uneven national identity to one with a civic, unified nation and political culture," in other words, nation building.

Ukraine has historically emerged as a *Kulturnation* rather than a *Staatnation* and a "genuine" Ukrainian identity has been mostly defined in ethnolinguistic terms; the cultural approach to the quadruple transition just described is therefore important to bear in mind. It is quite clear that each of the four transitional processes has its own separate impact on culture and cultural politics in contemporary Ukraine. On the other hand, it is also apparent that culture (broadly understood as a "whole way of life") significantly determines the character, the speed, and the very direction of the quadruple transition. The four-pronged transition can thus be described, from the cultural perspective, as a dual process of decommunization and decolonization, largely, but not exclusively, meaning desovietization and de-Russification.

In this chapter, culture and cultural politics in contemporary Ukraine hence will be considered primarily within the context of the twin legacies of communism and colonialism, and of rather incoherent attempts to overcome them. This incoherence stems from the general incoherence and inconsistency of the "Ukrainian revolution" of 1991 and the so-called reforms adopted later. The ambivalent character of political and economic system of contemporary Ukraine which is neither totalitarian nor democratic, neither "communist" nor "capitalist," "neither European nor Soviet" (Sherman Garnett) has been described in detail in numerous works within a broad framework of postcommunist "transitiology." The cultural ambivalence, however, draws less attention—partly be-
cause the sphere of culture seems to be less important for many scholars, partly because the Ukrainian case does not fit the patterns of cultural transition in Russia (which is a major concern for most "transitologists") and needs a rather uncommon (for most experts on postcommunism) postcolonial approach.

In this chapter I argue that the postcommunist ambivalence and ambiguity of Ukrainian politics and economy match the postcolonial ambiguity of the cultural situation. This ambiguity is conceptualized through the notion of a Creole state; that is, a state that belongs primarily to the descendants of Russian settlers as well as to those indigenes who had eventually assimilated into the dominant (Russophone) urban culture. Such a state, however, profoundly differs from the traditional Creole states of America, Australia, South Africa, and so on. First, the culture and language of settlers happened to be unusually proximate to those of indigenes. Second, the indigenous culture was and still is capable of competing against the culture of colonizers not only in the realm of folklore and traditional art but also in virtually all modern, professional genres. This makes the Ukrainian case very peculiar and, as this chapter will propose, open to a great variety of possible developments. Some tendencies and phenomena of the ongoing processes will be analyzed at the end of the chapter.

The only secure, legitimate, and generally acceptable way of development is that of gradual "Ukrainianization," that is, of the very moderate but consistent policy of affirmative action, or state protectionism, on behalf of Ukrainian language and culture. Even though the Ukrainian state seems to be too dysfunctional now to pursue any coherent policy, it does not mean such a policy should not be elaborated and promoted by the both state and society. The Ukrainian state will be dysfunctional as long as it remains Creole, that is, neither Ukrainian nor Russian but, rather, Soviet. Ukrainianization thus, under peculiar post-Soviet circumstances, is by and large a synonymous word for desovietization.

THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION

The Ancien Regime, Democrats, and State-Nation Building

As many observers have noticed, neither an anticolonial nor an anticommunist revolution in fact ever happened in Ukraine. If we understand "decolonization" to mean that "which sets out to change the order of the world, is a program of complete disorder"; "a violent phenomenon"; and "a total, complete, and absolute substitution." (Frantz Fannon), then decolonization did not take place in Ukraine.

What happened in Kyiv in 1991, when central power in Moscow collapsed, was a compromise between the ruling pro-Moscow communists and oppositional anti-Moscow national democrats. The communists agreed to abandon Moscow's overlordship, while democrats agreed to accept the ancien regime as a renewed one (supposedly decommunized and decolonized). In fact, the compromise reflected and legitimized two mutually dependent processes that had occurred in Ukraine during perestroika. On one side was the evolution of the pro-imperial, heavily Russified nomenklatura toward local patriotism and, hence, civic nationalism (or, rather, bureaucratic statism). On the other side was
the evolution of the rather weak democratic and nationalist opposition toward pragmatism.

The positive results of this historical compromise are well known: independent Ukraine emerged as a legal continuation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic; its withdrawal from the USSR was carried out by constitutional bodies of the ancien regime; and the new state, from the very beginning, defined itself as a territorial jurisdiction rather than as an ethnolinguistic entity ("people of Ukraine" rather than "Ukrainian people"). This secured acceptance of the new state's independence by hitherto loyal Soviet citizens, and, at the same time, prevented the rise of rival claimants to power from among opponents of communism or opponents of Russian/Russophone dominance. It also helped to avoid a war with Russia or the former metropolitan center.

The drawbacks of the compromise are also well known, at least in the spheres of economy and politics. The old, formally "departized," nomenklatura remained in power, successfully hampering much-needed economic and political reforms. A corporatist economy dominated by organized crime and corrupt officials gained foothold, hyper-inflation and hyper-corruption reigned supreme, and the "bread-basket of Europe" became, in the words of The Economist, a "waste-basket." Social stability, which was claimed to be the major achievement of the 1991 compromise between communists and national democrats, led to stagnation.

However, in the cultural sphere the pitfalls of the 1991 arrangement are less evident. On its face, Ukrainian culture seems firmly secured by the very existence of the Ukrainian state where ethnic Ukrainians make up 73% of the entire population and where Ukrainian officially enjoys the status of state language since 1989. The number of pupils instructed in Ukrainian has gradually increased from 48% in 1990/91 to 63% in 1997/98; some measures (or, rather, half-measures) have been undertaken to introduce Ukrainian into the Soviet-turned-Ukrainian army, state apparatus, and higher education. The cultural institutions of the Ukrainian SSR have largely survived, dominated by communists-turned-democrats, yet new institutions have also emerged, and members of the anticommunist, national democratic opposition have been incorporated en masse within the new-old cultural establishment.

Is Ukraine a Ukrainophone or Russophone "Nationalizing State"?

It is hardly surprising, then, that many Western scholars and journalists who never bothered to learn Ukrainian or spend more time in Kyiv than in Moscow reported eagerly on Ukraine as a nationalizing state which tends to oppress and denationalize minorities, particularly the largest and most vociferous one, the Russians. Such reports have been largely supported by Russophone activists who claimed that Ukrainian nationalists obtained the upper hand in the country, launched forceful Ukrainianization, destroyed the national economy through corruption and incompetence, and began adopting a pro-Western, pro-capitalist, anti-Russian and anti-Soviet orientation.

Ironically, many Ukrainophone activists perceive the situation in the same way, although the oppressors and, therefore, the recipes for salvation are said to
be the opposite. In 1995, for example, a long and emotional Manifesto of the Ukrainian intelligentsia appeared in a number of Ukrainophile periodicals, signed by some notable Ukrainian writers, scholars, and cultural activists. In very strong words the Manifesto claimed that:

there has re-emerged the centuries-old policy of "Ukraine without Ukrainians"—a policy aimed at the destruction of the Ukrainian nation. . . . A part of this policy is the intensified devastation of Ukrainian culture. . . . On the fifth anniversary of independence Ukrainian book publishing is dying—only 3 per cent of books written in Ukrainian are published. . . . Ukrainian kindergartens and schools are being closed; and documentation in many branches of government, including the highest ones, is not conducted in the state language. In many areas attempts to open new Ukrainian cultural centers are blocked, Ukrainian newspapers and journals are closed down or their circulation forcibly stopped, and Ukrainian culture is excluded from radio and television. . . . Scholars, scientists, teachers, doctors, and cultural researchers are struggling for survival. . . . Ukrainian patriots are being dismissed from the army and left without work. Everything is being done in the training of cadres to attain a "critical mass" of those who hate Ukraine in the state apparatus. . . . In fact, anti-Ukrainian ethnic cleansing are already being conducted in Ukraine. 10

No doubt, the Manifesto loses a great deal by its exalted, apocalyptic tone, especially when it compares the ongoing de-Ukrainianization to that of the 1930s, "when the Bolsheviks destroyed virtually every activist in Ukrainian culture, scholarship, and science." It sees a conspiracy aimed at Ukraine's destruction where there may be none. In many Third World countries the oligarchies act in a similar self-interested manner without incitement from Moscow. And finally, the authors of the Manifesto urge the government to rely more on the "true" Ukrainian patriots to effectively promote state building. However, they do not specify how these "true" patriots should be selected and, the crucial question remains, why the allegedly anti-Ukrainian government should bother itself with such a selection.

All these faults notwithstanding, the document aptly reflects the confusion, despair, and hysterical search for a solution or, rather, for scapegoats by the marginalized postcolonial intelligentsia. It tells us little about the essence of the current situation but quite a lot about the way it is perceived by many Ukrainophones disappointed with developments in postcolonial Ukraine.

Of course, 1995 was a peculiar year, when the worst expectations of the Ukrainian intelligentsia seemed to become a reality. Leonid Kuchma, who won the presidential elections in July 1994 under the slogans of strengthening ties with Russia and making Russian the second official language in Ukraine, stated that the "Ukrainian (national) idea had not worked." Kuchma's remark was understood by the predominantly Sovietophile and Russophone bureaucracy as a signal to halt "Ukrainianization" (in reality, it had never been treated seriously anyway). In summer 1995 the mass funeral of the Patriarch of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate) was physically attacked in Kyiv by predominantly Russophone special police. Two prominent Ukrainian intellectuals, Dzyuba and Petro Taranuchuk, who had respectively led the Ministries of Culture and Education, were dismissed and replaced by dull Soviet functionaries. In neighboring Belarus, the newly elected President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, per-
ceived commonly as Kuchma’s double, launched an extensive anti-Belarusian campaign of further sovietization and Russification.

The years that followed have not changed the situation dramatically for the worse, as was expected in 1995, but they have hardly improved it, either. Kuchma’s policy in virtually all spheres proved to be a continuation of those of the Leonid Kravchuk era. The new president and his highly corrupted clique have not sold their chieftdom to Moscow as many experts predicted and many Ukrainophiles worried, but neither have they done very much to appease the indigenes on the territory they luckily happened to privatize. A Ukrainian publicist complains:

Again, as ten years ago a child could be derided by other children in the yard just because he or she speaks Ukrainian. The print of Ukrainian publications is miserable. Ukrainian books are virtually absent in book stores. And more than one third of Ukrainian citizens comes out against national independence.11

Another Ukrainophone activist adds:

The state has been called “Ukrainian,” but nothing has changed, besides phraseology. . . . The state power, the state authorities are the same. Ukrainian language and culture, and culture in general, have always been alien for the Soviet nomenklatura which still rules the country. . . . Lack of national will at the top gives a carte blanche to a predominantly Ukrainophobic bureaucracy which still lives with old stereotypes of intolerance. . . . The linguistic situation in Ukraine reflects the social situation. The Ukrainian people have always been wretched in Ukraine—and they still are.12

The Ambiguity of a Dysfunctional State

It is probably much easier to understand why the Russians are dissatisfied with the independent Ukraine than why the Ukrainians are. Russians, in Kuzio’s words, “have been such privileged immigrants, that any nationally-minded government in Kyiv is bound to try to redress the balance by restoring state support for Ukrainian language, culture and education, thus provoking easily manipulable fears of Ukrainianization, whether justified or not.”13 As the Ukrainian scholar, Kulyk, wrote:

Despite the fact that the sphere of Russian usage had not grown smaller and Russian speakers retained all their opportunities to exercise their traditional cultural rights—the pro-Russian and left parties made use of the opportunity to frighten the electorate in the east and south with “Ukrainianization,” when, in fact, it had not even begun there. Under these conditions the demand for the legislative confirmation of bilingualism was a demand for a guarantee against future Ukrainianization. . . . They were not demanding a legalization of the obligation of Ukrainian-speaking citizens to know Russian (they know it), but the right of Russian speakers not to know Ukrainian.14

We should face however the more profound truth that Ukraine is a dysfunctional state which cannot satisfy anybody.15 The ruling nomenklatura is largely a-national and non-ideological, and pursues, in fact, no comprehensive policy in any sphere except self-profit and day-to-day survival. To achieve this para-
mount goal it pays lip-service to both communist and nationalist symbols, flirts with both Russophone and Ukrainophone leaders, sends mixed messages, and deliberately contributes to the total confusion, aptly called a “social schizophrenia.” There is no coherent, consistent cultural policy in Ukraine that could be interpreted as either a radical desovietization, decommunization, or decolonization (unlike in the Baltic, Central, and East European states) or a further sovietization and colonization-creolization (like in Belarus). Ukraine remains stuck between these two models.

On the surface, however, it may look as an odd mixture of laissez-faire policy, which irritates the Ukrainophones, and a very weak, incoherent, and inconsistent affirmative action, which provokes Russians’ anxiety. The word Ukrainianization (like democratization and economic reforms) seems to become discredited long before any real Ukrainianization (democratization, economic reforms) begins. This results, rather naturally, from the overall governmental impotence and dysfunctionality, as well as from incompetence and basic indifference to all those things cultural and Ukrainian (reformative, democratic, and so on).

The confusing eclecticism of Ukrainian life and Ukrainian cultural (and any other) politics results from the ambivalent nature of Ukrainian society, which is divided along regional, cultural, ethnic, linguistic, religious, generational, and many other lines. The victorious referendum of 1 December 1991 that had brought both Ukrainophones and Russophones together in the nearly unanimous 90% vote for Ukrainian independence hid the outcome of the presidential elections held on the same day. Only one-third of the voters supported the noncommunist candidates (i.e., a definitive break of the nascent nation with the Soviet legacy and a firm orientation toward a European way of development). Two-thirds of the voters supported the Soviet presidential candidate (Kravchuk) as a guarantee that relatively minimal cultural, political, and economical changes would occur and that the Soviet way of life would be largely preserved. An American scholar commented on those developments:

Political borders were quickly redrawn following the failed coup, but cultural barriers are not so easily dislodged. In spite of widespread support for an independent Ukrainian state, many living in Ukraine are less supportive of the cultural changes that have followed new state formation. . . . Having acquired a state, nationalist leaders have tried to forge a link between individuals and the state via a national culture. This link has been inadvertently challenged by the residual appeal and habit of seeing oneself as Soviet. . . . Practices and values spawned by the Soviet system and nostalgia for the security of a Soviet way of life persist and compete with a nationalist redefinition of self and society by providing alternative, non-national points of orientation for individuals reassessing their values and identities. Thus the process of institutionalizing a national culture must operate within the confines of tenacious aspects of a Soviet way of life and the allure of local allegiances.
THE LEGACY OF COLONIALISM

Ukraine as a Postcolonial Creole State

The pervasiveness and persistence of the colonial status quo in Ukraine infuriates many Ukrainian intellectuals and makes them define the independent Ukraine that emerged in 1991 as a kind of Creole state, that is, a state dominated by the descendants of Russian settlers and by Russified Ukrainians. This results from the fact, recognized by many historians, that the twin processes of modernization and urbanization in Ukraine coincided with large-scale Russification. A huge gap between things Ukrainian and modern emerged in the nineteenth century, something that has largely persisted to the present day. Not only did the indigenous population (Ukrainophone Ukrainians) become the oppressed majority (that tends to become a minority) in their own country vis-à-vis dominant Russianphones, but also the Ukrainophone world became firmly associated with village backwardness and “bumpkin-ness.” In fact, this world became a kind of inner colony, a local Third World of kolkhoz slaves that provided the First World of the higher (Russophone) civilization with lower-class employees. Today, according to some sociological data, almost twice as many people possess higher education among Russians than among Ukrainians, and perhaps ten times more among the (mostly urban) Russophones than (mostly rural) Ukrainophones. In nine years of Ukrainian independence, neither civic nor numerical equality have made Russophones and Ukrainophones genuinely equal in cultural and linguistic practices in everyday life.

The proposed conceptualization of contemporary Ukraine as a Creole state may provide a good explanation of why the numerical preponderance of Ukrainians gives them few if any advantages in independent Ukraine, especially compared with the much smaller preponderance of Latvians and Estonians in Latvia and Estonia, respectively. First of all, one should remember that the real hallmark of identity in the heavily Russified Ukraine is cultural and linguistic rather than ethnic. This means that the numerical preponderance of ethnic Ukrainians over ethnic Russians in Ukraine is much less relevant than the (approximate) numerical equality of Russophones and Ukrainophones: each group makes up 45% to 55% of the entire population. (The precise figure is not available because the identity of bilingual Ukrainians often proves to be very hazy, and there are no methods to unequivocally define it.)

According to the 1989 Soviet census, however, over 80% of ethnic Ukrainians claim Ukrainian to be their native language (“mother tongue”). This figure is questioned today by many sociologists who claim the term native language is imprecise and should be replaced with the less equivocal term language of convenience or language of everyday usage. Still, even if we take the census results at face value, and accept the number of Ukrainian speakers in Ukraine to make up over 60%, we cannot ignore the fact that most of these people live in villages and small towns (or else in economically marginal Western Ukraine) and represent therefore the socially marginalized strata of society, barred from adequate cultural, educational, and financial resources and dispossessed from appropriate levers of political and economic influence. In a sense, they represent a kind of
rural "blacks" vis-à-vis urban, predominantly Russophone "whites." Or, as Edward Said may have put it, they originated from "a lesser world, populated with lesser people." This seems to be the most relevant fact for making sense of any—cultural, ethnic, linguistic, regional, social—division of contemporary Ukraine.

Ukrainophones, indeed, were subjected to open "linguistic apartheid" in the Tsarist empire and to more sophisticated discriminatory measures in the USSR. In both cases they were exposed to an arrogant—if not "racist"—attitude on the part of the dominant Russophones, something encouraged by both empires. Those few Ukrainophones who resisted linguistic apartheid in everyday urban life and stubbornly upheld their ethnolinguistic identity were perceived as nationalists, as impudent and crazy dissidents who dared to publicly challenge behavioral conformity:

Language use has a potent symbolic quality in a politicized linguistic environment: it immediately assigns the user to one of two sides of the ideological barricade. . . . The use of Ukrainian, they realized, is tantamount to opposition to the Soviet state. . . . Although no laws forbid deviations from this behavioral norm (as one Soviet Ukrainian representative once told me, no one "is holding a gun to their heads"), non-Russians in general and Ukrainians in particular appear to understand that insistence on speaking one's native language—especially among Russians—will be perceived as rejection of the "friendship of peoples" and as hostility to the "Soviet people." Few Ukrainians are audacious enough to risk such unpleasantness as public censure, loss of employment, or even jail for the sake of linguistic purity. As a result, they signal their loyalty to the state and sidestep chauvinist reactions by speaking Russian.\textsuperscript{23}

The question remains, however, and needs to be answered: why, nearly a decade into Ukrainian independence, has the state ended such behavioral conformity? And, consequently, why are both Ukrainian language and culture still perceived as inferior to Russian—not only by virtually all Russians but also by many Ukrainians?

**Dysfunctional Culture**

As early as 1987, on the eve of perestroika, Ivan Dzyuba, a prominent Ukrainian dissident writer and author of the well-known 1965 samvydav book *Internationalism or Russification?* published an extended article entitled "Towards a Conceptualization of Ukrainian National Culture as a Complete System."\textsuperscript{24} Having examined various aspects and levels of the functioning of Ukrainian culture, Dzyuba concluded that it is a dysfunctional culture, with many genres, trends, institutions, and phenomena underdeveloped or missing, and many indispensable vertical and horizontal links badly weakened or forcefully interrupted. "Ukrainian culture is a culture with an incomplete structure," Dzyuba bemoaned.

For the first time in the official media the Soviet propagandistic myth on the thriving and flourishing of ethnic cultures in the USSR was challenged. Moreover, the strongest taboo on any reference to Russification was rebutted. "The Ukrainian language," Dzyuba argued,
does not fulfill all of its social and cultural functions, and national language is, after all, the backbone of a national culture. Even non-verbal art forms are linked to a language through imagination which is formulated via language and even through its sounds. . . . And since entire social strata, the non-humanitarian intelligentsia in particular, and the urban population in general, began to abandon the Ukrainian language, all the sphere of Ukrainian language usage has shrunk dramatically, and the entire Ukrainian discourse, its intellectual and spiritual content, became badly impoverished.

At the time, Dzyuba had probably not been aware of the polemics between George G. Grabowicz and Ivan L. Rudnytsky, two prominent Ukrainian scholars in the West, who ten years earlier heatedly argued over Dmytro Chyzhevsky's concept of "complete/incomplete" literatures, cultures, and nations. Being rather preoccupied with political hypercorrectness, Prof. Grabowicz claimed that "the differentiation, and, necessarily, evaluation of nations according to superior and inferior, historical and non-historical, complete and incomplete, is in the realm not of scholarship but of, say, political propaganda." Professor Rudnytsky quite reasonably responded that completeness or incompleteness of any nation or culture reflects primarily its socially and politically determined structure, its ability to function, and has nothing to do with superiority or inferiority, in anthropological terms, that might well have racist implications:

What determines the completeness or incompleteness of a literature is not the presence or absence of certain features, but rather whether a literature can satisfy all the essential cultural needs of its own society during a given historical period. . . . This, of course, has nothing to do with the artistic value of individual works, but refers only to the social function of a literature as a whole.

The dysfunctionalit of Ukrainian culture, conceptualized in sociopolitical terms by Rudnytsky and later by Dzyuba, is a pervasive legacy of colonial subjugation and forceful Russification. Such a postcolonial framework has become rather commonplace in both scholarly and popular writing after Ukraine became an independent state. Such a positivistic approach, however substantiated, leaves little room to comprehensively explain the current "pervasiveness and persistence of a Russian-based sovietized culture," in the words of Wanner. The sovietization and Russification of Ukraine still tend to be treated by scholars as an essentially social and cultural phenomenon—a sort of inertia, inherited, socially constructed, and imposed on society's way of life, thought, and behavior. Implicitly this suggests that, in the newly independent Ukraine, these old patterns could be rapidly, by simple administrative measures, replaced with new ones (i.e., through Ukrainianization and de-sovietization).

Some scholars, however, have challenged this view, pointing instead at the primarily psychological problem of people who had been "raped" for decades and, in order to survive, had to abandon their identity and to accept the alien one, imposed by the "rapists" (i.e., to accept the prolonged perverse relations with the "rapist" as a kind of voluntary quasi-marriage).
The Collective Shadow

Such a breakthrough approach to the Ukrainian postcolonial reality seems to be paved by the American anthropologist Oksana Grabowicz, who delivered a paper at the International Congress of Experts on Ukrainian Studies in L'viv as early as 1993. Her purely academic presentation elicited enormous reaction and was published in the local daily newspaper Ratusha, then reprinted by the Warsaw Ukrainian weekly Nasze slowo, the Berezil monthly in Kharkiv, and the Arka quarterly in Kyiv.\textsuperscript{30}

In her paper Grabowicz argued that centuries of colonial subjugation have led to a perverse impact on both the colonizers and the colonized. The former have gradually developed a superior attitude toward the “inferior” indigenous culture. Meanwhile, the latter have deeply internalized such an attitude, evolving inferiority complexes and accepting a stereotypical, “Oriental” view of themselves, imposed by the colonizers. Such a view of Ukraine was nothing new. The prominent Russian critic Vissarion Belinsky, who labeled Ukrainians as “cast iron headed,” and his Ukrainian contemporary Mykola Hohol’ (a.k.a. Nikolai Gogol’), who wrote rather sympathetically about “Little Russian” songs and dances, had something very important in common. Both considered Ukraine as an exotic, uncivilized borderland that used to have a glorious past and a great folklore which was naturally disappearing and doomed to be assimilated into a superior culture.

To disclose this mechanism of colonial subjugation, Grabowicz employed Carl Jung’s concept of the collective shadow, defined as “a dark side of man, the unconscious, the negative, the destructive, and the self destructive tendencies and desires in the psyche.” When the shadow is severely repressed, the negative contents of the unconscious are activated and forced out as projections on outside objects. Eventually, these projections come to be perceived as qualities of the “other”—the person, group or a nation. Hence, the collective shadow of the dominant society (its subconscious negative self-image) projected onto the oppressed group over a long period of time exerts a ruinous influence on the oppressed because the group begins to identify itself with such a projection. Ultimately, the oppressed group loses confidence in its own qualities (the qualities of its culture and society) and increasingly adopts the colonizers’ views as superior: “The subordinated group at the end becomes a despised minority in their own native land.”\textsuperscript{31}

Ukrainian society shows a remarkable similarity with other colonized societies, in terms of patterns and syndromes already described and elaborated at length by Frantz Fannon, Volodymyr Odajnyk, and many other students of colonialism. In Ukraine the distinction between the two rival groups is basically cultural and linguistic, not racial. Therefore, the problem of the social inferiority of the aboriginal kolkhoz slaves is solved (or at least cushioned) in a manner unthinkable in Africa or America: by passing for white; in other words, by discarding the “lower” Ukrainian language and adopting the “higher” Russian one. As a result, Russification and cultural creolization of East Ukrainian rural aborigines may well continue, despite the formal national independence of Ukraine and even after the granting of official status to the indigenous language.

More often than not the converted aborigines are ashamed of their autochthonous background (e.g., Ukrainian-speaking parents) and are even less in-
clined than ethnic Russians to show any interest in Ukrainian culture, which they consider inferior. Despite the fact that Ukrainian culture of the twentieth century and particularly of the last decade has very significant, internationally recognized, achievements, even the best Ukrainian books, magazines, films, or music are not much in demand in “Ukrainian” cities, whereas third-rate Moscow mass culture (or American, yet in Russian translations) is happily consumed by the aboriginal immigrants from the rural (so far, Ukrainophone) Third World areas. Paradoxically, the huge Russophone population of Ukraine (as well as of many other post-Soviet republics) has failed, so far, to produce any significant cultural artifacts—despite its hitherto cultural/social predominance in the country. On their part, Ukraine still remains “Little Russia,” meaning a primitive supplier of cultural raw materials and a passive consumer of ready-made, second-rate, and obsolete cultural products supplied by the former imperial metropolis.

Many Ukrainian intellectuals therefore remain rather cautious about the future of Ukrainian culture and language and the plight of the Ukrainophone majority-cum-minority in Ukraine. “Neither culturally nor politically independent Ukraine (in the real sense of the word) seems to be possible for a long time on, even under the most favorable circumstances. For a long time, if not eternally, the Ukrainophones will remain a social and cultural minority in the Ukrainian state. Ukrainian language and culture, of course, will persist—but only as assets of a minority group,” Hrabov’s’kyi provocatively argued.33

UKRAINE: TOWARD A POSTCOLONIAL FRAMEWORK

The Power of Nationalistic Myths

The pessimistic forecasts, however substantiated by many aspects of Ukrainian reality, seem to be slightly at odds with some other aspects of Ukrainian historical and current developments. Particularly, they seem to underestimate the resilience of Ukrainian nationalism and Ukrainian identity, which survived for centuries under highly unfavorable circumstances. And they seem to ignore the ambivalent character of the Ukrainian Creole state which, paradoxically, tends to be more Ukrainian than Russian in many (if not all possible) terms.

One may argue, of course—and quite reasonably—that this state, dominated by the “white” Russophone minority, has successfully marginalized the “black” Ukrainophone majority, corrupted a significant part of the Ukrainophone elites, and legitimized its rule by coopting some Ukrainian symbols, heroes, ideas, and narratives. Yet it is not so clear why the Creole elite in Ukraine opted primarily for indigenous, nationalistic heritage rather than Soviet, quasi-internationalist—like the Creoles in neighboring Belarus did. In 1991, such a choice looked quite reasonable in both Ukraine and any other Soviet republics where the Soviet, predominantly Russophone (Creole) nomenclatura was looking for allies among the indigenous nationalists, and for emancipatory narratives elaborated by natives, in order to secede from Moscow and to legitimate independent statebuilding. Yet by 1994, as the Soviet republics-cum-independent states were successfully privatized by local postcommunist Creoles, the need for ideologically
committed allies had vanished. It was especially clear in Belarus and Ukraine, where modern national identity has not been determined by race or ethnicity or religion but, rather, by common language and culture and a desperate struggle against Russification. It proved to be very difficult to cure historical injuries and to obliterate the fact that Russophones were on the other side of historical barricade, on the side of the oppressor, "rapist," and colonizer. Since independence both Russophones and native-speakers seemed to be unified by a common state, citizenship, territory, and history. But different cultural and linguistic identities still divide them and, moreover, significantly subvert the unifying effect of civic factors, giving both groups very different, if not opposite, ideas of their history(-ies), statehood(-s), geopolitical arrangement(-s), and desirable development(-s) for the future.

In both Belarus and Ukraine, the post-Soviet Creole elite had eventually broken ties with local nationalists and opted for overtly pro-Soviet, antinationalistic leaders. Kuchma, however, has not become a local brand of Lukashenka, despite a strong pro-Russian rhetoric, and promises to de facto preserve the colonial status quo by making Russian de jure the second state language in Ukraine. Of course, the indigenous nationalists in Ukraine proved to be much stronger than in Belarus, making it rather impossible for any Creole elite to simply ignore them. However, indigenous nationalists proved to be a minority both in 1991, when they managed to mobilize up to 30% of the electorate to support the nationalistic presidential candidates; and in 1994, when they succeeded to mobilize only 46% of votes against the assumed threat to Ukrainian independence embodied in the would-be pro-Russian candidate Leonid Kuchma.

How, therefore, could such a minority force, for nearly a decade, get the ruling Creole elites to accept Ukrainian as a language of official communication; to grant Ukrainophone leaders various positions in the state apparatus, including ministerial posts; to promote, however equivocally, the gradual Ukrainianization of education and state institutions; to gradually abandon Soviet symbols and narratives and to accept those of Ukrainian National Republic (1918–1920), of Ukrainian seventeenth-century Kozakdom, and finally, of Kyivan Rus'? Why do Ukrainian Creoles make so many concessions to the indigenes—unlike their Belarusian colleagues who seem to have found the "final solution" for the "Belarusophone problem"?

The only reasonable answer to these questions is that Ukrainian nationalistic myths are much more powerful than Belarusian, and therefore more attractive for local Russophones, at least in some, the most acceptable and adaptable parts (Kyivan Rus' and Kozakdom rather than OUN and UPA, Hrushevsky rather than Petliura, etc.). Ukrainian Russophones seem to be an even less homogeneous group than Ukrainophones. Many of them are actually bilingual: they speak more Russian than Ukrainian just because Russian is the common language in places where they live and work. In the Ukrainian environment they easily change their communication patterns, proving thereby that the sociological term language of convenience is probably as dubious as that of the mother tongue. In fact, the nearly 20% difference between the numbers of people who claim Ukrainian to be their native language (over 60%) and who claim Ukrainian is their language of convenience (over 40%) reflects, on one hand, the rather high attachment of many Ukrainians to their mother tongue and, on the
other hand, rather low possibility to employ this tongue in their everyday life in heavily Russified (and rather unfriendly to Ukrainian speech) East Ukrainian cities. In a sense, the ambiguous linguistic identity of these people resembles the identity of many Ukrainian immigrants to the West who still claim their native language to be Ukrainian but find it much more convenient to communicate in English when living in Toronto or Philadelphia.

Another indicator of the relatively high attachment of many Ukrainian Russophones to things Ukrainian can be seen in the fact that nearly all of them agree that their children and grandchildren should be fluent in Ukrainian; nearly two-thirds of them confirm that they would not mind their children and grandchildren to be instructed at school in Ukrainian.\textsuperscript{37} This is an apparent sign that although many Russophones in Ukraine refuse (quite naturally) to be Ukrainianized themselves, are ready to accept the smooth Ukrainianization of their offspring.

In Search of Appropriate Cultural Policy

In sum, we may conclude that Ukraine has not become and probably will not ever become another Belarus just because Ukrainian Creoles came to be attached to the indigenes’ land both politically and culturally much more than their Belarusian siblings. According to sociological data, fewer than 2% of Ukrainian Russophones identify themselves with Russia politically; many more, however, do so culturally. But again, there is a significant difference between their prevailing orientation toward high Russian culture, versatile and rather ambivalent attitude towards Russian popular culture, and extremely low attachment to Russian traditional culture and folklore. Ukrainian Russophones perceive Ukrainian rather than Russian folklore as their own, consume rather sympathetically Ukrainian popular culture, and, as a rule, are eager to accept Ukrainian high culture as soon as they manage to discover it under the layers of colonial biases and postcolonial ignorance.

Such a biased, a priori negative attitude towards Ukrainian culture on the significant part of Ukrainian Russophones is not easy to overcome, of course. Yet, the local Ukrainian patriotism of virtually all Russophones, as well as the ambivalent, latent sympathetically, however cautious and socially oppressed, attitude of many of them toward Ukrainian culture, provides Ukrainian activists with sufficient room to gradually subvert the negative stereotypes by appropriate, comprehensive, and coherent cultural politics.

The first attempt to systemically elaborate the cultural policy of the Ukrainian state was undertaken as early as 1994, by the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine, briefly headed at the time by Ivan Dzyuba. Under his auspices, a team of bright young experts analyzed the current cultural situation in Ukraine and produced some preliminary guidelines for the cultural policy to be pursued.\textsuperscript{38} They considered four major models of cultural politics defined as “European,” “nativist,” “wild-western,” and “CIS” (Commonwealth of Independent States). In Ukraine, they argued, the economic conditions of mafia-style capitalism promote in fact no cultural policy but a “wild-west” laissez-faire, while the political conditions are rather supportive of a “CIS” cultural (under)development (i.e., neocolonial
dominance by the former imperial culture, primarily through mass culture, and
the further marginalization of Ukrainian culture and language). To alter this,
they opted for the European model as a sophisticated mixture of free-
market laissez-faire and various forms of state paternalism for national culture and sup-
port for the high arts. The nativist model, however, should not have been aban-
doned either, because in their view it may be rather effectively adopted in a
postcolonial country to revive the formerly discriminated against national cul-
ture and language.

Within the framework of the European model, the young reformers sug-
gested gradual transformation of the Ministry of Culture into a project-
management and grant-distribution agency. They insisted on greater transpar-
ency and efficiency of state cultural institutions, and encouraged competi-
tiveness among grant seekers. At the same time, in order to overcome the colonial
legacy, they provided protectionist measures for Ukrainian culture which em-
phasized tax credits rather than direct subsidies for Ukrainian cultural products
and activities. The major strategic goal outlined by the reformers was to pro-
mote by all means the modern, primarily urban, and youth-oriented image of
Ukrainian culture.

The election of Kuchma and resignation of Dzyuba in July 1994 ended the
courageous, yet quixotic, attempts to reform one of many post-Soviet bureau-
cratic strongholds in Ukraine from within. The negative cultural tendencies
(wild west and CIS) remained dominant in Ukraine, although the positive
(European and nativist) have not been completely abandoned either. Six years
later, they still are noticeable in both public discussions and some government
policies, however weak, incoherent, and inconsistent.

Society versus the State

The most if not the only significant change that occurred on the Ukrainian
cultural scene within the last decade was the emergence of a relatively large,
outspoken, well-educated and socially well-established group of intellectuals
who have no illusions about Ukrainian state and its cultural or any other politics.
As a rule, they tend to dissociate themselves from a highly corrupt and cultur-
ally incompetent government. They seem skeptical about their predecessors
who, by and large, have opted for cooperation with a ruling regime (however
limited, reserved, and equivocal), and accepted en masse diplomatic, govern-
mental, and other posts through a romantic or, perhaps, self-deceptive belief in
the ability to improve and, maybe, Ukrainianize the post-Soviet establishment
from within.

At the same time, they are not prone to demonize the Ukrainian oligarchic
state as anti-Ukrainian, and the ruling Creole elite as "Ukrainophobic." With a
grain of philosophical irony, they claim that the Ukrainian state is very bad but
so far this is the best state Ukrainians have ever had; it is almost as good as the
Austro-Hungarian monarchy which ruled the western part of Ukraine through-
out the nineteenth century. The Habsburgs, one may remember, provided virtu-
ally no support for Ukrainian culture and language, but, unlike Russians, they
did not oppress them either. As a result, western Ukrainians, without any gov-
ernmental support, developed their own civic and cultural institutions, and en-
tered the twentieth century with modern national self-awareness while eastern Ukrainians had been arrested in their national and cultural development and largely preserved until present a premodern, quasi-medieval level of civic consciousness and national self-awareness.

Today, for the first time in their history, eastern Ukrainians have a government that does not kill them, starve them deliberately to death, deport them to Siberia, oppress their language, or impose censorship. One may complain that the government is not good enough, but it would be unwise to ignore the rare historical opportunity to successfully replicate what western Ukrainians did hundred years ago: promote national culture and self-awareness by the efforts of civil society rather than an alien or, at best, indifferent state. This belief is reflected in deeds and words of many Ukrainian intellectuals, for example, in the following statement of the prominent young artist Tiberiy Silvashi:

In the last decade, we have a very favorable situation for artistic activity. The state is not interested in us any more, it goes into various businesses, except ideology, thank God. Somebody becomes anxious about this, somebody keeps on begging for state subsidies. But the state guardianship over the arts usually proves to be too expensive for artists. . . . As long as there is freedom of artistic expression in Ukraine, there is no reason to emigrate. Emigration could be pushed only by persecutions, terror by the only and “true” ideology. We should be happy that our rulers have no ideology, so far.19

Such a philosophical attitude does not prevent, of course, Ukrainian intellectuals from sharply criticizing the ruling, highly corrupted, elite and the policies they pursue. “Our culture is oppressed, and our rulers lack culture,” a leading Ukrainian writer of the younger generation, Yuri Andrukhovych, said, having withdrawn his candidacy for the (Taras) Shevchenko State Prize (traditionally presented by the President). Andrukhovych argued:

I don’t know whether seven years [of independence] can be considered as a long period from the standpoint of eternity, but I know that national culture remains unfree, and the state leaves much to be desired in terms of cultural standards. . . . Our current political order is conveniently referred to as “transitional” (maybe eternally transitional). To me, it is personified by a steadily increasing “lumpenization”—what Shevchenko called the reign of stupid and thick-headed bureaucrats, complemented by mushrooming structures built in the Soviet baroque style and paid for by the nouveaux riches; by our decision to be like Africa, and by the lack of the will to be true to oneself—all of which reigns in Ukraine.

The sharp polemics with more “collaborative” predecessors and colleagues could be read behind the lines of Andrukhovych’s statement:

How can one accept a government award against this backdrop? If I did, I would feel like an accomplice or maybe like one of those hear-no-evil speak-no-evil monkeys. I’m not a lackey and need no handouts. I don’t want to be one of those that accept them and wake up the next morning morally castrated, resting on laurels made from a dying tree.40
Intellectuals versus the Intelligentsia

The profound disparity between the postmodern Ukrainian intellectuals and traditional populist intelligentsia has been embodied perhaps most graphically in the extensive conflict and eventual split within the official post-Soviet Writers’ Union of Ukraine. In Autumn 1996, during the Union congress in Kyiv, a relatively small but notorious group of young and middle-aged writers left the organization and in March the following year founded an alternative Association of Ukrainian Writers with about 100 members. There apparently were both generational and aesthetic reasons for the schism: the dissidents proved to be not only younger but also more Western-oriented, better educated, inclined to modern and postmodern cultural practices, adjusted to a free-market environment, more dynamic, and published, translated, and anthologized abroad, and rather skeptical about any ideology. In sum, they resemble more nonengaged West European intellectuals than the ideologically preoccupied East European intelligentsia, a dubious product of inner freedom and outer slavery.

The major discrepancy yet, although largely under the surface, was about the Soviet legacy and the Writers’ Union reluctance to break with it definitely and unequivocally. Created by the Communist Party in 1934 as a kind of a “literati kolkhoz,” the Writers’ Union was heavily branded from the very beginning with servilism, mediocrity, state paternalism, preoccupation with ideology and propaganda, intrinsic nativism and anti-Westernism, authoritarianism, and intolerance. This legacy, from the dissidents’ point of view, had not been duly overcome during the first years of national independence, prompting them to establish their own very loose professional association—partly to alter the seemingly mainstream literary process, partly to draw the public attention to desovietization problems.

For some observers, this episode has heralded a more general tendency of a gradual decline of the Ukrainian intelligentsia as a social stratum—with all its agendas, behavioral patterns, and discursive practices. This would be matched by a gradual rise of independent intellectuals with a more moral than ideological basis, professionally rather than ideologically motivated. The problem, however, is that not only are the prospects for Ukrainian democracy unsteady, but the very future of Ukrainian language, culture, and Ukrainophones themselves remains unclear.

Therefore, many observers remain reserved about the “end of the intelligentsia” and the advent of a bright postcolonial freedom, nonpartisanship, and a firmly committed non-commitment to ideology. The Ukrainian poet Oksana Zabuzhko prematurely declared: “The ‘New Wave,’ the generation to which I belong, is actually the first one after the last six decades that has been freed from the obligation ‘to save the nation.’” Michael Naydan, an American Slavist, aptly remarked that she is only partly correct because Writers like Zabuzhko, as well as hundreds of others, by writing in Ukrainian today continue that traditional line from Shevchenko. While they are not “obligated” to save the nation, they, indeed, do so. They are absolutely necessary for two primary tasks: (1) to promote the expansion of the usage of the Ukrainian language and culture within the
borders of Ukraine; and (2) to establish an articulate voice for the nation as a bridge to the West and the rest of the world.43

As long as the Ukrainian language is endangered, any attempt to write in it, promote it, and make it thrive, is an essentially moral choice, a choice for the weakest species against the strongest, an act of solidarity with a marginalized culture against a dominant one. Or, as Zabuzhko has less pathetically put it, it's something "very much akin to being a masochistic occupation."44 The common truth is that "in Ukrainian history the cultural has been inexorably linked to the political,"45 something that has remained virtually unchallenged, Naydan believes:

With independence in 1991 the Ukrainian idea has been realized and, for the first time, Ukraine has control over its own destiny as a state. Yet over the course of over eight years of independence, that state has been defined by its own government not culturally, but rather only in geographic terms, with the same borders that had delineated it previously as a republic in the Soviet Union with the concomitant bicultural/bilingual remnants of imperialist Russian and imperialist Soviet rule. Thus, the cultural impetus that had sustained the Ukrainian idea over two centuries remains—but in reality only among a still relatively small number of cultural activists. While the government has declared Ukrainian as the official national language, with benign indifference it has failed to support the growth of the indigenous Ukrainian literary culture in virtually any way.46

The politically correct observations by an American scholar have probably little in common with the frantic Manifesto of the Ukrainian intelligentsia. And the sardonic style of Andrukhovych's Eulogy hardly resembles a highly discreet speech of Dzyuba, who claims:

Still, there is a dramatic lack of any coherent and reasonable cultural policy of the state, and there are heated arguments about its concepts in Ukraine. The further persistence of such a situation is fraught with serious consequences since the cultural problems evoke little comprehension in Ukrainian society while in some [upper] circles, including the ruling elite milieu, one may find overt counteraction against the development of Ukrainian national culture.47

Yet, at least one feature apparently brings all these texts together: their authors are highly uncertain to which degree (if at all) the "Ukrainian" state is Ukrainian and whether the natural rights of Ukrainophones to preserve and develop their language and culture are really affirmed in Ukraine's postcolonial environment.

CONCLUSION

Such an ambiguous situation may persist for an indefinite time because of a number of factors. First, while Russophones seem to have a numerical preponderance over Ukrainophones or at least stronger social positions in urban centers, Ukrainophones are far more active, vociferous, and committed to their cause. Second, neither Russophones nor Ukrainophones are unanimous in their cultural orientations. While many less educated Ukrainophones are inclined to
Russian (mass) culture, many educated Russophones are rather bilingual and sympathetic about Ukrainian culture. Finally, the culturally ambivalent and indifferent postcommunist elites in Ukraine are interested in preserving rather than resolving such a situation because it enables them to manipulate both sides and to effectively hold power.

Such a dysfunctional policy preserves a “bad peace,” which is certainly better than a “good war.” But, at the same time, such a policy makes any prospects for a “good peace” quite bleak. Neither a modern Ukrainian nation nor a civil society can fully emerge unless a modern national identity and civic consciousness are forged and accepted by the majority of the population. So far most of these people are neither Ukrainians nor citizens sensu stricto—because they are predominantly Homo Sovieticus. As long as desovietization and de-Russification are delayed Ukraine is doomed to political-economic stagnation. So far Ukraine remains at the crossroads in all possible terms—"undecided" in cultural direction, economic reforms, or geopolitical orientations. If the Russophone and Soviet culture persists Ukraine will resemble another postsoviet "Eurasian" republic, like Belarus. If Ukrainian (anti-Soviet) culture achieves the upper hand, then Ukraine will certainly take the European way of development, like its Baltic, Central, and East European neighbors.

The first scenario seems to be highly explosive—as the experience of Northern Ireland or Basque country graphically confirms. Modern Ukrainian (Ukrainophone) national self-awareness that emerged in the nineteenth century encompasses today at least one-third of the population, having its stronghold in Western Ukraine but recruiting supporters all over the country. This self-awareness may be counterweighted with modern Russian or, the most probably, premodern-cum-modern Creole (Ukrainian Russophone) self-awareness. So far there is no evidence anywhere that a modern national identity, once having emerged, would ever disappear. This means that the modern Ukrainian self-awareness can be contained, at the worst scenario, within its current boundaries of the 30% of the population. Ukrainophones would become a minority on their own territory, that is, a historically abused minority which would never accept a minority status as just and legitimate. It would certainly launch a protracted and probably endless struggle for its "natural," "God-given" rights.

The second scenario seems to be also difficult to complete, but, as the experience of Latvia and Estonia shows, it can be done if appropriate cultural and linguistic policy is supported by successful economic reforms. In Ukraine the economy is of paramount importance because any extension of modern Ukrainian national self-awareness largely depends on changes in the agricultural sector, on modernization of the rural/provincial environment where a majority of East Ukrainian Ukrainophones live. So far most of them have rather premodern, local self-awareness, and have virtually no civic consciousness being heavily dependent on the quasi-feudal kolkhoz system. Russophones in Ukraine, as was pointed out earlier, are prone to accept gradual “Ukrainianization” of their children because of a number of reasons. First, the Ukrainian language is not as alien for them as Latvian or Estonian and, at the same time, is not perceived as inferior to Russian as are the Central Asian languages. Modernization of the Ukrainian economy and promotion of modern Ukrainian culture may ultimately eradicate any biases against things Ukrainian. Second, most Ukrainian Russo-
phones have not yet developed modern national self-awareness (of the Creole type) and, in these terms, are more susceptible to any properly arranged nationalism than committed Ukrainophones. Finally, even those Russians and Russophones who have firmly developed their national (Russian or Creole) self-awareness, as opposed to the Ukrainophone "other," would much more easily accept minority status than committed Ukrainians—just because they neither feel their demands are historically quite legitimate nor believe that Ukraine is the only place where Russian language and culture could be preserved and cherished.

One may suggest that there could be also a third scenario of peaceful coexistence of two cultures, two languages, and, actually, two nations (Creole Ukrainian and Ukrainophone Ukrainian) on the same territory. The Belarusian experience shows, however, that in a post-Soviet state this is hardly possible: formal equality of two cultures and languages means in reality nothing more than preserving the odious colonial status quo. Yet, even if Ukraine (or Belarus) were an exemplary liberal democracy, it would not be so easy to practically equalize two languages, one of which has a reputation as international, empowered by centuries of imperial domination, while the other one is perceived as a local, stigmatized by centuries of colonial subjugation. Even reputable "international" languages like German and French, or French and English, are not on a par in Bern or Ottawa, let alone in Brussels, where French is apparently much more "equal" in practical terms than Flemish. Still, in Ukraine there is one more problem, uncommon elsewhere: Ukrainophones and Russophones cannot be successfully "cantonized" (i.e., administratively separated and satisfied with relative cultural autonomy within certain native territory). For Ukrainophones, all the territory of Ukraine is native and they would hardly accept being ghettoized in rural regions—a sort of cultural autonomy the Russophones are eager to concede. Finally, the main question remains: as far as Creole (Russophone) identity is largely premodern, ambivalent, vague, and virtually based on no original culture, is it worthwhile to promote this identity into full-fledged national self-awareness while 30% of Ukrainians already profess a modern Ukrainian national self-awareness?

Although most experts recognize that the economy, in the Ukrainian case, is to play a crucial role, culture also remains an important battlefield. It has largely determined the context of Ukrainian national identity for decades and seems likely to determine it in the decades to come.

NOTES


3. For the relevant bibliography see, for example, Andrew Wilson, The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 320–321.

5. Roman Szporluk, “Ukraine: From an Imperial Periphery to a Sovereign State,” *Daedalus*, vol. 126, no. 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 85–120.


8. According to the same source (ibid., p. 115), the proportion of students instructed in Ukrainian in institutes of higher education increased from 37% in 1992–1993 to 51% in 1995–1996.

9. Just to cite a few random samples from Russian mass periodicals published in Ukraine which represent the opposite view: “Now, it is [Ukrainian] bureaucrats who reign supreme, determining language policy in the country. It is they, who, with a typical bureaucratic zeal, turned the support for Ukrainian language into a ruthless struggle against everything Russian.” Pavel Smirnov, “V Ukrainye russkiy yazyk nye dolzhen chuvstvovat' syebya inostrannym,” *Fakty*, 18 September 1999; “Expulsion of Russian language from the territory of Ukraine is underway. . . . Nobody respects the people who cannot defend themselves. Therefore we [Russians] should get organized. . . . The main goal of our organization is to protect the rights of Russians [in Ukraine] and to disseminate information about rights violations.” Lyudmila Gordyeeva, “Russkiye s'yezdami bogatyieu,” *Donyeitskiy kryazh*, no. 25 (1–7 July 1999).


15. The concept was elaborated at length by James Mace in his conference presentation “Ukraine as a Dysfunctional State.” See T. K., I. Makaryk, and Roman Weretelniky, eds., *Towards a New Ukraine I: Ukraine and the New World Order, 1991–1996* (Ottawa: Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa, 1997). To address the same phenomenon, Paul D'Anieri employed the term “weak state”— “where weak describes not the power of the state relative to other states but the ability of the government to adopt a policy and implement it in the society.” “Ukrainian society is divided,” he comments, “and its institutions do little to resolve those divisions. Indeed, the government may be even more divided than the society.” See Paul D'Anieri, “The Impact of Domestic Divisions on Ukrainian Foreign Policy: Ukraine as a ‘Weak State,’” in Taras Kuzio, Robert S. Kravchuk, and Paul D'Anieri, *State and Institution Building in Ukraine* (New York: St. Martin's, 2000), p. 84.

16. Ukrainian sociologist Yevhen Holovakha was perhaps the first who explored this
phenomenon in his article “Osozbyvosti politychnoy svidomosti: ambivalentnist suspil-
17. One of Ukraine’s leaders visited the museum of Taras Shevchenko in 1999. Shevchenko is the greatest Ukrainian poet and a sacred figure in the Ukrainian national
iconostasis. The top politician was highly surprised to know that Shevchenko was also a
gifted artist, despite the fact that this is common knowledge and taught in schools.
18. Catherine Wanner, Burden of Dreams: History and Identity in Post-Soviet
19. The concept was initially introduced in a couple of my articles published in
1997–1998 and eventually incorporated into my book Vid Malorosiyi do Ukrayiny:
For further discussion on this concept see Oleksandr Hrytsenko’s and Serhiy
Hrabov’skyi’s articles in Krytyka, vol. 4, nos. 9–10 (September–October), 2000.
21. In this conceptual framework, the Soviet propiska system, largely preserved in
post-Soviet republics and even strengthened in today’s Moscow, can be interpreted as a
system of visa surrogates which enabled the better-off urban “First World” to limit the
influx of immigrants from the rural “inner colony.” Not accidentally, these immigrants
got a nick-name, limitchiki.
22. Ian Bremmer, “The Politics of Ethnicity: Russians in the New Ukraine,” Europe-
Asia Studies, vol. 46, no. 2 (March–April 1994), p. 266. See also Bohdan Krawchenko,
Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine (Basingstoke,
England: Macmillan, 1985). According to Krawchenko, the percentage decline of
Ukrainians in the student population since the 1930s was a “direct consequence of the
Russification policies which put Ukrainians at a natural disadvantage vis-a-vis Russians
in the struggle for vuč-entrance.” In particular, Germ Jannmaat comments, Ukrainians
proved to be less competitive “because of their low social origins (most of them had a
working class or collective farm background), with insufficient means and skills to vie
with the Russians and Jews, who disproportionately came from an intelligentsia or mid-
dle-class milieu” (Jannmaat, p. 58).
23. Alexander J. Motyl, Will the Non-Russians Rebel? State, Ethnicity and Stability
24. Ivan Dzyuba, “Chy usvidomylyuemosi natsionalnu kulturu yak tsilisnist?” Kultura
i zhytia, 24 January 1987. For an abridged English version see Soviet Ukrainian Affairs,
25. Ivan Dzyuba, “Chy usvidomylyuemosi natsionalnu kulturu yak tsilisnist?” Nauka i
26. George G. Grabowicz, Toward a History of Ukrainian Literature (Cambridge,
27. Ivan L. Rudnytsky, “Observations on the Problem of ‘Historical’ and ‘Non-
historical’ Nations,” in his Essays in Modern Ukrainian History (Edmonton: Canadian
28. See Wanner, Burden of Dreams.
29. See in particular Oksana Zabuzhko, Shevchenkiv mif Ukrainy (Kyiv: Abrys,
1998) and Khronyky vid Fortinbrasa (Kyiv: Fakt, 2000).
30. For an English version see Oksana Grabowicz, “The Legacy of Colonialism and
Communism in Ukraine: Some Key Issues,” Perspectives on Contemporary Ukraine,
vol. 2, no. 2 (March–April 1995).
31. Ibid., cited from the manuscript in the possession of the author, pp. 3–4.
32. While Oleksandr Dovzhenko’s and Serhiy Paradzhanov’s films, Arkhypenko’s sculptures, or Silvestrov’s music are still categorized in the West as “Russian,” Ukrainian writing (at least that in Ukrainian) escapes from this unfortunate labeling. A number of anthologies of contemporary Ukrainian literature have been recently published and received good reviews in the West. In particular, the American anthology From Three Worlds: Writing from Contemporary Ukraine (Boston: Zephyr Press, 1996) was reprinted in hardcover after the initial, rather unexpected, success of the paperback edition. A few more publications should be mentioned here: Yuri Andrukhovych’s and Oksana Zabuzhko’s prose, translated into many European languages (including Finnish and Hungarian), and Oleh Lysheha’s poetry distinguished in 1999 with the American PEN-Club Award for the best translated poetry book.


34. As Andrew Wilson has aptly noticed, “when opinion polls are sensitive to the possibility of dual or situational identity and offer a broader choice of categories [than the rigid census questionnaire], the results can be very different.” Wilson refers to the 1997 survey which revealed that 27% of the respondents identified themselves as “both Ukrainian and Russian,” including “more Ukrainian than Russian” 7%, “equally Ukrainian and Russian” 14%, “more Russian than Ukrainian” 5%. Only 56% defined themselves as “Ukrainian only,” and 11% as “Russian only”—against 73% and 22%, according to the census data, respectively. Wilson, The Ukrainians, p. 219.


41. The split in the Writers’ Union gives us the most graphical, but not the only, example of how the nascent civil society tries to overcome the legacy of sovietism, etatism, and state paternalism. The old Soviet “creative unions,” the Academy of Sciences, and some other institutions are still privileged by the post-Soviet state (all of them have been recently declared “National”)—while the new institutions have no subsidies, wages, pensions, rent discounts, and tax exemptions. For a comprehensive analysis of similar problems in Ukrainian humanities, see Hryhorii Hrabovich, “Sovietyatsiya humanistyky,” Krytyka, vol. 1, nos. 1–2 (Summer–Fall 1997); also Marko Pavlyshyn, Kanon ta ikonostas (Kyiv: Chas, 1997).


47. Ivan Dzyuba, “Problemy kultury v nezalezniy Ukraini,” in T. Kis, I. Makaryk, and Roman Weretelnik, eds., Towards a New Ukraine I: Ukraine and the New World
Order, 1991–1996. (Ottawa: Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa, 1997), p. 120.

48. “In Ukraine there is great consensus on the need to build an inclusive nation around the civic features. . . . The problem is that such civic features are not likely to be sufficient to give great cohesion to the people of Ukraine. In part this is because civic features are inherently less likely than ethnic and cultural features to evoke an emotional attachment to the nation. Also, however, the fact that the Ukrainian state is young and its political institutions are not very effective and certainly not very well respected means that relying on civic components of national identity is likely not going to be sufficient to bind the citizenry together. Thus, nation-builders in Ukraine must rely heavily on ethnic or cultural factors to unite the population. And here there are two main options in Ukraine that are popular and potentially viable. One might be termed an Ethnic Ukrainian National Identity, and the other an East Slavic National Identity.” See Stephen Shulman, “Nation-Building and Ukrainian Foreign Policy,” in Theofil Kis and Irena Makaryk, eds., Towards a New Ukraine III: Geopolitical Imperatives of Ukraine: Regional Contexts (Ottawa: Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa, 2001), pp. 11–30. Despite the vague terminology (Ukrainophone and, respectively, Creole identities seem to be more precise in this case), the American scholar rightly stresses that any Ukrainian government “must choose between an East Slavic national identity and an Ethnic Ukrainian one,” in order to unify the nation and to mobilize it for much-needed reforms. Shulman seems, however, to mistakenly believe that “there is no right or wrong answer here as to which of these choices is ‘best’—these are purely normative questions that depend on the values of the observer.” I am arguing here that the “Ukrainian” choice is better because it is more acceptable for the majority of the people and less prone to set about the endless conflict for the future.

49. In 1998, I failed to find any person in the French embassy in Kyiv able to communicate in Ukrainian. English, as a neutral language, was also boldly rejected. The only languages in use were French and Russian. The most astonishing thing was that nobody bothered to apologize for this. To the contrary, the young women in the consulate responded aggressively, with extreme arrogance.
Mass Attitudes and Ethnic Conflict in Ukraine

Craig A. Weller

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, 25 million Russians found themselves outside the Russian Federation. No longer were these Russians the majority ethnic group of the Soviet Union. Russians outside Russia found themselves in the new position of being part of ethnic minorities in countries renewing or beginning the complicated process of state building. The fate of these Russians, to what state they owe their allegiance, how they might figure or be manipulated in relations between Russia and her neighbors, and what impact they might have in the democratization processes of post-Soviet states are just a few of the issues that have become the object of intense interest among scholars.¹

Of the over 25 million Russians living outside Russia, roughly 44% of them live in Ukraine. They number nearly 11.4 million and make up roughly 22% of the population.² They are by far the largest ethnic minority in Ukraine. Paul Kolstoe has determined that in Ukraine, "four out of every five non-Ukrainians are Russian."³ These numbers, in and of themselves, are of interest to those studying the impact of large ethnic minorities on the process of democratic consolidation and transition.⁴ Perhaps more worrisome for observers interested in the potential for ethnic conflict are the assertions of some scholars that there has been a growing perception in Ukraine, especially among Russians and Russophones, that the Ukrainian state since 1991 has embarked on a nationalizing course.⁵

This chapter, based on an examination of all-Ukrainian surveys conducted in 1993, 1995, and 1998,⁶ addresses the question of to what extent the Ukrainian population believes in the likelihood of ethnic conflict. This chapter argues four points. First, attitudes of Ukrainians and Russians toward the likelihood of ethnic conflict have remained remarkably stable over time and are consistent with the low level of violent interethnic conflict in Ukraine since 1991. Second, possible perceptions of nationalizing tendencies by the Ukrainian state do not seem to be manifested in either Ukrainophone or Russophone attitudes toward the likelihood of ethnic conflict. Third, when the regional dimension is considered, polarization along the lines that we might expect from regional voting preferences is not powerfully reflected in attitudes towards ethnic conflict. Fourth,
surveys indicate generally low levels of ethnic distance between Ukrainians and Russians, but even in regions where perceptions of ethnic distance are greatest, there is not an accompanying increase in percentages of respondents who believe there is bound to be conflict. While recognizing that Ukrainians and Russians do differ on important issues in Ukraine, this chapter argues against viewing these differences as evidence of a deep social cleavage along ethnic lines that is bound to lead to conflict. Instead, this chapter offers evidence of increased partisanship as a factor that might help explain the seemingly incongruous existence of both low expectations of ethnic conflict and the electoral divisions witnessed in 1994. In other words, the 1994 presidential elections might have been an indication that the voters of Ukraine were actually getting better at democracy—a pattern that seems to be confirmed by all-Ukrainian surveys conducted in 1998, as well as by the presidential elections of October–November 1999.

CIVIC AND NATIONALIZING STATE?

In 1991, there seemed to be no shortage of obstacles to the democratic consolidation of post-Soviet Ukraine. Differences with Russia over the Black Sea Fleet, the status of the Crimea, and nuclear weapons were all issues that might have served as potential flashpoints. Add to these issues economic hardship, a large Russian minority, and a common border with the Russian Federation, and the ground in Ukraine seemed to be fertile for conflict along ethnic divisions. Thus far, the worst fears of outside observers have not been fulfilled. This is not to argue that there have not been incidents of ethnic conflict. Indeed, Ukraine has not been totally immune from violent conflict along ethnic dimensions. Ethnic conflict in Ukraine is the exception, however, not the norm, and these incidents remain fairly isolated.

Scholars might be tempted to explain this relative absence of ethnic conflict by Ukraine's avowed commitment to define the state in civic rather than ethnic terms. The Ukrainian citizenship law, a variant of the "zero principle," is one of the most liberal citizenship laws of the post-Soviet states. Moreover, other indicators of political discrimination based on ethnicity, including restrictions on political participation, election to office, and political association, appear to be mostly absent.

Several studies, however, have questioned Ukraine's commitment to define the state in civic rather than ethnocultural terms. David Laitin metaphorically refers to Ukraine as "Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde." Laitin writes:

Ukraine presents to the world a civic agenda; but just below the surface seethes anger against, even hatred of Russians. The West sees the civic face of Dr. Jekyll; the Russians are beginning to see the enraged one, Mr. Hyde. Which half of the double personality will prevail is a question that is deeply worrisome to Russians now living in Ukraine.
Some of Laitin’s supporting evidence includes the threatening language by both radical and national democrats appearing in the Ukrainian-language press.¹³

Dominique Arel, as early as 1995, wrote on the perception that Ukraine had initiated a nationalizing agenda: “Despite official rhetoric that it [Ukraine] embraced a territorial, or civic, conception of the state, that is, one not favoring one national group at the expense of the another, after the 1991 independence a perception began to grow, particularly in the eastern and southern regions, that the Ukrainian state was being set on a nationalist course. The two most divisive issues revolve around language policy and Ukraine’s relations with Russia.”¹⁴

Arel goes on to argue that the “nationalizing intent” was not directed at any particular national minority but at a linguistic group, the Russophones. He concludes: “The state sent signals that Russian might be phased out of state institutions; decreed that the language of instruction in schools should be determined by an ethnic, rather than linguistic, criterion, and that all higher educational institutions will have to transfer to Ukrainian; and engaged in a hostile political discourse toward Russia based on an exclusive and victimized conception of Ukrainian versus Russian identities.”

It is important, I think, to distinguish the differences between Laitin’s and Arel’s views. Laitin’s language is much stronger and most powerfully expressed by the ”Jekyll and Hyde” metaphor. Laitin suggests that Ukraine is Janus-faced, showing a civic side to the West and another side to ethnic Russians. He implies that just below the surface, many ethnic Ukrainians harbor angry, if not hateful, feelings toward ethnic Russians. Finally, he intimates that ethnic Russians recognize this and are increasingly apprehensive and perhaps fearful of it. If this scenario is accurate, one could reasonably expect it to be strongly reflected in attitudes towards ethnic conflict among both ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians. Given Laitin’s characterization, one might anticipate the expectation of ethnic conflict to be substantial among both groups.

Arel’s views are more measured. Writing prior to 1995, Arel doesn’t necessarily accept that Ukraine has embarked on a nationalizing course, but argues that this has widely been the perception, especially in eastern and southern regions of Ukraine, where there are significant numbers of ethnic Russians and Russophones. Perceptions are often more crucial in framing beliefs than reality. If there has been a perception that Ukraine has been instituting nationalizing policies, one might also reasonably expect this to be reflected in attitudes toward ethnic conflict, especially among Russians. Especially in the East and in the South we might anticipate higher expectations of ethnic conflict among ethnic Russians.

**ATTITUDES TOWARD ETHNIC CONFLICT: THE ETHNIC GROUP AND LANGUAGE (NON-) FACTORS**

Addressing first possible ethnic differences in attitudes toward ethnic conflict, neither the seething "anger and even hatred" of Russians by Ukrainians nor the Russians’ unmasking of the "enraged" Mr. Hyde that Laitin alludes to are
reflected in the attitudes of either ethnic Ukrainians or ethnic Russians toward the likelihood of ethnic conflict (Tables 5.1 and 5.2).

Table 5.1
Attitudes toward the Likelihood of Ethnic Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1993 n = 2264</th>
<th>1995 n = 2260</th>
<th>1998 n = 2196</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bound to be conflict</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can get along</td>
<td>90.9%</td>
<td>89.4%</td>
<td>93.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Table 5.1, when we look at the attitudes of all ethnic groups, we see consistently low percentages of respondents believing that there is bound to be ethnic conflict in Ukraine. What is also notable is that the percentages are, in general, consistent from year to year. There is a slight increase in the percentage who believe there is bound to be conflict in 1995, but the percentage decreases to lower than 1993 levels in 1998.

Table 5.2
Attitudes toward the Likelihood of Ethnic Conflict by Ethnic Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1993 n = 2124</th>
<th>1995 n = 2118</th>
<th>1998 n = 2087</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian n = 1645</td>
<td>Russian n = 479</td>
<td>Ukrainian n = 1614</td>
<td>Russian n = 504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bound to be conflict</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can get along</td>
<td>91.4%</td>
<td>89.5%</td>
<td>93.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference Index</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Again, in Table 5.2, when we look particularly at the attitudes of ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians, we see very consistent low percentages of individuals who believe there is bound to be conflict. As in Table 5.1, we do witness in 1995 slight percentage increases of both ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians who believe there is bound to be conflict, but those percentages diminish to lower than 1993 levels in 1998. The attitudes of both ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians change by less than four percentage points in the three surveys. The final row of the table shows an index that measures the attitudinal differences between ethnic groups. This index is calculated by taking the sum of the differences between the proportions of each ethnic group giving a particular response and dividing by two. The resulting difference index (D.I.) ranges from 0 when the proportions are identical in both ethnic groups to 100 when no ethnic Ukrainian shares an opinion with an ethnic Russian on the given issue. Although in each survey ethnic Ukrainians are less likely than ethnic Russians to believe in the likelihood of ethnic conflict, the D.I.s show the differences be-
tween the two groups to be negligible. The overall attitudes of both ethnic groups are almost precisely the same on the likelihood of ethnic conflict. The possible expectations from Laitin's "Jekyll-and-Hyde" characterization of Ukraine are not reflected in the attitudes of either ethnic Ukrainians or ethnic Russians toward conflict.

Yet what about the language dimension? Laitin's path-breaking book is more about language and identity than ethnicity, and it has already been noted that Arel is quite clear that he believes that the Russophones, not just the Russians, perceived the state to be embarking on a nationalizing course. The distinction is quite important. As Arel points out, language cuts across ethnic lines in Ukraine. Significant numbers of ethnic Ukrainians are Russophones. Arel argues that the perceived nationalizing tendencies of Ukraine therefore were also directed against ethnic Ukrainians. In fact, both Arel and Laitin argue that the state's nationalizing strategies were perhaps directed more against ethnic Ukrainian Russophones than against ethnic Russians.

Without attempting to diminish the significance of this point, there are reasons to believe that ethnic Russians might not feel the weight of this distinction. In the three all-Ukrainian surveys utilized in this chapter, the percentage of ethnic Ukrainians who spoke Russian at home was consistently around 30%. On the other hand, the percentage of ethnic Russians who spoke Ukrainian at home was only around 7% or 8%. Ethnic Russians might therefore view themselves to be more the targets of a nationalizing strategy. In any event, if Russophones of either ethnic group have perceived themselves to be the target of a nationalizing policy and discourse, one might reasonably expect it to be reflected in attitudes toward ethnic conflict. Table 5.3 looks at attitudes toward ethnic conflict by language at home.

Table 5.3
Attitudes toward the Likelihood of Ethnic Conflict by Language at Home

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1993 n = 2221</th>
<th>1995 n = 2216</th>
<th>1998 n = 2147</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ukrainian n = 1187</td>
<td>Russian n = 1034</td>
<td>Ukrainian n = 1175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bound to be Conflict</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can get along</td>
<td>90.6%</td>
<td>91.5%</td>
<td>87.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference Index</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The language variable does not seem to substantially alter the picture of attitudes toward ethnic conflict in Ukraine. Comparisons with Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 again underline both the consistency and the low percentages of those who believe there is bound to be ethnic conflict in Ukraine. We do see a slight increase in difference between Ukrainophones and Russophones in 1995, but by
1998 the percentages of respondents who believe in the likelihood of ethnic conflict drop down to lower than 1993 levels. Again, the D.I.s indicate that there are virtually no differences between Ukrainophones and Russophones on the likelihood of ethnic conflict. Interestingly, in 1995, where the D.I. is slightly larger, the Ukrainophones rather than the Russophones are more likely to believe in the likelihood of ethnic conflict. This is contrary to what we might expect if nationalizing policies were strongly felt by Russophones. Possible perceptions of nationalizing tendencies by the Ukrainian state thus do not seem to be manifested in language group attitudes toward the likelihood of ethnic conflict.

LOOKING AT THE REGIONAL DIMENSION

Regional differences have been widely explored by scholars seeking to understand post-Soviet Ukraine. It is a dimension that encompasses a range of historical, economic, linguistic, and ethnic issues. The outcome of the June–July 1994 presidential elections has led some to point to a regional-linguistic polarization of the country. A recent study of Ukraine's 1998 parliamentary elections concludes that "where people live in Ukraine is more important than who they are in determining values and political attitudes." An examination of the regional dimension in Ukraine, then, might provide us with a more nuanced understanding of attitudes toward the likelihood of ethnic conflict.

The ethnic and linguistic makeup of Ukraine is well known. Neither ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians nor Ukrainophones and Russophones are evenly distributed throughout the country. As in most other post-Soviet states, there are larger populations of ethnic Russians and Russophones in urban areas. Moreover, in Ukraine, the concentrations of ethnic Russian and Russophone populations are located in the East and the South. The Crimea, part of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic until 1954, is an area of particular concern. Ethnic Russians constitute more than 65% of the population of that peninsula, and more than 80% of the population are Russophones. The issues surrounding the possibility of ethnic conflict in Crimea are complex ones and have received the attention of a number of scholars. Most agree that Crimea poses the most threat to Ukraine's state-building and territorial integrity. Given Arel's assertion that the Eastern and Southern regions most keenly perceived nationalizing tendencies by the Ukrainian state, we might expect attitudes in the East, West, and Crimea to reflect higher expectations of ethnic conflict.

Similar points can be made about the West. The percentages of ethnic Ukrainians are highest in the West, and there are correspondingly low percentages of ethnic Russians and Russophones. In the Western oblast of Ternopil for example, ethnic Russians account for just 2% of the population. Moreover, the western parts of Ukraine have a different historical legacy than that of Eastern Ukraine. Arel describes the West as the "heart of Ukrainian nationalism." Similarly, Melvin views the West as a region of "fierce Ukrainian ethnonationalism." One might expect this also to be reflected in attitudes toward
Table 5.4 attempts to capture the possible regional influence of attitude toward ethnic conflict.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1993</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>East n = 594</td>
<td>South n = 121</td>
<td>West n = 415</td>
<td>Center East n = 204</td>
<td>Center West n = 611</td>
<td>Kyiv City n = 208</td>
<td>Crimea n = 111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bound to be conflict</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can get along</td>
<td>88.6%</td>
<td>92.6%</td>
<td>91.1%</td>
<td>93.6%</td>
<td>91.7%</td>
<td>90.9%</td>
<td>91.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1995</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>East n = 700</td>
<td>South n = 253</td>
<td>West n = 380</td>
<td>Center East n = 200</td>
<td>Center West n = 476</td>
<td>Kyiv City n = 153</td>
<td>Crimea n = 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bound to be conflict</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can get along</td>
<td>89.4%</td>
<td>92.5%</td>
<td>91.6%</td>
<td>81.5%</td>
<td>86.8%</td>
<td>94.1%</td>
<td>94.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1998</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>East n = 673</td>
<td>South n = 229</td>
<td>West n = 390</td>
<td>Center East n = 175</td>
<td>Center West n = 490</td>
<td>Kyiv City n = 143</td>
<td>Crimea n = 96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bound to be conflict</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can get along</td>
<td>93.8%</td>
<td>90.8%</td>
<td>96.4%</td>
<td>91.4%</td>
<td>92.7%</td>
<td>94.4%</td>
<td>82.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An examination of Table 5.4 is illuminating, more for what it says about a lack of regional polarization on attitudes toward ethnic conflict than for the regional differences that we observe. Looking particularly at the South and East, where there are large percentages of ethnic Russians and Russophones, regional influences on attitudes toward ethnic conflict remain mostly unrevealed. Singling out the Crimean region, if we look at the 1993 data we see that respondents in Crimea are in tune with respondents in the rest of the country. The 1995 data suggest that Crimean respondents were, perhaps not surprisingly, slightly less likely to believe that there was bound to be conflict between ethnic groups. However, in the Crimea in 1998 we do see a significant increase in the percentage of respondents who believe that there is bound to be conflict. It may at first seem a paradox that attitudes toward the likelihood of ethnic conflict were low and stable in 1993 and 1995 when the threat of separatist movements was great-
est, and increasing in 1998, well after the separatist movements had collapsed. This, however, would be consistent with the growing hostilities between ethnic Russians and Crimean Tartars on the peninsula in the last four years. The Crimean Tartar leadership has been well organized in pressing for their legal rights and for protection against what they perceive to be discrimination by a Russian majority intent on preserving its economic and political advantages.\textsuperscript{27} At the same time, there has been a disquieting trend among the younger radical Tartars to forward their agenda by violent means.\textsuperscript{28} What actually might be manifesting itself, then, is not interethic discord between ethnic Russians and ethnic Ukrainians, but rather discord between ethnic Russians and Crimean Tartars.

In the West, where Ukrainian nationalists are more likely to be found, the regional impact of attitudes toward ethnic conflict is not evident in any year. The same holds true for Kyiv City. In 1995, we do see a slightly increased percentage of respondents in the Center-West who believe there is bound to be ethnic conflict, and a more significant percentage in the Center-East who feel similarly. Sub-region examination reveals the largest percentage increases in the Sumy and Poltava oblasti. Unfortunately small sample size on the oblast level makes it difficult to explain with any confidence what factors may have led to this increase in those who believe there is bound to be conflict. Encouragingly, the 1998 responses do not reflect the same tendencies.

Still, even taking into account the Center-East figure in 1995 and the Crimea figure in 1998, the overall trend is clear. Expectations of ethnic conflict are generally low in all the regions in all three years.

ETHNIC DISTANCE AND ETHNIC CONFLICT

The eminent scholar on ethno-nationalism, Walker Connor, has written that: “ethnic strife is too often superficially discerned as principally predicated upon language, religion, customs, economic inequality, or some other tangible element. But what is fundamentally involved in such a conflict is that divergence of basic identity which manifests itself in the "us-them" syndrome.”\textsuperscript{29}

This "'us-them' syndrome," otherwise referred to in the literature as “ethnic schism” or “ethnic distance,” has been examined by a number of scholars on both an all-Ukrainian and regional level.\textsuperscript{30} Taras Kuzio concludes that, outside of Crimea, an "us-them" syndrome is largely absent from Ukraine along either ethnic or linguistic divisions. Jan Bremmer, while pointing out ethnic stereotyping differentiations in L'viv, Kyiv, and Simferopol, similarly believes that ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians "exhibit a low sense of ethnic schism."\textsuperscript{31} Liber, while stressing that ethnic distance perceptions do vary according to region, does not view these differences as insurmountable obstacles to Ukrainian state building because of the Ukrainian peoples' common longing for peace and stability. The following section attempts to explore some of these contentions.

Table 5.5 reflects responses of both ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians when asked how much they have in common in their views and way of life with the Ukrainian ethnic group. A number of scholars have cautioned against view-
ing ethnic groups as monoliths and failing to take into account diversity and heterogeneity subsumed under broad ethnic labels. It should not necessarily be assumed, then, that all ethnic Ukrainians believe they share common views and a way of life. However, the survey evidence suggesting that ethnic Ukrainians do indeed believe that they have a great deal or a lot in common with fellow members of their ethnic group is quite compelling on the all-Ukraine level. Roughly 99% of ethnic Ukrainian respondents believe they have a great deal or a lot in common in their views and way of life with other ethnic Ukrainians. It is apparent, as well, that ethnic Russians, at almost the same levels, also believe they have a great deal or a lot in common with ethnic Ukrainians. In fact, looking at the D.I. in each year, one can see that ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russian responses are almost identical.

Table 5.5
How Much Do You Feel You Have in Common—In Your Views and Way of Life—with Members of the Ukrainian Ethnic Group? (by Ethnic Group)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>1998</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n = 2261</td>
<td>n = 2298</td>
<td>n = 2345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>n = 1755</td>
<td>n = 1762</td>
<td>n = 1800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>n = 506</td>
<td>n = 536</td>
<td>n = 545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A great deal or quite a lot</td>
<td>98.6%</td>
<td>98.9%</td>
<td>99.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>97.2%</td>
<td>98.1%</td>
<td>97.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little or nothing at all</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference Index</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>.8%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The similar responses can be interpreted in different ways. Following Connor’s assertions, the ethnic distance perceptions of ethnic Russians are quite encouraging for the prospects of inter ethnic peace and are consistent with attitudes of ethnic Russians toward the likelihood of ethnic conflict. If ethnic Russians have felt themselves to be the target of nationalizing policies, it does not seem to be reflected in ethnic distance measures in any year. Still, some may see it differently. It is possible to argue that the ethnic Russian response is consistent with the legacy of Russian colonialism and the Russian view that ethnic Ukrainians are not a distinct people. This may or may not be true. The percentages do not reflect the responses of a dominant ethnic group within their empire; they reflect a minority ethnic group within a Ukrainian state. Second, the question in the survey is formulated such that it is asking respondents to comment on how much they have in common with ethnic Ukrainians, rather than asking the respondents to evaluate how much ethnic Ukrainians have in common with them.
Yet ethnic distance is not a unidirectional concept. It is important to examine how both ethnic groups view their differences. If ethnic Russians do not feel significant levels of ethnic distance from ethnic Ukrainians, then how much do ethnic Ukrainians feel that they have in common with ethnic Russians? Large differences in perceptions of ethnic distance vis-à-vis each other might lend support to those who believe that the low ethnic distance perceptions of ethnic Russians toward ethnic Ukrainians impede rather than aid harmonious interethnic relations between the two groups. In Table 5.6, we do see that there are differences between ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians in their perception of ethnic distance from the Russian ethnic group. While ethnic Russians show the same levels of ethnic distance from the Russian ethnic group as they did from the Ukrainian ethnic group, ethnic Ukrainians perceive a greater degree of ethnic distance from the Russian ethnic group than from their own ethnic group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>1998</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n = 2245</td>
<td>n = 2278</td>
<td>n = 2333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n = 1740</td>
<td>n = 505</td>
<td>n = 1790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A great deal or quite a lot</td>
<td>88.3%</td>
<td>97.4%</td>
<td>89.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little or nothing at all</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference Index</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Yet, despite the differences in perceptions of ethnic distance between each ethnic group, what stands out is that high percentages of ethnic Ukrainians feel they have a great deal or a lot in common with ethnic Russians. Ethnic distance perceptions between ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians, then, are generally very low. The difference indexes remain fairly consistent from year to year with a slight increase in 1998. We will note from Table 5.2 that this slight increase is not accompanied by an increase in percentages of either ethnic group who feel there is bound to be ethnic conflict.

If we look at the same question by "language at home" instead of ethnicity, we see the same patterns emerge with only very slight variations. Table 5.7 shows extremely high percentages of both Ukrainophones and Russophones who believe they have a great deal or a lot in common with the Ukrainian ethnic group. The D.I.s range from just 1.2% to 2.2%.
In Table 5.8 we see that Ukrainophones and Russophones have different perceptions of commonality with the Russian ethnic group, yet the percentages of both groups who feel they have a great deal or a lot in common still remain very high. A comparison of Tables 5.6 and 5.8 will reveal slightly lower percentages of Ukrainophones than ethnic Ukrainians who feel a great deal or a lot in common with the Russian ethnic group. Consequently the difference indexes in 1993, 1995, and 1998 are greater in Table 5.8 than they are in Table 5.6. This is almost certainly a reflection of ethnic Ukrainians who speak Ukrainian at home feeling more distinct from ethnic Russians than ethnic Ukrainians who speak Russian at home.

Table 5.7
How Much Do you Feel You Have in Common—in Your Views and Way of Life—with Members of the Ukrainian Ethnic Group? (by Language at Home)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1993 n = 2362</th>
<th>1995 n = 2407</th>
<th>1998 n = 2415</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>n = 1284</td>
<td>n = 1311</td>
<td>n = 1317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A great deal or quite a lot</td>
<td>99.0%</td>
<td>99.0%</td>
<td>99.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>n = 1078</td>
<td>n = 1096</td>
<td>n = 1098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little or nothing at all</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Difference Index | 2.2% | 1.2% | 1.5%

Table 5.8
How Much Do You Feel You Have in Common—in Your Views and Way of Life—with Members of the Russian Ethnic Group? (by Language at Home)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1993 n = 2347</th>
<th>1995 n = 2384</th>
<th>1998 n = 2403</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>n = 1262</td>
<td>n = 1289</td>
<td>n = 1305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A great deal or quite a lot</td>
<td>85.5%</td>
<td>85.0%</td>
<td>83.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>n = 1085</td>
<td>n = 1095</td>
<td>n = 1098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little or nothing at all</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Difference Index | 10.3% | 13.3% | 14.0%
If we examine the same questions on a regional level, we see from Table 5.9 that high percentages of respondents in each region in 1993, 1995, and 1998 feel that they have a great deal or quite a lot in common with the Ukrainian ethnic group. What may surprise observers is that the percentages are nearly identical in six of the seven regions. Those who focus on East/West divisions in Ukraine might be surprised to see no variation on attitudes toward ethnic distance from Ukrainians in these two regions. As might be expected, the lowest percentages are in Crimea, yet, perhaps surprisingly, even these percentages do not fall below 91% in any year.

Table 5.9
How Much Do You Feel You Have in Common—in Your Views and Way of Life—with Members of the Ukrainian Ethnic Group? (by Region)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1993</th>
<th></th>
<th>1995</th>
<th></th>
<th>1998</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>East $n = 635$</td>
<td>South $n = 128$</td>
<td>West $n = 463$</td>
<td>Center East $n = 212$</td>
<td>Center West $n = 644$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A great deal or quite a lot</td>
<td>97.5%</td>
<td>97.7%</td>
<td>97.0%</td>
<td>98.1%</td>
<td>98.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little or nothing at all</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1995</td>
<td></td>
<td>1998</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>East $n = 728$</td>
<td>South $n = 280$</td>
<td>West $n = 427$</td>
<td>Center East $n = 221$</td>
<td>Center West $n = 533$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A great deal or quite a lot</td>
<td>98.6%</td>
<td>96.1%</td>
<td>97.9%</td>
<td>98.6%</td>
<td>99.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little or nothing at all</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1998</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>East $n = 726$</td>
<td>South $n = 278$</td>
<td>West $n = 439$</td>
<td>Center East $n = 239$</td>
<td>Center West $n = 525$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A great deal or quite a lot</td>
<td>98.5%</td>
<td>99.6%</td>
<td>98.6%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>97.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little or nothing at all</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>.4%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From Table 5.10, we do see more regional variation and variation from year to year in ethnic distance when respondents are asked how much they have in common in their views and way of life with the Russian ethnic group. In the
East and in the South, very high percentages of respondents feel they have a great deal or quite a lot in common with the Russian ethnic group. In the West, however, as might be expected from its different historical legacy and from its reputation as the heartland of Ukrainian nationalism, significantly smaller percentages of respondents believed they had a great deal or a lot in common with the Russian ethnic group. Moreover, while the percentages in the West were nearly the same in 1993 and in 1995, in 1998 we see the figure of those who believe they have a great deal or quite a lot in common with the Russian ethnic group drop to just over 62%.

**Table 5.10**
*How Much Do You Feel You Have in Common—in Your Views and Way of Life—with Members of the Russian Ethnic Group? (by Region)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1993</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>East</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>Center</td>
<td>Center</td>
<td>Kyiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n = 635</td>
<td>n = 128</td>
<td>n = 444</td>
<td>East</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>n = 211</td>
<td>n = 642</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A great deal or quite a lot</td>
<td>97.0%</td>
<td>97.7%</td>
<td>72.5%</td>
<td>92.9%</td>
<td>91.0%</td>
<td>89.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little or nothing at all</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|        | 1995          |        |        |        |        |        |        |
|        | East          | South  | West   | Center | Center | Kyiv   | Crimea |
|        | n = 729       | n = 279| n = 414| East   | West   | City   | n = 111|
|        |               |        |        | n = 218| n = 528|        |        |
| A great deal or quite a lot | 98.8% | 95.0% | 71.0% | 89.0% | 92.0% | 94.2% | 97.3% |
| Little or nothing at all | 1.2% | 5.0% | 29.0% | 11.0% | 8.0% | 5.8% | 2.7% |

|        | 1998          |        |        |        |        |        |        |
|        | East          | South  | West   | Center | Center | Kyiv   | Crimea |
|        | n = 726       | n = 276| n = 431| East   | West   | City   | n = 109|
|        |               |        |        | n = 236| n = 524|        |        |
| A great deal or quite a lot | 97.7% | 97.8% | 62.4% | 97.9% | 89.5% | 92.9% | 99.1% |
| Little or nothing at all | 2.3% | 2.2% | 37.6% | 2.1% | 10.5% | 7.1% | .9% |
Thus, an important point to arise from this study is that ethnic distance between respondents and the Russian ethnic group seem to be widening in the West. In the Center-East, the percentage figures of those who feel they have a great deal or quite a lot in common with ethnic Russians are high. In the Center-West and in Kyiv City the percentages of those who feel a great deal or quite a lot of commonality with ethnic Russians are also high in the three years under investigation. Perceptions of ethnic distance between respondents and ethnic Russians are low in Crimea as we might expect, and the survey trend indicates that ethnic distance diminished in each year.

If we compare respondents' perceptions of ethnic distance from both ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians in the three years, several patterns emerge that might reveal something about identities in each of the regions. In the East and in the South, very high percentages of respondents felt that they had a great deal or quite a lot in common with both ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians. Ethnic distance between ethnic Russians and ethnic Ukrainians, then, would appear to be extremely low in these regions. A number of explanations might account for this. It is possible that the long intermingling of ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians in this region has blurred ethnic boundaries and distinctions. It is also plausible that a regional identity, based on a variety of social, cultural, and economic factors, is more powerfully felt than identities based on ethnicity. It might be argued as well that what we are witnessing in these regions is actually the legacy of a supra state Soviet identity that transcends ethnic boundaries (which is reflected in polls where respondents describe their identity as Soviet). Without attempting to delve deeper into which of these, or other explanations best account for ethnic distance attitudes in these regions, it does seem apparent that an "us-them syndrome" based on ethnicity is absent in the East and in the South.

In the West, we see quite another story. There are significant differences when comparing respondents' perceptions of ethnic distance from ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians. Very high percentages of respondents feel they have a great deal or quite a lot in common with ethnic Ukrainians. On the other hand, much lower percentages of respondents feel that they have a great deal or quite a lot in common with the Russian ethnic group. This gulf in ethnic distance perceptions suggests a much more powerful ethnicity-based identity in the West in comparison with the other regions. It appears that these significant ethnic distance perceptions are unidirectional and probably exclusive to the majority Ukrainian ethnic group which is overwhelmingly dominant in the region. It should also be noted, however, that on average in the three years, over two-thirds of the respondents believed they had a great deal or quite a lot in common with the Russian ethnic group. Thus if we do see an "us-them syndrome" in the West, it is not the dominant perception in the region and it is likely to be a perception of mostly ethnic Ukrainians.

The Center-East is a region that seems to have witnessed a slight change in attitudes toward ethnic distance over the five years in which the surveys were conducted. High percentages of respondents in this region have felt a great deal or quite a lot in common with members of the Ukrainian ethnic group in the
three survey years. In 1993 and 1995, slightly lower percentages of respondents felt they had a great deal or quite a lot in common with the Russian ethnic group. This would suggest perhaps that a distinct ethnic Ukrainian identity, however weak, existed alongside an identity that transcended ethnicity. However, by 1998, the percentage of respondents who felt they had a great deal or quite a lot in common with ethnic Russians rose to 98%. This is in the same year that 100% of the respondents felt they had a great deal or quite a lot in common with ethnic Ukrainians. By 1998 then, we witness ethnic distance measures in the Center-East similar to those found in the East and in the South. The "us-them syndrome" seems completely absent.

Ethnic distance measures in the Center-West and in Kyiv City reveal patterns similar to those found in the Center-East in 1993 and in 1995. High percentages of respondents felt that they had a great deal or quite a lot in common with the Ukrainian ethnic group. Lower percentages of respondents felt that they had a great deal or quite a lot in common with ethnic Russians. There are low perceptions of ethnic distance between groups in these regions, although it seems likely that ethnic Ukrainians feel more distinct from ethnic Russians than ethnic Russians do from ethnic Ukrainians. The "us-them syndrome" appears to be at the most extremely weak.

Crimea is the only region where respondents feel a greater affinity toward the Russian rather than the Ukrainian ethnic group in each of the surveys conducted. This may not come as a surprise since Crimea is the only region in Ukraine where ethnic Russians constitute the majority population and where Russian ethnic identity is strongest. It might come as a surprise, however, that there are overall greater disparities in respondents' views toward ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians in the Center-East in 1993 and 1995, and in the Center-West and Kyiv City in all three years, than in Crimea. In no year do fewer than 91% of the respondents feel that they have a great deal or quite a lot in common with the Ukrainian or Russian ethnic groups. Thus, while it may be argued that there is more of a Russian rather than Ukrainian identity in the region, there are still rather low perceptions of ethnic distance.

How do ethnic distance measures, then, relate to attitudes toward ethnic conflict? First, at an all-Ukraine level, there are extremely low perceptions of ethnic distance toward the Ukrainian ethnic group by both ethnic Russians and ethnic Ukrainians. The same holds true if we look specifically at Russophones and Ukrainophones. There are higher perceptions of ethnic distance toward the Russian ethnic group by both ethnic Ukrainians and Ukrainophones. Yet overall the ethnic distance measures are still low. If we were to accept Connors's paradigm that ethnic strife is often predicated on an "us-them syndrome," then we would find the low numbers of respondents on the all-Ukraine level who believe there is bound to be conflict consistent with low perceptions of ethnic strife. However, ethnic distance measures at the regional level might bring into question the efficacy of Connors's assertion. We still find low and very low perceptions of ethnic distance in most regions, including Crimea.
Yet, in the West there does seem to be a significant and growing feeling among ethnic Ukrainians that they are distinct from the Russian ethnic group. Following Connor, we might expect this to be manifested in attitudes toward the likelihood of ethnic conflict at the regional level. However, looking at Table 5.4 we note that growing ethnic distance perceptions in the West are not accompanied by an increase in those who believe there is bound to be conflict. In fact, comparing Tables 5.4 and 5.10 we note that the greatest perception of ethnic distance in the West occurs in 1998, the same year where the lowest percentage of respondents in the West believe there is bound to be conflict. Liber’s claim that ethnic distance measures are outweighed by an overall desire among the population for peace and stability seems to be supported.

A VIEW OF ETHNIC DIVISIONS

Thus far, this chapter has attempted to demonstrate that attitudes toward ethnic conflict have remained stable over time and that expectations on the inevitability of conflict based on ethnicity are low. This is also true when we look at language. A look at attitudes in the regions did reveal some regional differences in particular years, but overall attitudinal trends were mostly unaffected. Ethnic distance perceptions theorized as indicators of ethnic strife, are low in Ukraine at the mass level. Even where ethnic distance measures seem significant at the regional level, they seem weak predictors of attitudes toward ethnic conflict. If ethnic Russians and Russophones have seen the "enraged face of Mr. Hyde," or if they have had perceptions of a nationalizing strategy on the part of the Ukrainian state, it has not in any substantial way manifested itself in attitudes toward ethnic conflict or, for that matter, in perceptions of ethnic distance. This is not to argue, however, the absence of divisions between ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians over certain issues. Arel and Laitin both point to language as a divisive issue in Ukraine. Table 5.11, which reveals ethnic Ukrainian and ethnic Russian views toward language instruction in schools, confirms this.

From Table 5.11 we see deep divisions between ethnic Russians and ethnic Ukrainians on the issue of minority ethnic groups being taught in Ukrainian. The divisions occur in all three years, and the difference index increases from year to year. In 1993 and 1995 the ethnic Ukrainian responses were almost identical. In neither year did a majority of ethnic Ukrainians strongly agree or agree as opposed to neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the proposition that all minority ethnic groups should be taught in Ukrainian. A sub-ethnic group analysis reveals that Ukrainophone Ukrainians in 1993 and 1995 were evenly split between the two categories, while only 19% to 25% of Russophone Ukrainians strongly agreed or agreed with the statement. Ethnic Ukrainians were slightly under 1.5 times more likely to neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree than to strongly agree or agree with minority ethnic groups being taught in Ukrainian. On the other hand, ethnic Russians in 1993 were over three times more likely to feel the same way. The division is more pronounced in 1995 where we see ethnic Russians five times more likely to have
no opinion or disagree than to agree with the statement in Table 5.11. Deep divisions and interesting trends can be seen in 1998 as well. The percentage of ethnic Ukrainians who strongly agree or agree with the statement that all minority groups should be taught in the Ukrainian language increases to nearly 50%. The percentage of ethnic Russians who strongly agree or agree with the statement also increases from 1995, however ethnic Russians are still almost four times more likely to neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the statement. Comparing Ukrainian and Russian responses in each year, Ukrainians were about twice as likely as Russians to strongly agree or agree with minority groups in Ukraine being taught in Ukrainian.

Table 5.11
All Minority Ethnic Groups in This Country Should Have to Be Taught in Ukrainian (by Ethnic Group)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1993 (n=2117)</th>
<th>1995 (n=2216)</th>
<th>1998 (n=2241)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=1632)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree or strongly agree</td>
<td>41.9%</td>
<td>41.2%</td>
<td>48.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree</td>
<td>58.1%</td>
<td>58.8%</td>
<td>51.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference Index</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>28.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=485)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree or strongly agree</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree</td>
<td>76.7%</td>
<td>83.8%</td>
<td>79.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We would be telling only a partial story if we failed to look at the language factor on the same issue. In every year there is a greater level of polarity between Ukrainophones and Russophones on this issue than the polarity exhibited between ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians. One can readily see from Table 5.12 that the significant divisions between the Ukrainophones and Russophones occur in all three years. The difference indexes show the greatest divisions between Ukrainophones and Russophones to occur in 1995, before diminishing somewhat in 1998.

Slightly increasing percentages of Ukrainophones were more likely to strongly agree or agree than to neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the statement that minority groups should be taught in Ukrainian. Russophones do not replicate exactly the converse pattern. Although Russophones were significantly more likely to neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree than to agree or strongly agree in all three years, the differential did not increase in each year. In 1993 Russophones were over three times more likely to have no opinion or to disagree than to agree with ethnic minori-
ties' being taught in Ukrainian. In 1995, Russophones were five times more likely to have the same attitude. By 1998, Russophones were just three times more likely to possess the same view. Comparing Ukrainophone and Russophone responses in each year, Ukrainophones were over twice as likely as Russophones to agree with minority groups’ being taught in Ukrainian in 1993 and 1998. In 1995 Ukrainophones were three times more likely to agree with that same view.

Table 5.12
All Minority Ethnic Groups in This Country Should Have to Be Taught in Ukrainian (by Language at Home)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1993</th>
<th></th>
<th>1995</th>
<th></th>
<th>1998</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n = 2212</td>
<td></td>
<td>n = 2310</td>
<td></td>
<td>n = 2309</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukranian</td>
<td>1180</td>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>1032</td>
<td>Ukranian</td>
<td>1240</td>
<td>Russian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree or strongly agree</td>
<td>49.8%</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
<td>50.7%</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>55.5%</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither agree nor disagree, e.g., agree, or strongly disagree</td>
<td>50.2%</td>
<td>77.2%</td>
<td>49.3%</td>
<td>83.8%</td>
<td>44.5%</td>
<td>74.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference Index</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
<td>34.5%</td>
<td>30.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A look at this question by region in the three survey years reveals some interesting figures (see Table 5.13). In the East, the percentage of respondents who strongly agree or agree with the statement that all minority groups should be taught in Ukrainian barely exceeds 25% in any of the three survey years. There is a significant decrease in the percentage who agree with the statement in 1995, but by 1998 the percentage returns to slightly below the 1993 figure. The figures might be consistent with Arell's view that there was a perception in the region, especially on the language issue, that the state was pursuing a nationalizing line. The drop in those who strongly agreed or agreed with minorities being taught in Ukrainian might have been a reaction to this perception.

However, the same trend does not seem to be evident in the South. In the South, the percentage of respondents who strongly agreed or agreed remained stable in 1993 and 1995. In fact, the 1995 figure is slightly higher than the 1993 figure. What is most surprising is that the 1998 percentage figure jumped to 38%. Thus, even though a minority of respondents in the South strongly agree or agree that minority groups should be taught in Ukrainian the numbers have swelled substantially since 1993.

The West is the only region where a substantial majority of the respondents in all three years strongly agreed or agreed that all minority groups in Ukraine
should be taught in Ukrainian. In 1993, 57% of respondents in the West strongly agreed or agreed with this view. The percentage of respondents answering similarly increased to about 70% in 1995 and 1998. Thus there has not only been a significant increase in this view, but the view remained stable between 1995 and 1998.

Table 5.13
All Minority Ethnic Groups in This Country Should Have to Be Taught in Ukrainian (by Region)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1993</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>East</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>Center</td>
<td>Center</td>
<td>Kyiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( n = 598 )</td>
<td>( n = 115 )</td>
<td>( n = 450 )</td>
<td>( n = 185 )</td>
<td>( n = 586 )</td>
<td>( n = 201 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
<td>57.3%</td>
<td>42.7%</td>
<td>36.3%</td>
<td>42.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or</td>
<td>Strongly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>74.6%</td>
<td>77.4%</td>
<td>42.7%</td>
<td>57.3%</td>
<td>63.7%</td>
<td>57.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agree</td>
<td>nor disagree,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree,</td>
<td>disagree, or</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>East</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>Center</td>
<td>Center</td>
<td>Kyiv</td>
<td>Crimea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( n = 710 )</td>
<td>( n = 269 )</td>
<td>( n = 402 )</td>
<td>( n = 210 )</td>
<td>( n = 512 )</td>
<td>( n = 148 )</td>
<td>( n = 105 )</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>24.9%</td>
<td>69.9%</td>
<td>44.3%</td>
<td>41.2%</td>
<td>29.7%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
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<td>or</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>84.2%</td>
<td>75.1%</td>
<td>30.1%</td>
<td>55.7%</td>
<td>58.8%</td>
<td>70.3%</td>
<td>97.1%</td>
</tr>
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<td>East</td>
<td>South</td>
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<td>Center</td>
<td>Center</td>
<td>Kyiv</td>
<td>Crimea</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( n = 710 )</td>
<td>( n = 256 )</td>
<td>( n = 426 )</td>
<td>( n = 203 )</td>
<td>( n = 515 )</td>
<td>( n = 152 )</td>
<td>( n = 100 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
<td>38.3%</td>
<td>70.4%</td>
<td>30.5%</td>
<td>51.5%</td>
<td>52.0%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>or</td>
<td>Strongly</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>76.5%</td>
<td>61.7%</td>
<td>29.6%</td>
<td>69.5%</td>
<td>48.8%</td>
<td>48.0%</td>
<td>92.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agree</td>
<td>nor disagree,</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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The Center-East seems to have shown the opposite trend. Although a minority of respondents in 1993 strongly agreed or agreed with the view that all minority ethnic groups should be taught in Ukrainian, the percentage was about 43%, much higher than in the East and in the South. The percentage slightly increased in 1995, but in 1998 there was a substantial decrease in the percentage of respondents with this view. The Center-East, then, is the only region in 1998 that has shown a decrease in the percentages in comparison to 1995 levels.

The Center-West, on the other hand, has shown a steady increase in the percentages of respondents who strongly agree or agree that all minority ethnic groups should be taught in Ukrainian. The percentages in 1993 and 1995 were smaller than in the Center-East in those same years. However, by 1998, over a majority of the respondents strongly agree or agree with the view that all minority ethnic groups in Ukraine should be taught in Ukrainian.

Kyiv City is interesting because of the fluctuation from year to year. In 1993, a substantial minority of respondents strongly agreed or agreed with the view that all ethnic minorities should be taught in Ukrainian. This figure, however, dropped to below 30% in 1995. By 1998, however, a majority of respondents agreed with this view.

In Crimea, where 1989 census figures calculated the percentage of Russophones to be around 82%, we not surprisingly find the lowest percentages in all three years of respondents who strongly agree or agree that all ethnic minorities should be taught in Ukrainian. The pattern in Crimea strongly resembles the pattern in the East over the three years. In 1993, the percentage of respondents who agreed with ethnic minorities being taught in Ukrainian was only 11%. That percentage decreased to just 3% in 1995, before increasing slightly in 1998. The sample size in Crimea is quite small, so that trends should be viewed with caution. However, it is clear that the overwhelming majority in the autonomous republic neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree that all minority groups in Ukraine should be taught in Ukrainian.

What seems clear when we examine the views of respondents on the issue of minorities being taught in Ukrainian is that no overall trend holds true for all the regions. That is not to say that there have not been interesting attitudinal shifts on this issue. In 1993, only in the West could there be found a majority of respondents who agreed that all minority ethnic groups should be taught in Ukrainian. In 1998, a majority of respondents in three regions agreed with that view. Three regions, the East, Kyiv City, and Crimea, experienced sharp drops in the percentages, between 1993 and 1995, of respondents who agreed with minority ethnic groups' being taught in Ukrainian. In all three regions, the percentages increased, albeit by different degrees, in 1998.

Language instruction in schools has been a contentious issue in Ukraine. From the preceding tables we have, not surprisingly, seen differences between both ethnic groups and language groups on this question. There have been significant trends and fluctuations in particular regions on this issue as well. Despite these differences, it is also clear that these have not been strongly mani-
fested in attitudes toward ethnic conflict, which have remained mostly stable over time.

**ELECTORAL POLARITY**

The previous section highlighted the ethnic and language division around the issue of language instruction in schools. Yet are ethnic divisions manifested in electoral politics? Arel makes the case that the 1994 presidential elections demonstrated a polarization in politics along a linguistic/region al dimension rather than an economic one. The following table attempts to present at voting preferences according to ethnicity. In Table 5.14 are outlined presidential voting preferences by ethnic group for the years 1993, 1995, and 1998. Since respondents were not limited in their choice of candidates, candidates were loosely as signed into two camps. The first camp, whose mainstay is Leonid Kravchuk, might be viewed as having a more nationalist orientation on issues such as language and relations with Russia than the second camp, whose mainstay is Leonid Kuchma. The grouping of candidates according to nationalist orientation might give us a better idea of how salient a dimension this is in influencing ethnic, linguistic, and regional electoral behavior. Grouping candidates according to this dimension is replete with difficulties. For example, Kuzio has argued that Kravchuk and Kuchma have had a great deal more in common than not on issues of defining the Ukrainian state, and that both "promoted the view that Ukraine needs political centrism in its current stage of state and nation-building." Kuzio further asserts that far from donning the nationalist cloak, Kravchuk's policies were "pluralistic, multicultural, and liberal." Yet, if there are broad areas of agreement between Kravchuk and Kuchma, their differences on certain national issues seem to have clearly been the focus in the 1994 presidential elections. These differences would been evident not only in the run up to the 1994 elections, but also before, when there were disagreements between the two in 1992 and 1993 on how closely Ukraine should integrate into the CIS.

Another hazard in grouping candidates along one dimension is that it may obscure important differences along other dimensions. Relatedly, views, alliances, and defining issues may shift over time. The October–November 1999 presidential elections provide good examples of this. The Zlahoda bloc, which supported Kuchma's reelection bid, had among its members both Kravchuk and the former Parliamentary Chairman Ivan Plisich. The "Kaniv Four" alliance, formed shortly before the October 1999 elections, consisted of Oleksandr Tkachenko, Yevhen Marchuk, Oleksandr Moroz, and Volodymyr Oliynyk—candidates with quite different reputations on nationalist issues. However, if the goal of this section is to shed light on the impact of ethnic, linguistic, and regional divisions on voting behavior, the 1999 shifts do not invalidate the 1998 candidate groupings. Rather, the 1998 data suggest that we should not have been surprised by the shifting 1999 electoral alliances, which transcended real or imagined nationalist/non-nationalist cleavages.
In Table 5.14, the trends seem fairly clear. In 1993 both ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians preferred candidates who could be at least loosely characterized as having more nationalist views. It is important, however, to note the differences. Ethnic Ukrainians were slightly less than two times more likely to vote for nationalist candidates than for the other candidates. Ethnic Russians, on the other hand, were only marginally more likely to vote for the nationalist candidates in 1993. The difference index between the two ethnic groups in 1993 is just under 12%. In 1995, the difference index jumps to 25% and we see what appears to be clear and sometimes dramatic increased polarization along ethnic lines. When ethnic Ukrainian respondents were asked whom they voted for in the first round of the June 1994 presidential elections, a majority still preferred the Kravchuk grouping, albeit, interestingly, by a lesser margin than in 1993. Ethnic Russians, however, by a close to 3-to-1 margin claimed to have voted for candidates in the Kuchma grouping. Ethnic Ukrainians were almost twice as likely as ethnic Russians to vote for nationalist candidates in 1994. Ethnic Russians were more than 1.5 times as likely as Ukrainians to vote for a candidate who defined the state more in civic-territorial than in ethnocultural terms. In 1998, even considering the problems in grouping candidates, there appears to be an end to ethnic polarization. The difference index drops to roughly 9%, which is lower than the 1993 D.I. Both ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians significantly preferred the Kuchma grouping of candidates, although ethnic Russians did so by a wider margin.

Table 5.14
Presidential Voting Preferences (by Ethnic Group)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate Groupings</th>
<th>1993 (future) n = 867</th>
<th>1995 (past/1st) n = 1722</th>
<th>1998 (future) n = 943</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ukrainian n = 686</td>
<td>Russian n = 181</td>
<td>Ukrainian n = 754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kravchuk (93, 95, 98)</td>
<td>64.9%</td>
<td>53.0%</td>
<td>37.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chornovil (93)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pliushch (93, 95)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lanovoi (95)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marchuk (98)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yuschenko (98)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>51.2%</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Kuchma (93, 95, 98)  | 35.1%                 | 47.0%                    | 62.7%                 |
| Grinyov (93)        |                       |                          |                       |
| Babich (95)         |                       |                          |                       |
| Moroz (95, 98)      |                       |                          |                       |
| Lazarenko (98)      |                       |                          |                       |
|                      | 48.8%                 | 74.1%                    | 71.4%                 |

| Difference Index    | 11.9%                 | 25.3%                    | 8.7%                  |
It might be claimed that what is manifesting itself is actually the language divide. The percentages do indeed show a divide along the language dimension in 1993 and 1995. In 1993 the difference index in presidential voting preferences by language at home, at 16.5%, is greater than the 11.9% difference index in voting preferences by ethnicity in the same year. However, in view of the 1998 figures, the D.I. is smaller when in the comparison of Ukrainophones and Russophones than in the comparison of ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians. We witness an end to polarization along a linguistic dimension in 1998.

An examination of the regional dimension of electoral preferences reveals several points. First, voter preferences differ significantly by region in 1993, 1995, and 1998. In 1993 all regions come out for the Kravchuk grouping although in varying degrees. In the 1995 surveys, regional voting polarization was consistent with the actual 1994 presidential election results, with the minor exception of the Center-West, which might be explained by a certain amount of recall bias. As we keep in mind the caveats about grouping candidates, the 1998 data show that with the exception of Kyiv City, which is split almost evenly, all regions would support a presidential candidate who possesses less of a nationalist (ethnocultural) than territorial (civic) perception of the state.

The discussion in this section is an attempt to highlight and confirm the existence of increased electoral polarity, at least reflected in the 1995 data, along an ethnic, linguistic and regional dimension. The existence of this split raised important questions about the future of Ukrainian politics and state building. The splits along these divides, however, seem to have largely disappeared by 1998 if we attempt to group candidates by nationalist orientations. Moreover, alliances made prior to the 1999 presidential elections between candidates and political figures with conflicting views on such issues as language and Ukraine's relationship with Russia suggest that dimensions other than ethnicity and language were important in determining voting preferences. How ethnic conflict and other measures may or may not have been reflected in this electoral split is addressed in the next section.

**COMPARING LEVELS OF ETHNIC AND LANGUAGE POLARIZATION**

To glean a better understanding of ethnic and language divisions and how they may or may not have influenced voting preferences, Table 5.15 has been devised. The numbers in this table have been derived by maximizing the ratios of the responses of ethnic Ukrainians to ethnic Russians, or Ukrainophones to Russophones, found in the tables under the column headings. As an example, in Table 5.2, for 1993, the ratio between ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians who believe there is bound to be conflict is 8.6/9.8 or 0.87. The ratio of ethnic Ukrainians to ethnic Russians who believe ethnic groups can get along is 91.4/90.2 or 1.01. The resultant ratio 0.87/1.01 can be otherwise expressed as 0.86. If ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians had no differences in their views, then the number derived would be 1. The further away the derived number is
from 1, the greater the differences between ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians or Ukrainophones and Russophones. By performing the same operation for each of the tables, we should be able to see the more clearly degree of differences between groups, how the magnitude of those differences have changed over time, and, perhaps most important, the relationships between measures.

The main focus has been on ethnic conflict. What stands out are the minimal differences between ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians on the issue of conflict and the stability of those views over time. Even when increased voting polarity by ethnicity occurs, such as between 1993 and 1995, we do not see that polarity reflected in views toward ethnic conflict, nor are deep ethnic divides over language use in school reflected in ethnic Ukrainian and ethnic Russian views toward conflict.

**Table 5.15**

**Trends in Ethnic and Language Polarization**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Ethnic Conflict by ethnicity</th>
<th>Ethnic Conflict by language</th>
<th>Language in schools by ethnicity</th>
<th>Language in schools by language</th>
<th>Voting preference by ethnicity</th>
<th>Voting preferences by Language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>2.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>5.30</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>2.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*In 1993, 69.7% of Ukrainophones preferred candidates in the Kravchuk grouping, as opposed to 30.3% preferring candidates in the Kuchma grouping. In the same year, 53.2% of Russophones preferred candidates in the Kravchuk grouping, as opposed to 46.8% preferring candidates in the Kuchma grouping. In 1995, 54.8% of Ukrainophones preferred candidates in the Kravchuk grouping, as opposed to 45.2% preferring candidates in the Kuchma grouping. In the same year, 32.3% of Russophones preferred candidates in the Kravchuk grouping, as opposed to 67.7% preferring candidates in the Kuchma grouping. In 1998, 37.6% of Ukrainophones preferred candidates in the Kravchuk grouping, as opposed to 62.4% preferring candidates in the Kuchma grouping. In the same year, 33.2% of Russophones preferred candidates in the Kravchuk grouping, as opposed to 66.8% preferring candidates in the Kuchma grouping.*

We see similar patterns when we look at the language factor and how it relates to ethnic conflict. Perhaps not surprisingly, considering the language makeup of Ukraine, we see especially in the 1993 and 1995 data, deep divisions among Ukrainophones and Russophones over language use in school. We do not, however, see the divide at anywhere near the same level in attitudes toward conflict.

We might infer other things as well from the table. If we do not find a relationship between voting preferences and ethnic conflict, we still might see a relationship between the "language at school" variable and voting preferences. For example, a comparison of the "language in school by ethnicity" column with the "voting by ethnicity" column possibly reveals a relationship between the two variables in an examination the trends in 1993 and 1995. Although differences
between ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians in voting preferences are smaller than the differences in views toward language in schools in 1993 and 1995, the magnitudinal change is quite similar. Interestingly, the same trends are not markedly evident when you look at these variables by language. An examination of columns 4 and 6 reveals that the magnitudinal change in language in schools by language is not concomitant with a similar change in voting preferences by language.

Patterns, when they exist, should be viewed cautiously. However, it does appear that voting polarization and differences in voting preferences by language and ethnicity have largely disappeared by 1998. While this seems consistent with measures of ethnic conflict, we know from the 1995 data the weakness of ethnic conflict measures against the reality of polarization. Moreover, differences between ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians and Ukrainophones and Russophones on views toward language in schools in 1998 remain great. Measures other than the ones offered in this chapter may or may not better explain voting preferences and how they have changed over time. For example, Arel asserts that views on relation towards Russia might be a measure that could help explain changes in voting polarity between 1993 and 1995 (by 1997–1999 Russian-Ukrainian relations had stabilized after a treaty was signed and ratified). Another measure that might help us explain voting preferences and polarity might be the increasing partisanship of Ukrainian voters.

INCREASING PARTISANSHIP

Stephen Whitefield and Geoffrey Evans have made a strong case for the existence of increasing partisanship in Eastern Europe since 1991. Their view is that despite all the difficulties encountered by post-communist states, such as "newness to democracy, the weak organizational links between parties and citizens, and the general social and ideological flux associated with the transition," there exist "well-structured cleavages underlying partisanship." Whitefield and Evans argue that there are increasingly intelligible links between voters and parties, and presidential preferences. An examination of the survey data does demonstrate this increasing partisanship among the Ukrainian electorate. In answer to the question, Do you think of yourself as a supporter of any particular party? only 14.6% of respondents in 1993 answered positively. In 1995 this percentage increased to 22.0%. By 1998, 58.7% of respondents answered yes to the question.

More and more Ukrainian voters are identifying themselves with political parties. This increased identification would suggest that voters are becoming more politically savvy and better able to identify political preferences with parties and candidates. If in fact candidates are partly defining themselves or being defined in terms of how they stand on certain issues, we should expect this to be increasingly evident in Ukrainian voting preferences. If there was little to distinguish between candidates on economic issues in the 1994 presidential elections, differences on language issues or the fact that Kuchma chose to campaign in
Russian\textsuperscript{43} naturally would not be lost on even the most politically naïve voter. It is likely that as Ukrainian voters become increasingly more sophisticated they will be better able to distinguish candidates and party views on issues important to them.

Not only are Ukrainian voters becoming increasingly more partisan, but they are also becoming more increasingly involved with the democratic process. In response to the question, If there were a presidential election tomorrow whom would you most likely vote for? 26.9\% of the respondents in 1993 indicated that they would not vote. In 1995 this percentage decreased to 22.9\%. By 1998, the number of respondents saying they would not vote decreased to 14.6\%. This trend seemed to be confirmed by the first round of the Ukrainian presidential elections of October 1999. By most accounts campaigning was nasty and dirty. Under these circumstances we might expect a lower voter turnout from an electorate turned off by unsavory campaign tactics. Instead, voter turnout was higher than it was in 1994.

How might increased partisanship explain trends in Table 5.15? It might be argued that the polarity exhibited in 1995, compared to 1993, can at least be partially explained by partisanship. Voters in 1995 increasingly were able to identify where the candidates stood on issues. Thus issue cleavages, such as language, might have been reflected more accurately in voting preferences. The absence of polarity in 1998 might also be reflected by partisanship. Whitefield and Evans assert that ethnic divisions do not constitute the only axis of partisan polarity.\textsuperscript{44} Perhaps another social or ideological dimension is more relevant to explaining voting preferences in 1998. The November 1999 second-round presidential results would seem to confirm this, because it offered a clear choice between two candidates—communist and anticommunist.

CONCLUSION

Attitudinal surveys in Ukraine show low expectations of ethnic conflict. This is true for ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians as well as for Ukrainophones and Russophones. Moreover, with some exceptions, regional factors do not appear to have had a great impact on attitudes toward conflict. Attitudes toward ethnic conflict have remained stable, despite what we might have expected from real or perceived nationalizing policies and in the face of polarization manifested in the 1994 presidential elections.

How can the weakness of ethnic conflict measures against these expectations and realities be explained? Low perceptions of ethnic distance between ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians may provide a partial answer. Yet, perhaps more important, it seems probable that both ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians are seeking to address their differences through normal democratic processes rather than through conflict. This is manifested not only by the low levels of conflict that have occurred in Ukraine since the collapse of the Soviet Union, but also by the manner in which deep issue cleavages with an ethnic dimension have been addressed. Ethnic divisions on certain issues do not have to be an indication of
ethnic cleavages along other dimensions. In Ukraine, there are a number of crosscutting cleavages, as we have seen with the language issue. The findings of this chapter caution against the notion that a nationalizing program is needed to hold the country together. Ethnic divisions on issues can exist in a society alongside low expectations of ethnic conflict. What may be more important are mechanisms for expressing differences.

That the citizens of Ukraine have been able to use normal democratic means to voice their preferences has in no small part been because of the inclusive citizenship policy and absence of political discrimination. Moreover, Ukrainians, rather than demonstrating apathy toward politics, are demonstrating increased participation and partisanship, which are sure to be reflected in their future political choices. Voter preferences will be important in determining how far a real or imagined nationalizing agenda can be pursued. This is not to rule out the possibility of ethnic conflict in Ukraine, but if Ukrainians continue on the path of democratic reform, the likelihood that differences will continue to be dealt with through the democratic process remains high.

APPENDIX: DETAILS OF THE SURVEYS

The questionnaires contained approximately 300 items. They were pilot tested on 50 to 100 respondents in Ukraine prior to being finalized for use in the main surveys. Back-translation of the items took several months of iterative adjustment. It was facilitated by the presence of fluent Slavonic speakers in the British team, academic translators, and the helpful contribution of East European collaborators, who also provided additional information regarding the political salience of the issues being examined. All interviews were conducted face to face in respondents' homes. Interviewers were generally experienced and were also given special training for some of the more difficult aspects of the interview schedule. Local area supervisors carried out checks on interviewers. The reliability of responses was also checked using a follow-up study of 10% of the respondents, who were randomly selected and were reinterviewed a few weeks after the main surveys. This also allowed a check on whether interviewers had obtained the interview as claimed. Dr. Mykola Churilov, Director, Institute of Sociology, Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences, Kyiv, directed the fieldwork. The sampling frame consisted of the adult population (18+) drawn from the Housing Offices' residence list of individuals. The sample achieved in 1993 was 2,537, and in 1995 and 1998 the samples achieved were 2,500.

NOTES


6. The survey data presented in this chapter were commissioned as part of the Economic and Social Research Council's East-West Programme: Grant No. Y 309 25 3025, "Emerging Forms of Political Representation and Participation in Eastern Europe," awarded to Geoffrey Evans, Stephen Whitefield, Anthony Heath, and Clive Payne as well as from an INTAS Grant, "Ethnicity, Nationality, and Citizenship in the Former Soviet Union," awarded to Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield. The surveys were conducted in May–June 1993, April–May 1995, and in April 1998. I would like to thank Stephen Whitefield for his kind permission to use these data as well as for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this chapter. All errors and omissions are, of course, my own.


8. For incidents of ethnic conflict in Ukraine see Laitin, *Identity in Formation*, pp. 179–180. Laitin acknowledges that ethnic conflict has been largely contained in Ukraine but claims that "extremist groups have brought areas of Ukraine to the brink of ethnic war" (p. 179).

9. For a detailed examination on Ukraine's citizenship policies see Lowell William Barrington's Ph.D. dissertation, *To Exclude or not to Exclude: Citizenship Policies in Newly Independent States*, University of Michigan, 1993. While the inclusiveness of the citizenship law is generally recognized as a positive aspect, Barrington notes that there exist both ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians who feel that the law is too inclusive.

10. It might be argued that Ukraine has clearly set limits on political expression in Crimea. However, one should not confuse political discrimination of one ethnic group over another with limits on the political expression of territorial secession.


12. Ibid., p. 102.

13. Ibid.


15. In all three surveys, respondents were more likely to believe that there would be conflict among workers, entrepreneurs, managers, the intelligentsia, and farmers than they were to believe that there would be conflict among ethnic groups.

16. This index and its calculation are taken from Richard Rose, *Governing without Consensus: An Irish Perspective* (London: Faber and Faber, 1971), pp. 200–201. I would like to thank Professor Rose for bringing his index to my attention.


22. See, for example, Kuzio, Ukraine: State and Nation Building, p. 82; and Kolstoe, Russians in the Former Soviet Republics, p. 190.


25. Melvin, Russians Beyond Russia, p. 94.

26. The regional division I use is based on the division utilized by Arel, "Ukraine: The Temptation," p. 170. I do, however, in most cases treat the Crimea as a separate region because of its unique status as an autonomous republic and because of the perceived greater potential for ethnic conflict in the region. I also look at Kyiv City separately. Laitin suggests that a language shift and Ukrainianization of Kyiv might determine what kind of "national state [Ukraine] will become" (Laitin, Identity in Formation, p. 140). It might be important then to look at how a potential shift might be reflected in attitudes toward ethnic conflict. Otherwise, the East comprises of the Donets'k, Luhans'k, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk's, and Zaporizhzhia oblasti. The South is made up of the Odessa, Kherson, and Mykolaiv oblasti. The West is constituted by the Volyn', Rivne, L'viv, Ivano-Frankivs'k, Ternopil', Chernivtsi, and Zakarpattia oblasti. The Center-East is made up of the Chernihiv, Poltava, and Sumy oblasti and the Center-West is made up of the Kyiv, Cherkasy, Zhytomyr, Kirovohrad, Vinnytsia, and Khmel'nits'kyi oblasti.


28. See Michael Haxton and Anne Pitsch, Russians of the Crimea in Ukraine, 6 May 1997. Online. Minorities at Risk Project, Center for International Development and Con-

29. Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying,"

in Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 46. This chapter was originally published as Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?" World Politics, vol. 24, no. 2 (April 1972), pp. 319-355. Connor's quotation was brought to my attention from reading Kuzio, Ukraine: State and Nation Building, p. 73.


33. This chapter does not directly engage in the debate as to what degree Ukraine has pursued a nationalizing agenda or to what extent it should be regarded as a nationalizing state. I am, however, sympathetic to the view that characterizing Ukraine as a nationalizing state in some areas underplays the importance of Ukraine's efforts to define the state in civic rather than ethnic terms. For a critique of Brubaker's nationalizing states paradigm and how it is applied to Ukraine see Taras Kuzio, "Nationalizing States or Nation-Building? A Critical Review of the Theoretical Literature and Empirical Evidence," paper prepared for the annual convention of the Association of the Study of Nationalities, Columbia University, New York, 15-18 April 1999.

34. Past vote was used in 1995 to better compare responses with actual voting results in the 1994 Ukrainian presidential elections. The first-round preferences were used because there were more candidates in the field. This would make for a better basis of comparison with 1993 and 1998 future preferences.

35. I would like to thank Dominique Arel for helping me with the groupings. However, as Arel has pointed out to me in personal correspondence, assigning candidates into clear-cut camps is a difficult business at best. Certainly my 1998 groupings are most open to question. Still, what I am looking for are general trends, and I would argue that grouping changes in 1998 would not terribly affect the point I am making.


37. Ibid., p. 172.


39. See Taras Kuzio's comments in The Ukraine List (UKL), no 54, Item 4.


42. Ibid., p. 245.


45. Much of this information on the surveys is taken from Whitefield and Evans, "Electoral Politics," p. 247.
The Internal-External Nexus in the Formation of Ukrainian National Identity: The Case for Slavic Integration

Stephen Shulman

Leaders of states seeking to develop and solidify the national identity of their populations have a wide array of tools at their disposal, including language policy, education policy, citizenship laws, power-sharing arrangements, and federal territorial-administrative structures. Another nation-building resource often overlooked by scholars and analysts is foreign policy. In Ukraine in particular, how leaders resolve the central foreign policy debate—whether they place priority on developing political, economic, and military ties with Europe and the West or with Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States—will greatly influence whether a unified nation is built in Ukraine and what type of nation is built. This chapter explores in a systematic manner the main ways in which Ukraine’s foreign ties influence its national identity, and on the basis of this analysis recommends how Ukrainian leaders can use foreign policy to maximize the success of the nation-building project.

Several previous works have investigated the internal-external linkage in the realm of identity in Ukraine. One problem with many of these works is that the term identity is usually not clearly defined and explicated. Scholars routinely use the term as though there were general agreement on its meaning, but this is far from the case. Particular confusion surrounds the term national identity, since often it is not clear whose identity is being discussed—that of the Ukrainian ethnic group or that of all citizens of the Ukrainian state, an ambiguity resulting from the fact that both ethnic groups and states make pretensions at being (or representing) nations. Additionally, and most importantly, specific mechanisms by which foreign policy and national identity interact are usually not clearly laid out. For example, Ilya Prizel’s long monograph on national identity and foreign policy in Ukraine, Poland, and Russia, contains no general theoretical statements on the relationship between national identity and foreign policy which are then empirically examined in the case studies.

National identity is defined here as the feeling of solidarity and unity among the people living in a state. There are two components to national identity: strength and content. Strength refers to the intensity with which people feel soli-
darity and unity with one another and wish to live together in their own state. Thus, strength is the quantitative component of national identity. National identity is weakest in countries where individuals from different ethnic groups and regions feel a high degree of estrangement and hostility toward one another, separatist movements are strong, the population feels alienated from the state’s political system and its leaders, or large numbers of citizens wish to terminate the independent existence of the state. Cultivating the strength of national identity entails measures by states to increase the “we-feeling” among its citizens and their desire for common statehood. This goal in itself is usually not controversial, except for those individuals and groups who seek to exit or terminate the state and therefore do not want to be part of the political community in the first place. A strong national identity is important because it legitimizes government, increases political stability, and assists policy makers in the formulation and implementation of coherent and effective policies.

Content of national identity, on the other hand, refers to the substantive or qualitative reasons by which the people in a state feel they form a community separate and distinct from other communities. Such content varies in accordance with the traits people in a state stress as unifying all or most of the population and distinguishing them from the populations of other states. In this sense, constructing the content of national identity is an act of self-definition, whereby state and non-state elites seek to alter the characteristics of the population and the state and manipulate symbols so that certain traits stand out as the basis for the population’s special persona and image. This process is potentially highly conflictual, because different ethnic groups and regions in a state often have different visions of the basis on which national unity should be built. Content and strength of national identity are thus closely intertwined. The construction of some contents of national identity may be successful in strengthening national identity, while others may in fact weaken this identity, depending on the relative popularity of the contents and the domestic and foreign policies they require for their construction.

While national identity is affected by many domestic factors, this chapter focuses on how Ukrainian foreign policy influences both the content and strength of Ukrainian national identity. It argues that the content of national identity with the greatest ability to produce a strong national identity is an Eastern Slavic one, which can in part be pursued with a foreign policy placing priority on integration with Russia and other CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) countries. In making this argument, this chapter pursues a strictly empirical analysis, eschewing the normative concerns that seem to underlie many approaches to the emotionally charged questions of Ukrainian national identity and foreign orientation.

STRENGTH OF NATIONAL IDENTITY AND FOREIGN POLICY IN UKRAINE

Foreign policy affects the strength of national identity in a state in two main ways. First, disagreement among the state's citizens over foreign policy is both a
reflection of weak national identity and a source of it. Several scholars have pointed to common values as an important basis for national unity, though the precise values that are most important to national unity are not specified. Disputes over which foreign peoples and states to associate with denote conflict over values in two senses, and thus represent a potentially powerful obstacle to strong national identity. First, they constitute conflict over values defined as preferences. Different individuals have different goals for the state’s foreign policy orientation. Second, they constitute conflict over values defined as norms. Some states and peoples, because of their past behavior and culture, are liked and respected, while others are disliked and condemned. Furthermore, foreign policy debate in a state often reflects the different value placed by citizens on various contents of national identity, a linkage further explored below. If people disagree over what traits, ideas, and symbols should serve as the basis for unity in the state, then unity itself suffers, and this disintegrative effect is intensified when the debate finds expression in the foreign policy sphere.

In short, one’s desire for association or dissociation with foreign states is a statement of one’s values. Controversy over foreign policy makes apparent to citizens of a state their different values, and in so doing can feed feelings of alienation among them. When disagreement over foreign policy falls along ethnic and/or regional lines, then the threat to national identity is potentially very strong given the key role played by ethnicity and territory in the construction of national identity. Ethnic groups and regions will be more likely to see themselves as incompatible partners in the nation-building enterprise as a result of their disparate values.

A second way that foreign policy influences the strength of national identity relates to the degree of match between the foreign policy preferences of the population and the actual foreign policy pursued by the state. In the modern era, democratic ideology has very successfully promoted the principles of popular sovereignty and self-determination of peoples. Under the influence of nationalist ideology, states usually claim that they represent a nation that is the ultimate bearer of sovereignty and authority in the state. In this formulation, the state, as the agent of the nation it represents, is obligated to fulfill the latter’s will. Where the state fails in its mandate to obey the values, preferences, and interests of its people, its respect and legitimacy suffer. As a result, a potent symbol of national unity is weakened, and intra-national tensions can arise, since those members of the state whose values are ignored are likely to feel alienated not only from the state but also from the groups and individuals seen as responsible for state policy. National unity is especially vulnerable to state policies that violate the values of many or most of its people in the sphere of culture and identity. Ethnic and regional conflicts have repeatedly been catalyzed or exacerbated by language, educational, economic, migration, and other policies that retard or promote the culture and identities of various groups within a state. Particularly in light of the link between foreign policy on one hand and culture and identity on the other (to be explored below), a state that pursues a foreign policy program that is at odds with the values of the majority of the population, or of particular ethnic groups and regions, risks weakening national identity. Conversely,
a foreign policy that accords with the values of most of the population of a state will tend to intensify feelings of devotion to the state and its dominant group(s), and thus to the political community—the nation—as a whole.

To what extent do foreign policy issues in Ukraine affect the strength of national identity through the two paths discussed above? Tables 6.1 through 6.5 present data collected from the population of Ukraine on their views of foreign policy. The following analysis of the data in Tables 6.1 through 6.5 indicates that foreign policy preferences of the population vary substantially according to ethnicity and region, and, for large numbers of Ukrainians, differ from the foreign policy implemented by the state. The result is that Ukrainian national identity is weakened.

A mass survey conducted by the Ukrainian Institute of Social Research and the Social Monitoring Center in March 1999 reveals substantial dissension over foreign policy, particularly toward Russia. One question asked is, Is an orientation of greater closeness (orientatsia na zbyzhennia) with Western European countries important for the successful development of Ukrainian society? Table 6.1 shows the responses according to region and ethnicity.

**Table 6.1**

**Mass Views on Foreign Policy toward Western Europe by Region and Ethnicity, Respectively (in Percentages)**

"Is an orientation of greater closeness with Western European countries important for the successful development of Ukrainian society?"

**By Region**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>West</th>
<th>Center</th>
<th>North</th>
<th>East</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>Crimea</th>
<th>Kyiv</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to say</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**By Ethnicity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ukrainians</th>
<th>Russians</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to say</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The highest regional levels of support for closer ties with Western Europe are in Kyiv and the West, where 78% and 73% of respondents, respectively, answered yes to the question. In contrast, only 27% and 45% answered yes in the South and Crimea. The North, Center, and East register levels of support between these extremes. When categorized according to ethnicity, differences remain, though they are smaller than regional ones. Thus, 61% of Ukrainians and 52% of Russians think closer ties with Western Europe are important.

Another question inquired, Is unification (ob'ednannia) of the Eastern Slavic states—Ukraine, Russia and Belarus—important for the successful de-
velopment of Ukrainian society? Here a higher degree of integration is being asked about than in the previous question. While not clearly defined, "unification" implies much greater contact and cooperation than "greater closeness." The regions of Ukraine express distinct positions regarding such unification (Table 6.2).

Table 6.2
Mass Views on Foreign Policy toward Russia and Belarus by Region and Ethnicity, Respectively (in Percentages)

"Is unification of the Eastern Slavic states—Ukraine, Russia and Belarus—important for the successful development of Ukrainian society?"

By Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>West</th>
<th>Center</th>
<th>North</th>
<th>East</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>Crimea</th>
<th>Kyiv</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to say</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By Ethnicity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ukrainians</th>
<th>Russians</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to say</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The West, Kyiv, and Crimea again occupy the extreme positions, with 16%, 34%, and 81%, respectively, supporting Eastern Slavic integration. While the other regions also show varying levels of support, in each case a majority of respondents answered yes to the survey question. Further, as Table 6.2 shows, ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians differ on foreign policy toward Russia and Belarus much more than they do for foreign policy toward Western Europe. Only 43% of ethnic Ukrainians support Eastern Slavic unification, while 73% of ethnic Russians do.

Other data on foreign policy preferences tell a similar story. In a survey conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology in November–December 1997, respondents were asked what kind of relations they want with Russia. Three choices were given: "The same relations as with other states," "independent but friendly states," and "unification into one state." The last choice unambiguously refers to the eradication of Ukrainian statehood, and thus represents the most extreme form of integration with Russia. Table 6.3 shows the results according to a regional scheme that differs from that in the previously discussed survey.

Large differences again manifest themselves, particularly with respect to the option of merging with Russia. Only 7% from the West want to end Ukrainian statehood, compared to 45% from the South and 50% from the East. Table 6.3 also shows how ethnic differences complement these regional ones, with 22% of
those declaring themselves Ukrainian supporting this option, in contrast to 56% of Russians. Not surprisingly, the proportion of mixed Ukrainian–Russians who expressed a desire to end statehood falls between these extremes (43%).

Table 6.3
Mass Views on Status of Ukraine’s Relations with Russia, by Region and Ethnicity, Respectively (in Percentages)

By Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>West</th>
<th>West-Center</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>East-Center</th>
<th>East</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Same relations as</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with other states</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent but</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>friendly states</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unification into</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>one state</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By Ethnicity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ukrainians</th>
<th>Ukrainian-Russians</th>
<th>Russians</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Same relations as</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with other states</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent but</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>friendly states</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unification into</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>one state</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, a survey distributed in what may be called the antipodes of Ukrainian society, L’viv and Donets’k, in September 1994–January 1995 indicates the degree of dispute over foreign policy among elites, not the masses. A sample of approximately 1,000 elites in Donets’k and L’viv was presented with a list of six geographic regions of the world: the Near East, Russia/Belarus, all countries of the CIS, United States/Canada, Western Europe, and Eastern Europe (Table 6.4). The respondents were asked: Which two regions do you consider the most important partners for Ukraine?

In Donets’k, the two regions mentioned most often as desirable foreign partners are Russia/Belarus, chosen by 77% of the respondents, and all CIS countries, chosen by 38%. In L’viv, however, these regions fared much less well, beating out only the Near East. Instead, Western Europe (72%) and the United States/Canada (37%) were deemed the most important regions. Especially noteworthy is the fact that relatively tiny Eastern Europe (27%) surpasses the huge CIS (26%)—with which western Ukraine still has substantial economic ties. Large numbers of Donets’k elites chose Western Europe (36%) and United States/Canada (29%), while large numbers of L’viv elites chose the CIS (26%) and Russia/Belarus (21%). Thus there is a significant degree of overlap in pref-
erences between the Donets’k and L’viv, and the degree of dissension over foreign policy in Ukraine should not be exaggerated, even in two cities as different as Donets’k and L’viv.

Table 6.4
Elite Foreign Policy Preferences in Donets’k and L’viv (Percentage of Respondents Who Chose the Given Geographical Regions as Being the Most Important Foreign Partners for Ukraine; Relative Rank Given in Parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic Region</th>
<th>Donets’k (n = 496)</th>
<th>L’viv (n = 487)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Near East (including Turkey)</td>
<td>3 (6)</td>
<td>15 (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia and Belarus</td>
<td>72 (1)</td>
<td>21 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
<td>38 (2)</td>
<td>26 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States and Canada</td>
<td>29 (4)</td>
<td>37 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe (including Germany)</td>
<td>36 (3)</td>
<td>71 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe (including the Baltics)</td>
<td>9 (5)</td>
<td>27 (3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, this survey question does not indicate the relative strength of the pro-West and pro-East orientations of the cities. Another question from the same survey designed to ascertain directly the relative strength of a westward versus eastward orientation requested respondents to agree or disagree with the following statement:

Close international ties with Russia and Belarus are more beneficial for Ukraine than close international ties with Eastern Europe.

In Donets’k, 90% of the respondents agreed in some fashion (fully, basically, or somewhat). In L’viv, though, only 36% agreed with this statement—testimony to a strong cleavage between these cities, and likely Galicia and Donbas more broadly, over foreign policy orientation.

As argued earlier, such foreign policy dissension in Ukraine weakens national unity by underscoring value differences among its citizens. Russians and Ukrainians and inhabitants of the various regions are likely to feel less close to one another as a result of these differences over such an important issue. Is it possible to demonstrate more concretely that such a negative result ensues from the foreign policy debate? Strong empirical evidence that conflict over relations with Russia directly weakens national identity comes from the elite survey in Donets’k and L’viv. In Donets’k the survey asked respondents to agree or disagree on a six-point scale with this statement:
If someone in western Ukraine does not want to have close ties with Russia, it would be better if he simply emigrates to a country weakly tied to Russia.

In L'viv, this version appeared:

If someone in Donbas wants to have close ties with Russia, it would be better if he simply emigrates there.

The questions seek to discover whether conflict over foreign policy leads to an extreme form of alienation—the desire not to live in the same political community with those who disagree with one's position in the debate.

Donets'k elites who indicated their support for ties with Russia/Belarus and/or All Countries of the CIS were included in the analysis. Though the modal answer is to disagree fully with the proposition, 41% (189/463) of all respondents agree to one degree or another (fully, basically, or somewhat) that western Ukrainians who do not want close ties with Russia should leave their own country—the homeland of ethnic Ukrainians—in search of a state that is weakly tied to Russia. Nearly a fifth (19%) agree fully with this assertion. An even higher degree of alienation was expressed by L'viv elites toward those in Donbas with different foreign policy preferences. Included in this analysis are L'viv elites who chose neither Russia/Belarus nor All Countries of the CIS as the most important regions with which Ukraine should develop ties. The modal answer to the L'viv version of the survey question is agree fully, with 66% (176/268) of respondents choosing this option. And 88% of respondents agree to one degree or another (fully, basically, or somewhat) with the statement that those in Donbas who want close ties with Russia should emigrate there. These results suggest an extremely high degree of alienation felt by L'viv elites, the vast majority of whom are ethnic Ukrainians, toward eastern Ukrainian Russophiles, who compose both ethnic Russians and ethnic Ukrainians.

There is also evidence of a mismatch between the actual foreign policy implemented by Kyiv and the foreign policy preferences of significant portions of Ukraine's citizenry. The foreign policy pursued since independence is best described as "multi-vectored," to use the term popular in Ukraine. Presidents Kuchma and Kravchuk have each sought to develop Ukraine's ties with both Europe/United States and Russia/CIS without tilting much in either direction.11

This attempt to balance Ukraine's foreign policy orientation, however, leaves large numbers of Ukrainians with their foreign policy preferences unsatisfied. An insufficiently eastern orientation is likely to cause greater overall dissatisfaction with and alienation from the government in Kyiv—to the detriment of national identity—than an insufficiently westward orientation. This is because of the great overall popularity for extremely high degrees of integration with Russia/CIS, which outmatch in intensity the widespread desire merely for closer relations with Europe and the West. Additionally, the main obstacle to close ties with Europe and the United States is not policymakers in Kyiv, but the West itself (which is unwilling to let Ukraine into the European Union and NATO anytime soon) and the poor condition and lack of competitiveness of the Ukrainian economy. The main obstacle to strong integration with Russia and Belarus,
on the other hand, is the government in Kyiv. National identity is likely to suffer under the latter circumstances precisely because representatives of the state are primarily seen as responsible for the gap between one’s preferences and the state’s implemented policy.

Survey data, especially at the aggregate level for Ukraine as a whole, indicate just how large is the unsatisfied contingent of Ukrainian citizens with Ukrainian foreign policy as a result of its failure to pursue a stronger eastern orientation. A survey from July 1999 asked respondents, “Do you favor close security relations primarily with Russia and the CIS or the U.S. and NATO?” Only 13% said the United States/NATO, while 58% said Russia and the CIS. A large regional difference here appears, with 38% of Western Ukrainians wanting closer relations with the United States/NATO, and only 8% of respondents from all other regions. Additionally, according to Table 6.2, 53% of the population want unification of Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia, versus 29% against. Important here as well is the fact that majorities in every region except the West and Kyiv support such unification. And while ethnic differences in support for Slavic unification exist, as noted earlier, a plurality of ethnic Ukrainians favor such unification (46% for, versus 34% against). Another survey conducted in December 1995—January 1996 similarly finds that 59% think “Ukraine’s interests would best be served if the government sought confederation with Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus and other former Soviet republics,” compared to 31% who desire that Ukraine remain “a sovereign and independent state.”

Most remarkable of all, a third of the country so desires close relations with Russia that they want to wholly terminate Ukraine’s statehood (Table 6.3). This represents the greatest threat to the strength of Ukrainian national identity; these citizens want to eliminate that identity. A majority of Russians (56%) and near-majorities of the inhabitants of the East (50%) and South (45%) do not support the continued existence of a sovereign Ukrainian political community. Additionally, an enormous 23% of the country’s titular ethnic group—ethnic Ukrainians—I wish to unify their country with a neighboring state. It is surely an anomaly with few parallels in world history for large proportions of both of the two largest ethnic groups in a state to wish to terminate its existence (Belarus also belongs in this rare club). Perplexing is the lack of attention many analysts of Ukrainian politics devote to this phenomenon, which should be seen as a crisis for Ukrainian national identity. For example, Taras Kuzio’s otherwise fine account of national identity in Ukraine neglects even to mention figures on the lack of support for statehood, asserting instead that “Ukrainian society is largely united at a ‘minimal’ level through relatively high backing for statehood and sovereignty.” Relative to almost any other state in the world, the levels of support for independence, statehood, and sovereignty in Ukraine are extremely low.

The preceding analysis reveals two somewhat contradictory patterns. On one hand, substantial ethnic and regional differences over foreign policy exist in Ukraine. But on the other hand, there is great overall mass support for a strong eastern foreign orientation. It is the western territories of Ukraine in particular that distinguish themselves as outliers against this general tendency. To under-
stand how policy makers in Kyiv might strengthen national unity as much as possible in the face of ethnic/regional disputes over foreign policy and the gap between popular foreign policy preferences for a strong eastern orientation and state foreign policy, it is necessary to explore the content of national identity in Ukraine and how foreign policy constructs it.

CONTENT OF NATIONAL IDENTITY AND FOREIGN POLICY IN UKRAINE

The foreign policy debate in Ukraine has many sources.¹⁷ There can be no doubt that citizens of Ukraine disagree about the economic and political consequences of integration with Russia/CIS and Europe/United States. Those who place priority on strong ties with the West believe not only that such an orientation is economically beneficial to Ukraine, but also that it will reduce Russia’s ability to impose its will on Ukraine and threaten her security and sovereignty. Likewise, those who place priority on strong ties with Russia believe that this will improve the economy, while at the same not threatening the security of the people of Ukraine. Some scholars mistakenly assume that the driving force behind the desire in Ukraine for close ties with Russia is economic. For example, Zenovia Sochor writes that “it may very well be that the ‘pro-Russian’ position is based largely on economic considerations and a nostalgia for the ‘good old days’ rather than shared identities and values.”¹⁸ Kuzio argues that “Reintegration with Russia is only popular at the level of elites or at the level of the public at large as a substitute for economic reform to overcome the pain of the reform process.”¹⁹ Such analysis implies that as the economy strengthens in Ukraine the desire for close ties with Russia will wane rapidly, and national unity in Ukraine will increase.

The ethnic and regional basis for the debate suggests, however, that in addition to differences over the expected political and economic consequences of foreign ties with the West or the CIS, an additional important source is the consequence of foreign policy for content of national identity. Also, if economic motivations were paramount, one would have expected a marked decrease in Ukrainian popular support for integration with Russia after the crash of its economy in August 1998. However, there was no such decrease.²⁰ More generally, the experience of other countries demonstrates that there is no consistent relationship between the level of economic prosperity in a country and its level of national unity.²¹ Often economic growth strengthens ethnic identities and conflict, and frequently secessionist movements arise or intensify in groups that are becoming wealthier (e.g., Quebecois in Canada) or are already wealthy compared to other groups in the state (e.g., Sikhs in India).²²

Data from the 1994–1995 elite survey in Donets’k and L’viv provide further insight into the identity-related basis for the foreign policy debate. The survey sought to uncover the extent to which concerns about culture and identity underlay respondents’ foreign policy preferences indirectly by asking respondents about the role economic and political factors play. Elites in Donets’k were asked to agree or disagree on a six-point scale with this statement:
I support Ukraine’s development of strong ties with Russia and Belarus even if these ties were to bring no economic or political advantages to Ukraine.

Those who agree with this statement, it may be assumed, support ties with Russia and Belarus mainly because of considerations of culture and identity. Of course, the measurement is a blunt one, since it cannot determine the degree of support that results from consideration of culture and identity alone. Donets’k respondents were included in the analysis if they indicated in the previously discussed question on foreign policy preferences that either Russia/Belarus or all Countries of the CIS (or both) are among the two most important regional partners for Ukraine. Of these 464 Donets’k respondents, the great majority—81%—agree in some manner (fully, basically, or somewhat) with the statement. Indeed, 46% agree fully, while only 8% disagree fully. These figures suggest that noneconomic and nonpolitical factors alone are likely sufficient in explaining the high levels of eastern Ukrainian support for close ties with Russia and Belarus.

The survey asked L’viv elites to agree or disagree with the following analogous statement regarding their views toward Russia:

I do not support Ukraine’s development of strong ties with Russia even if these ties were to bring economic or political advantages to Ukraine.23

This statement even more strongly than the previous statement taps into the concerns of the respondents over culture and identity. This is because it refers to their support for a foreign orientation that forgoes available political or economic benefits, while the Donets’k elites were asked about their support for a particular foreign orientation merely in the absence of political or economic benefits.

Included in the analysis were the 274 L’viv respondents who indicated that they consider neither Russia/Belarus nor all Countries of the CIS as among the most important foreign partners for Ukraine. A large majority—69%—of these respondents agree in some manner with the question (fully, basically, or somewhat) and thus do not want close ties with Russia/Belarus even in the event that these ties are politically or economically beneficial to Ukraine. The modal response is to agree fully with the statement in the survey (38%), with a total of only 31% of the respondents disagreeing in some form. Thus, while much of the ethnic Ukrainian nationalists’ rhetoric and anti-CIS arguments are filled with assertions that integration eastward will hurt the Ukrainian economy and weaken Ukrainian statehood and sovereignty in the face of Russian attempts to reestablish imperial control, the results of the survey indicate that while these fears may be very real, they are not the sole source of nationalists’ policy preferences.

This analysis suggests that an important element of the debate over foreign policy in Ukraine is the content of national identity. What are the main options for the content of national identity in Ukraine and how does foreign policy construct these contents?
The most fundamental choice for the content of national identity for a state has been conceptualized in the academic literature as one between a "civic," "political," or "territorial" nation on the one hand, or an "ethnic" or "cultural" nation on the other. The primary basis for unity in a civic-territorial nation is, depending on the scholar, common rights and duties in the political system, living in common territory, shared belief in a set of political principles, or some combination thereof. The basis for unity in ethnocultural nations is common ancestry, culture, language, religion, and traditions, or some combination thereof. These are ideal types, and most states strive to develop an identity grounded in both, though states often stress one type of content more than the other.

A national identity based primarily on civic-territorial traits is likely insufficient to promote a high degree of positive affect and solidarity in Ukraine; that is, it is unlikely to promote a strong national identity. The political and legal institutions of the Ukrainian state are new and generally do not have much legitimacy and respect among Ukrainian citizens. Opinion polls show that of the major state institutions, only the armed forces enjoy a substantial degree of trust. Most Ukrainians also do not believe that the elections conducted by the state are fair and honest, and they feel low levels of political efficacy in their capacity as citizens to affect the political process. In addition, there is vigorous debate and disagreement over political ideology in Ukraine, especially with regard to the role the state should play in the economy and the proper institutional structure of the polity. Finally, the historical fragmentation of the territory of Ukraine impedes the construction of a predominantly civic-territorial nation. The lands that constitute present-day Ukraine have been incorporated into several empires and states over the course of approximately 600–700 years: the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Russian Empire, Ottoman Empire, Austro-Hungarian Empire, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and the Soviet Union. Most important, different parts of Ukraine were subjugated by different states in a prolonged imperial tug of war. As a consequence of this turbulent history, strong regional identities in Ukraine hinder attachment to the Ukrainian territory as a whole, whose present boundaries date only to 1954.

Even if Ukraine did have a rich political and legal tradition, basic consensus over political ideology, and strong popular identification with its current territory, it is not clear that a primarily civic national identity would provide the emotional and psychological resonance that the Ukrainian state needs to weather successfully its economic difficulties, which will not be overcome anytime soon. Generally speaking, ethnocultural identities are superior to civic identities (and perhaps all other social identities with the exception of the family) in their great potential to mobilize people's passions and loyalties. Even the states that are often hailed as prototypical civic nations—the United States and France—achieved their unity and solidarity in good part because of common language and culture among their citizens. In any case, in Ukraine the issue of ethnocultural rebirth and identity is so salient that it is not clear how the government would be able to put this question on the back burner, so to speak.
Consequently, the historical and political reality in Ukraine is such that if the government in Kyiv is to build a strong and unified nation, it must do so in large degree on ethnocultural foundations. The crucial question then becomes *what* and *whose* ethnocultural traits should be chosen as the basis for national cohesion and distinction. The two main alternatives prominent in current political discourse in Ukraine for this ethnocultural content of Ukrainian national identity may be termed Ethnic Ukrainian and Eastern Slavic.

Before discussing these alternatives, however, it is necessary first to analyze the ways that the foreign policy of a state can influence the ethnocultural content of its national identity. There are two basic routes. 30 First, foreign policy may substantively alter the cultural characteristics of the state's population through processes of cultural diffusion. Foreign political, economic, and other ties are conduits through which ideas, values, and language cross state borders and modify the cultural landscape inside a state. The unifying and distinguishing cultural characteristics of the citizenry that form the qualitative basis for national unity therefore are altered by foreign cultures. Additionally, because cultures inside a state often are perceived as similar to or different from the cultures outside, import of foreign cultures can either degrade or strengthen ethnic cultures in a state. This shift in the cultural balance of power can change the cultural image of the nation (at home and abroad) and the traits it stresses as those that unify the majority of its citizens. Ethnic groups in a state that compete with each other over what culture should serve as the basis for the content of national identity thus will have different foreign policy preferences when foreign ties are seen as altering the relative strength of their cultures.

Second, foreign policy symbolically conditions national identity through its effect on the in-group/out-group boundaries driving identity. 31 Close relations between a state and foreign countries that members of the state perceive as culturally similar (positive reference groups) symbolically erode boundaries and cement together the members of the state into a nation on the basis of the cultural traits shared within and between the countries at hand. Reducing the distance between the state and its positive reference groups is an act of cultural self-definition specifying the cultural character of the nation: “we are similar to X.” Similarly, weak ties with foreign countries perceived by the nation as culturally distant (negative reference groups) symbolically sharpen boundaries and strengthen national identity on the basis of the distinguishing traits that members of the nation share among themselves. By increasing the distance with such out-groups, the nation again engages in an act of self-definition specifying its cultural character: “we are not like Y.” If the state is split into multiple ethnic and regional groups that differ in culture, forging foreign ties with culturally similar countries and breaking ties with dissimilar countries can symbolically strengthen one group’s identity and its claim to be the basis for the state-wide national identity. Thus, ethnic and regional groups will push for close foreign ties between their state and states they perceive as culturally similar and weak ties with culturally dissimilar states in an effort to promote their identity in the domestic competition with other groups over whose identity will form the content of national identity.
In light of these influences of foreign policy on identity, what are the two main options for the ethnocultural content of Ukrainian national identity and what policies do they demand for their actualization? The Ethnic Ukrainian identity is founded on the claim that what does or should unite and distinguish the majority of the population of Ukraine is Ethnic Ukrainian language and culture. Domestically, this content of national identity requires policies that recognize the special position of Ethnic Ukrainians as the core and indigenous group of the Ukrainian state, and that seek to spread Ukrainian language and culture throughout society, displacing to some extent Russian language and culture. An important example of such a policy is assigning Ukrainian as the sole official language of the state. The Ethnic Ukrainian content of national identity does not necessitate a coercive and undemocratic ethnocratic state motivated by “integral nationalism” that gives members of ethnic minorities few rights. The overwhelming support in Ukraine for civic elements of national identity calling for an inclusive notion of citizenship with equal civil and political rights precludes such an option. Rather, the Ethnic Ukrainian content simply calls for the state to give official preference and support to the symbols, traditions, language, and history of Ethnic Ukrainians.

In the foreign policy sphere the Ethnic Ukrainian national identity calls for breaking economic and political ties with Russia and focusing on integration with Europe and the West. Such a foreign policy orientation will hinder diffusion of Russian culture and facilitate diffusion of European culture into Ukraine. The Ethnic Ukrainian identity is predicated on fundamental differences between Ethnic Russian culture (in Russia) and ethnic Ukrainian culture and fundamental similarities between Ethnic Ukrainian and European culture. Consequently, stronger diffusion of European culture and weaker diffusion of Russian culture into Ukraine promote the rebirth and development of Ethnic Ukrainian culture and its ability to serve as the basis of the Ukrainian nation. Additionally, because the Ethnic Ukrainian identity considers Russia as a negative reference group and Europe as a positive reference group for Ethnic Ukrainians, a western orientation symbolically enhances the Ethnic Ukrainian component of Ukrainian national identity by sharpening the state's boundary with Russia and eroding its boundary with Europe. This boundary sharpening with Russia is especially critical for the Ethnic Ukrainian content of national identity due to its role in countering the widespread image among foreigners (and many Ukrainian citizens themselves) of the absence of meaningful cultural distinctions between Russians and Ukrainians. Breaking ties with Russia is a powerful symbolic statement of Ethnic Ukrainian uniqueness. A western orientation is a declaration by the state that, overall, the people of Ukraine are similar to Europeans and different from Russians. Finally, the Ethnic Ukrainian content assumes that Ethnic Ukrainian and Ethnic Russian identities are to some degree mutually exclusive, and that loyalty to Russia competes with loyalty to Ukraine. Consequently, close ties with Russia should be avoided lest they fuel Russian loyalties and identities among the citizenry at the expense of Ukrainian identities and loyalties.
The Eastern Slavic national identity, on the other hand, is grounded in the claim that what does or should unite the majority of the people in Ukraine is a common Eastern Slavic heritage and culture. Ethnic Russians and Ethnic Ukrainians both in Ukraine and Russia are for the most part considered by this identity as peoples with common roots in Kyivan Rus', with very similar languages, values, and worldview. Domestically, this identity calls for official recognition of both Ethnic Ukrainian and Russian culture and language, seeking to treat both equally in the pursuit of a fundamentally bicultural and biethnic nation. In the foreign arena, an Eastern Slavic identity requires close and friendly relations with Russia, in either a bilateral scheme or a multilateral one with Belarus and other former Soviet republics. Although it does not exclude the development of close ties with other regions, such as Europe, priority would be placed on integration with Russia. Through diffusional processes such an orientation would help maintain the strength and position of Russian language and culture in Ukraine. Moreover, such a foreign policy degrades the boundary with what is asserted to be a positive reference group for both Ethnic Ukrainians and Ethnic Russians in Ukraine—Russians in Russia. In this manner, both groups' common (Eastern Slavic) culture is reinforced as the basis for Ukrainian unity. Finally, in contrast to the Ethnic Ukrainian content, the Eastern Slavic content is based on the compatibility of Ethnic Ukrainian and Ethnic Russian identities, of loyalty to Russia and loyalty to Ukraine. The promotion of mixed identities and loyalties through bilingualism at home and close ties with Russia is no threat to the image and status of Ukraine; rather, such identities and loyalties further emphasize the common Eastern Slavic culture of the people of Ukraine.35

To a considerable extent the Ethnic Ukrainian and Eastern Slavic identities and their implied domestic and foreign policies are mutually exclusive. Either Ethnic Ukrainians and their language and culture have a special place in the Ukrainian nation or they share equal status with Russians. Also, greater state support for the spread of Ukrainian language perforce erodes the position of Russian language. Similarly, one cannot pursue simultaneously both closer ties with Russia and weaker ties with Russia. Ukrainian citizens will perceive any substantial movement by Kyiv away from Russia/CIS as support for an Ethnic Ukrainian national identity, while any move toward Russia/CIS will be perceived as support for an Eastern Slavic national identity.

The preceding discussion makes it clear that the foreign policy debate in Ukraine in great part derives from conflict over national identity content. The ethnically and regionally based foreign policy dissension resulting from conflict over the content of national identity is likely to be long-lived, while dissension based only or primarily on economics and politics can be more easily reduced or eliminated. The reason here is that culture and preferences for identity are far less subject both to variation over time and to policy manipulation than are political and economic variables.36 For example, consistent evidence that Russian leaders in Moscow respect Ukrainian statehood and are unwilling to use economic leverage to humiliate Ukraine, and that economic relations within the context of a some kind of union with Russia and Belarus are helping to revive the Ukrainian economy, would have a powerful effect in reducing the foreign
policy controversy in Ukraine if economic and political considerations were paramount. The controversy would likewise largely evaporate in the face of evidence that breaking ties with the Russia and integrating into European economic and security institutions with generous extensions of aid and technology on behalf of the Western powers are bringing peace and prosperity to an independent Ukraine. Similar scenarios in which the outcomes are negative for Ukraine hold the same potential for reducing foreign policy dissension. The political and economic variables in the Ukrainian case are subject to change by developments and leaders both in Ukraine and abroad, potentially defusing in a relatively short period of time the controversy over foreign policy orientation. If, however, the less malleable factors of culture and identity are at work to a significant extent in the debate, then this debate and its negative consequences for Ukraine will likely persist for a long time.

**USING CONTENT OF NATIONAL IDENTITY TO BUILD STRENGTH OF NATIONAL IDENTITY: THE FOREIGN POLICY DIMENSION**

The previous analysis demonstrates that in formulating foreign policy, politicians in Kyiv confront the task of choosing among alternate ethnocultural contents of national identity. In so doing, one of their challenges is to reduce as far as possible the negative effects on the strength of national identity of the debate over foreign policy and the mismatch between the policies implemented by the state and the policies preferred by the population. Foreign policy preferences and thus the debate over foreign policy are relatively stubborn, since they are rooted in cultural and identity-related differences among the people of Ukraine that are themselves resistant to easy and quick manipulation. Therefore, the main available course of action is to substantially reduce the difference between state foreign policy and public preferences. Accordingly, the survey data suggest that Ukrainian leaders interested in strengthening national identity should pursue a content based on Eastern Slavic identity. In the foreign policy sphere, this means that integration with Russia/Belarus/CIS should take precedence over integration with Europe. Thus, instead of the Ministry of Foreign Affair’s current declared policy of “integration with Europe—cooperation with the CIS,” an orientation of “integration with Russia and Belarus—cooperation with Europe” would more likely strengthen national identity.

In more concrete terms, a Ukraine interested in strengthening national identity should at a minimum move from being a participant in the CIS to being a full member, by ratifying the CIS Charter. In March 1999 Ukraine joined the CIS Inter-Parliament Assembly, and should further its integration by joining the CIS Customs Union and Payments Union and pushing for a free-trade zone in the region. Furthermore, national identity would likely be solidified by Ukraine’s entry in some capacity into the Union of Sovereign States currently being negotiated by Russia and Belarus. Regarding the West, to maintain good relations with Russia, Ukraine should renounce any intention to enter NATO, and should declare its opposition to further enlargement of the alliance. It must be stressed that placing priority on integration with Russia does not mean that
the popular desire for development of good relations with the West cannot be fulfilled. Just as the North American Free Trade Agreement does not hinder Canada from maintaining and cultivating close political and economic ties with Europe and other regions, Slavic and CIS integration does not necessarily impede Ukrainians from integrating with Europe.

The figures presented earlier in this chapter testify to the great support a high degree of integration with Russia enjoys for every region except Kyiv and the West. Of particular import is the widespread rejection of Ukrainian statehood by so many inhabitants of eastern and southern Ukraine, and by so many Ethnic Russians. This crisis in national identity would almost certainly be aggravated by a westward orientation that entailed the further breaking of political and economic ties with Russia/CIS, and can be ameliorated by an eastward shift in foreign orientation. Every multiethnic state faces a great challenge in cultivating the devotions and loyalties of ethnic minorities. When an ethnic minority is a diaspora, then relations with the historic homeland of the diaspora community take on great importance for the strength of national identity in a state. Previous work using the 1994–1995 elite survey in Donets’k and L’viv shows that large numbers of ethnic Russians and mixed Ukrainian-Russians in Donets’k say that Ukraine’s development of close ties with Russia and Belarus would increase their support for Ukrainian statehood. The devotion of ethnic Russians and inhabitants of eastern and southern Ukraine more generally to the Ukrainian nation is critical for the strength of national identity given their demographic and economic importance. Especially in light of the fact that the long-term economic success of Ukraine will depend on the ability of policy makers in Kyiv to implement painful reforms to eastern Ukraine’s aging and obsolete industries and mines, the satisfaction of fundamental eastern and southern Ukrainian preferences regarding the content of national identity and foreign policy will go a long way in buying the feelings of unity with other regions and support for statehood necessary to survive a long and potentially politically destabilizing economic transition period.

The great popularity in Ukraine of integration with Russia is part and parcel of a general pattern of attitudes that reveal an overall popular preference for an Eastern Slavic content for national identity over an Ethnic Ukrainian one. In addition to foreign policy, the other major issue that fundamentally divides these two contents is language policy. The Ethnic Ukrainian identity implies a policy giving Ukrainian language official status throughout the country’s government apparatus, while the Eastern Slavic identity calls for Russian and Ukrainian to enjoy equal status in the conduct of state business. A compromise position is one giving Russian official status at the level of local government where Russians and Russian-speakers predominate. Public opinion data reveal the great popularity of the option most consistent with the Eastern Slavic identity over the option most consistent with an Ethnic Ukrainian identity. In a 1997 survey, 49% of respondents wanted to make Russian an official or second state language, while only 10% wanted to remove Russian from official relations. The compromise position of allowing Russian to be an official language where the local population so wanted was chosen by 35%. As with foreign policy, western oblasti dis-
t nguished themselves from the rest of the country, with half of all respondents calling for the removal of Russian from official discourse hailing from Galicia. Actual language use in Ukraine also makes an Ethnic Ukrainian content for national identity potentially destabilizing. Data from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology demonstrate that only 44% of adults in Ukraine use Ukrainian for day-to-day communication, compared to 56% using Russian.

Moreover, the cultural self-identification of the citizens of Ukraine and their perceptions of cultural affinity with other peoples favor the Eastern Slavic content over the Ethnic Ukrainian content for national identity. When asked how they would describe themselves to foreigners, 67% of respondents in a 1996 survey said “Slavs,” an identity consistent, naturally, with the Eastern Slavic content, while only 7% said “European,” an identity consistent with the Ethnic Ukrainian content. Some respondents (11%) would use both terms. Importantly, Ethnic Ukrainians and Ethnic Russians expressed very similar levels of self-identification as Slavs—65% and 75%, respectively. This strong Slavic identity in Ukraine is complemented by the widespread belief that Ukrainian, Belarussian, and Russian cultures are very similar to one another. This can be inferred from a statewide survey conducted by Ukraine’s Institute of Sociology in 1997 that asked respondents to assess the degree of their cultural affinity (in terms of traditions, customs, values, and art) to twenty-six ethnic groups using a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (“very close”) to 7 (“completely different”). Overall, the three groups that respondents felt most culturally similar to were Ukrainians, Russians, and Belarussians. Average scores for these groups on the seven-point scale were 1.43, 1.87, and 2.40, respectively. Only 3% of respondents assigned to Russians scores of 5 (“more different than not”), 6 (“quite different”), or 7. In contrast, such groups as Poles (3.47), Frenchmen (4.39), Americans (4.50), and Arabs (5.22) were seen as considerably more culturally distant. The idea, propagated under both Tsarist and Soviet regimes, that Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarussians are but three branches of a common Eastern Slavic people apparently maintains great popularity in contemporary Ukraine, and renders the construction of an Eastern Slavic national identity considerably easier than an Ethnic Ukrainian one. Thus, in contrast to many multiethnic countries, Ukraine’s main ethnic groups believe they share a common culture. Foreign and domestic policies that capitalize on this nation-building resource have great potential to emotionally unite the population.

Of course, a move toward greater integration with Russia, Belarus, and the CIS more generally would contradict the preferences of many Ukrainians regarding the content of Ukrainian national identity and foreign policy, particularly those living in western Ukraine. Indeed, whereas the key problem for an Ethnic Ukrainian national identity is how to maintain the devotion and loyalty of inhabitants of eastern and southern Ukraine to the Ukrainian nation, the key problem for an Eastern Slavic national identity is how to maintain the devotion and loyalty of inhabitants of western Ukraine. For too long scholars have focused on only the first problem. It should be recognized that the greatest obstacle to a strong national identity based on Eastern Slavic content may be the attitudes of western Ukrainians, especially Galicians, toward Russia and Russian
culture. Some accommodation to western Ukrainian sentiments must therefore be made, as moves toward eastern integration that are too extreme and that abrogate too much sovereignty risk alienating the region and weakening national identity. However, several points must be kept in mind. First, the population of southern and eastern Ukraine far outstrips that of western Ukraine.\textsuperscript{43} Second, as mentioned above, the economic import of southern and eastern Ukraine is greater than western Ukraine, and the successful modernization of the country requires that inhabitants of this region endure very painful changes and sacrifices.

Assuming equal amounts of alienation from the Ukrainian nation among residents of these regions from the mismatch between state foreign policy and individual foreign policy preferences, these two points mean that the price (in terms of weakened national identity) to Ukraine of not satisfying eastern and southern Ukrainian foreign policy preferences is higher than that of not satisfying western foreign policy preferences. And third, western Ukrainians have fewer alternatives for their identifications than Ethnic Russians and Russified Ukrainians living in eastern and southern Ukraine. Ethnic Russians and Russified Ukrainians can more easily be alienated from the state and the nation it represents precisely because they can identify powerfully with the Russian people and culture in Russia and ex-USSR, whereas the only state in which ethnic Ukrainians form the numerically dominant and titular group, and where Ukrainian culture is widespread, is Ukraine. Thus it is likely that even with a stronger eastern foreign orientation of the type advocated here, western Ukrainians will still on the whole remain devoted and attached to the state and its people. If their protests against this orientation do become too extreme, however, Ukrainian policy makers can consider devolving some economic and political decision-making power to western Ukraine so that it may concentrate on developing its foreign ties with Europe somewhat independently of the rest of a more eastward-leaning Ukraine.\textsuperscript{44}

Finally, there is a strong historical basis for both an Eastern Slavic national identity and eastern orientation. Throughout Russian-ruled Ukraine in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Ukrainian ("Little Russian") and Russian identities were commonly seen as fully compatible.\textsuperscript{45} Additionally, the Ukrainian nationalist movement of Russian-ruled Ukraine in the nineteenth and early twentieth century was dominated not by the goal of drastically severing with ties with Russia and integrating into Europe, but by the goal of Ukrainian autonomy within a democratic, federated state that included Russia. In contrast, the desire for full political independence was relatively quite weak. For example, the first by-law of the Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius reads, "We hold that the spiritual and the political union of the Slavs is the true destiny to which they should aspire."\textsuperscript{46} One of the Brotherhood's founders, Mykola Kostomarov, wrote about the Ukrainian people:

No one among us thinks about tearing South Rus' [Ukraine] from its connection to the rest of Russia. On the contrary, we would like to see all other Slavs unite with us in one union, even under the sceptre of the Russian sovereign, if that sovereign will become a
sovereign of free peoples and not the ruler of an all-devouring Tatar-Germanic Muscovy.47

Other leading figures in the early Ukrainian nationalist movement expressed similar convictions. Panteleimon Kulish looked back at "the moral inevitability of the merger into one state of the south-Russian community and the north-Russian."48 Mykhailo Drahomanov drew up a constitution that would reorganize the Russian Empire into a democratic state with a considerable degree of regional (ethno-national) and local self-government.49 Even the great historian and politician Mykhailo Hrushevsky, in the aftermath of the collapse of the Tsarist government in 1917, proclaimed as head of the Central Rada: "Autonomy—Federation! A broad autonomy for Ukraine within her ethnographic boundaries in a federal union with a democratic Russian republic. This is our platform, our slogan."50 Only with the Bolshevik seizure of power and invasion of Ukraine did the Rada declare independence from Russia. But this declaration still stressed the possibility of "federative ties with the People's Republics of the former Russian state."51 In short, the ubiquity of multiple Ukrainian/Russian identities and loyalties, and the predominance (in the non-Galician regions of Ukraine) of preferences for federation with Russia over independence from it constitute important historical resources that current state elites could harness in their effort to strengthen national identity on the basis of an Eastern Slavic content. By stressing this history, the state can reassure moderate ethnic Ukrainian nationalists that tighter integration with a democratizing Russia does not amount to a betrayal of Ukraine.

Some readers will object to this chapter's argument by countering that although preference for an Eastern Slavic national identity and tight integration with Russia/CIS are strong now, they will become increasingly weak as generational change replaces older citizens socialized in the Soviet period with younger ones. It is true that support for close ties with Russia varies somewhat by age. In response to the question analyzed earlier on whether unification of the Eastern Slavic states is important for the successful development of Ukrainian society, 61% of respondents 56–70 years old said yes, compared to 59% of those 36–55 years old, and 43% of those 16–35 years old. However, even for the youngest group, more respondents thought Slavic unification necessary for successful development than did not (43% versus 35%).

Other survey data as well demonstrate that young people are very positively disposed toward integration with Russia/CIS. A survey distributed in 1998 to youth 15–30 years old in Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine asked respondents: "The creation of a political and economic union of the separate states/former republics of the USSR, and their unification into a single country is..." followed by various options (Table 6.5).52

Surprisingly, more than half (53%) of young Ukrainians either want unification of the ex-USSR states into a single country as soon as possible, or want it but do not think it is possible. Just 40% think that it should never occur or is not desirable even if it is possible. Surprisingly, Ukrainian youth express very similar levels of support (in one form or another) for the foundation of a new country
made up of the former Soviet republics as do youth in Russia (57%) and Belarus (57%). On the domestic front, too, the attitudes of young people do not seem to be compatible with the Ethnic Ukrainian national identity. A 1998 survey shows that young people are more likely than old to speak Russian at home, and that young people are more likely to support making Russian a state language. This strong support of Ukrainian youth for Russian language and an extremely high degree of integration (common statehood) with Russia and other former Soviet republics is inconsistent with the claim that with time the popularity of an Eastern Slavic identity and the domestic and foreign policies it implies will weaken.

**Table 6.5**
**Attitudes of Youth in Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia toward Unification of the Former Republces of the USSR into a Single Country**

“The creation of a political and economic union of the separate states/former republics of the USSR, and their unification into a single country is . . .” (in Percentages)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Belarus</th>
<th>Russia</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Necessary as soon as possible</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desirable, but not possible</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possible, but not desirable</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should never occur</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
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**CONCLUSION**

The argument made in this chapter contradicts the views of many observers who assume not only that Ukraine’s foreign policy is destined to turn westward, but that it must. Volodymyr Zviglyanich, for example, writes that political stability in Ukraine requires that “Russia cannot be [its] major strategic political partner.” He claims that “the political future of Ukraine is in Europe,” and that Ukraine should avoid “the path of Belarus—a quasimomic/quasitragical example of colonization at the end of the twentieth century.” Similarly scornful of Ukraine’s tight integration with Russia is David Marples, who asks: “Do the answers to Ukraine’s problems then lie in a new union with Russia? It is time to place such conceptions where they really belong: on the garbage heap of history.” The problem with such views is that they so disregard, and even belittle, the preferences of the majority of citizens of Ukraine.

To the extent that Ukrainian leaders seek to strengthen national identity, they must choose a content of national identity that best maximizes this strength. A fundamental drawback of an Ethnic Ukrainian national identity is that it demands substantial state-directed reshaping of values, cultural patterns, and policy preferences of the population. This process of engineering social change is
difficult, long-term and potentially conflictual. Ukrainian leaders who instead capitalize on the existing panoply of values, cultural patterns, and policy preferences will more easily achieve their goal of strength of national identity. As the data in this chapter suggest, current mass attitudes, especially in the sphere of foreign policy, reflect an overall preference for an Eastern Slavic content of national identity over an Ethnic Ukrainian content. Implementing foreign and domestic policies consistent with the already dominant content of national identity (such as establishing closer political and economic ties with Russia and the CIS) will more likely promote national unity than pursuing less popular policies and identities.

Those observers who, for normative or other reasons, want to rectify historical injustices and construct an Ethnic Ukrainian national identity and the policies it demands must confront the very real possibility that this content of national identity will weaken millions of Ukrainian citizens’ loyalty to and identification with the state of Ukraine and the nation it represents. Furthermore, the increased alienation from the Ukrainian state that would likely follow from further breaking ties with Russia and other unpopular policies would greatly intensify the difficulties involved in the marketization and democratization of Ukrainian society. These processes can occur only if the people of Ukraine follow state laws, pay their taxes, participate in the political process, and patiently and peacefully endure many years of further economic deprivation. A strong national identity will catalyze all of these behaviors.

Whether the government in Kyiv pursues an Eastern Slavic identity and the foreign policy course it requires depends much on the individuals and parties that control the executive and legislature. In any case, state leaders fearful of losing power in the face of Slavic integration and weakened Ukrainian sovereignty must remember that their political power derives not only from their prerogatives to make policy in various issue areas, but also from the legitimacy of the state, the cohesion of the population, and citizens’ willingness to comply with governmental directives. Available evidence suggests that a stronger eastward foreign orientation will promote the latter.

NOTES


2. Przél, National Identity and Foreign Policy.


4. According to C. W. Cassinelli, the nation is a group of people who believe that they share common interests, that “these interests require for their promotion the active support of government, and that a government is justified only if it can be interpreted as an agency of the group.” C. W. Cassinelli “The National Community,” Polity, vol. 2, no. 1 (Fall 1969), p. 29.


10. Stephen Shulman, International and National Integration in Multiethnic States: The Sources of Ukrainian (Dis)Unity (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1996). The written questionnaire was distributed to educated elites working in seventeen occupations at twenty-seven organizations in Donets’k, and at twenty-three parallel organizations in L’viv. Occupations included university professors, schoolteachers, government administrators, factory managers, lawyers, doctors, musicians, artists, museum administrators, librarians, and others.

11. A good brief overview of Ukrainian foreign policy can be found in F. Stephen Larrabee, “Ukraine’s Balancing Act,” Survival, vol. 38, no. 2 (Summer 1996), pp. 143–165. For more extensive treatment, see Lubomyr Hajda, ed., Ukraine in the World:

12. _USIA Opinion Analysis_, "Ukrainians Draw Closer to Russia after NATO Air Campaign," M-172-99 (2 September 1999), pp. 2–3. Remaining respondents chose the answers "Strike a Balance" (22%) and "Hard to Say" (7%). Such data contradict the assertion by Kuzio that "There is little support anywhere in Ukraine for political and military integration within the CIS," in his _Ukraine: State and Nation Building_ (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 82.


14. The figure for ethnic Ukrainian support for merging Ukraine with Russia would be even higher if respondents in the survey had not had the opportunity to declare a dual Ukrainian-Russian identity, as is the case in most surveys.


16. The results of the 1 December 1991 referendum, according to which 90% of the voters supported Ukrainian independence, are increasingly obsolete. In particular, the strong backing for independence in the eastern _oblasti_ in the 1991 vote (83 to 90%) can be seen as an anomaly due to the unique historical circumstances associated with the failed August coup attempt and the delegitimization of the Soviet political order in the late Gorbachev era. Indicative of the disillusionment with Ukrainian independence are the results of a national survey conducted by the Center for Sociological and Political Research and Technology. The July 2000 poll asked respondents whether they would vote for independence if the December 1991 referendum were held today. Just 41% said they would, while 48% said they would not. _Den_, No. 152, 23 August 2000.


22. Also undermining the supposition that economic factors are dominant in the pro-Russian position is the finding by Valeri Khmelko and Andrew Wilson, based on a sur-

23. In this version of the question Belarus was omitted since most people in Western Ukraine harbor few negative feelings toward this country.


25. The March 1999 survey by the Ukrainian Institute of Social Research and Social Monitoring Center found that 61% of respondents trusted the armed forces (“completely” or "partially"), with much smaller figures for the judiciary (31%), police (29%), Supreme Council (12%), and cabinet of ministers (government—11%). Another source finds that confidence in state institutions is lowest among young Ukrainian citizens, and increases with age (*USIA Opinion Analysis*, “Growing Pains in Ukraine’s Political Culture,” M-48-96 [14 March 1996], p. 2). This suggests that the civic elements of Ukrainian national identity content will not automatically increase in strength with time.

26. A June 1999 survey found that 58% of respondents did not think the October 1999 presidential elections would be fair and honest, compared to only 24% who thought they would. Additionally, 71% of respondents thought that they have “little or no influence on the ways things are run in Ukraine.” International Foundation for Election Systems, “IFES National Surveys” [Online]. Available: http://ifes.ipri.kiev.ua/Surveys/index.html.

27. The June 1999 survey cited in endnote 26 shows respondents approximately equally divided among support for a market economy (27%), a centrally planned economy (30%), and a mixture of both (25%). A 1997 survey reveals similar disagreement over multiparty democracy. It found that 36% of respondents think a multiparty system in Ukraine is not necessary, 29% think it is necessary, and 36% found it difficult to say. “Ukrain’ske suspil’stvo 1994–1997,” *Politychnyi Portret Ukrainy*, vol. 20 (1998), p. 19.

28. For a good, brief analysis of the variegated history and characteristics of the lands that constitute Ukraine, see F. D. Zastavnyi, *Ukrains‘ki ethnichni zemli* (Lviv: Svit, 1993).

29. According to a 1998 survey, when asked, “Who do you most of all feel yourself to be?” the majority of respondents said an inhabitant of either their city or district (raion) (53%) or oblast (7%). Only 21% felt that they primarily are citizens of Ukraine. Other responses were citizen of the CIS (5%), European (5%), and citizen of the world (8%). Ukrainian Institute of Social Research, *Monitorynh hromads’koi dumky nasele垭nya Ukrainy* (vol. 10, no. 23), p. 38. At the same time it is important to stress that, outside Crimea, support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine is strong (Kuzio, *Ukraine: State and Nation Building*, pp. 69–99).

30. For derivation of the theoretical statements that follow, see Shulman, *International and National Integration*.


32. For further discussion of the effect of cultural diffusion on ethnic and national identities in Ukraine, see S. Shulman, "Cultures in Competition: Ukrainian Foreign Policy and the ‘Cultural Threat’ from Abroad," *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 50, no. 2 (March 1998), pp. 287–304.
33. Consistent with the Ukrainian nationalist tradition, the ethnic Ukrainian identity posits that Ukrainian culture is much more individualistic, freedom loving, and democratic than Russian culture, and on that basis is similar to European culture. For further discussion of cultural comparisons and their relevance to national identity in Ukraine, see S. Shulman "The Cultural Foundations of Ukrainian National Identity," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 22, no. 6 (November 1999), pp. 1011–1036.


35. Kuzio writes, "For state and nation building to proceed in Ukraine... Ukrainian and Russian identities have to be disentangled from one another; that is they have to return to the more clearly defined separate nationalities which existed prior to the first half of the nineteenth century." However, this is true only for the ethnic Ukrainian content of national identity, not the Eastern Slavic identity. Kuzio, *Ukraine: State and Nation Building*, p. 154.


43. Based on the regionalization scheme in endnote 7, the population of the West in 1991 was 9.8 million, while the population of the East and South was 25.2 million. Calculated from F. D. Zastavnyi, *Heorhiia Ukrainy* (L’viv: Svit, 1994), p. 121.

44. Such a move would have to weigh the risks of increasing “asymmetrical international integration” in Ukraine, a term referring to the asymmetries in foreign ties of western Ukraine and eastern Ukraine. This asymmetry itself hinders national unity. See S. Shulman, "Asymmetrical International Integration and Ukrainian National Disunity," *Political Geography*, vol. 18, no. 8 (November 1999), pp. 913–939.


47. Mykola Kostomarov, "A Letter to the Editor of Kolokol," in Ralph Lindheim and George S. N. Luckyj, eds., *Towards an Intellectual History of Ukraine: An Anthology of*
51. Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy, p. 324.
Region, Language, and Nationality: Rethinking Support in Ukraine for Maintaining Distance from Russia

Lowell W. Barrington

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine—like the other former Soviet republics—was suddenly converted into a newly independent state. This independence was supported by much of the population, though many others were less sure about the former republic’s new independent status. As high hopes about Ukraine’s economic future, held both by the population of the country and by many Western scholars, were dashed in the first few years of independence, the wisdom of “distancing” the country from Russia was further called into question. By the late 1990s, with nearly a decade of sovereignty behind it, the country’s independence appeared to be on solid ground. Yet, with the continuing economic misery, large numbers of people in Ukraine continued to hold the position that it should be, at the extreme, united with Russia in a single state or, at the least, pursuing much closer relations with its eastern neighbor. Those holding these positions felt that, if not an end to independence, there should at least be an end to the policy of distancing the country from Russia.

There has been a great deal written about the possibility of narrowing Ukraine’s societal cleavages. Some assert that government-led efforts can heal societal rifts. Others assert that such differences are beyond the government’s control, and that efforts to define Ukrainian identity must seek to recognize rather than overcome these problems. For any of these arguments to make sense, however, we must clearly understand the nature of cleavages in Ukraine. In particular, this means understanding the relationships among regional, linguistic, and ethnic components of identity. If Ukraine’s cleavages are based more on region than on language, then programs to increase the use of the Ukrainian language, even if successful, may not substantially enhance societal cohesion. This chapter aims to help sort out the relationship among ethnic, linguistic, and regional cleavages, in order to provide a clearer diagnosis of Ukraine’s problems.

What kinds of people in Ukraine would be more likely or less likely to support maintaining policies of distance from Russia? Over the last decade, numerous scholars of contemporary Ukraine have contended that the country’s population is deeply divided along geographic, cultural, and socioeconomic lines. Arguably, the most discussed cleavage in Ukraine is language. This is partly
because of the many Russian-speaking ethnic Ukrainians, especially in the east of the country. Scholars have typically assumed that the language an individual speaks in Ukraine is a highly important factor in shaping his/her attitudes about Ukrainian politics, economics, and independence. Ethnic identity (used interchangeably in this chapter with the term common to post-Soviet studies, nationality) is itself considered by many an important cleavage in Ukraine. Ethnicity has been an important political force throughout the former Soviet Union, and the presence of a large number of ethnic Russians in Ukraine (the largest ethnic minority in Europe) would indicate a potential importance of ethnicity in that country as well.

The Ukrainian regional divide has received less attention than it deserves as a factor in its own right, because it coincides somewhat with ethnicity and language use. When it has been focused on, it has often been discussed in simple terms—the east of the country versus the west, with the results of the presidential election in June–July 1994 providing tangible support for this position. For a few scholars, the regional divide has been considered to be more complex, with four or more distinct regions identified. The October–November 1999 presidential elections lend support to the idea of a more complex regional picture. This chapter (as does the chapter by Taras Kuzio) takes the approach that regional divisions in Ukraine are not as simple as east versus west. It employs a modified version of Arel’s framework and analyzes attitudes in Ukraine in nine regions—including Crimea and the city of Kyiv—as regions of the country distinct from the other, larger sections.

Language, ethnicity, and region are thus the three main social cleavages discussed by scholars of Ukraine. But what effects do these divisions have on support for maintaining Ukrainian independence from Russia? What is the effect of each when the others are controlled for? Are apparent regional effects simply due to the ethnolinguistic composition of the various areas of Ukraine? Are language and nationality really as important as scholars writing about Ukraine have assumed? This chapter provides answers to these questions, through the analysis of mass survey data from Ukraine collected in the late 1990s.

The statistical analysis presented in this chapter is based on the idea that variation in support for independence in Ukraine originates from basic demographic differences among individuals in the country: where they live, what nationality they are, what language they speak, how they are doing economically, and so on. The literature on mass attitudes in Ukraine has centered on these basic demographic differences as the driving force behind attitudinal variation at the aggregate and individual levels. While such analysis precludes an examination of grand theories of political attitudes in different settings, it is very useful for building a better understanding of attitudinal variation in Ukraine and its implications.

The results of this study indicate that region of residence plays a very important role in shaping support for independence, while other factors commonly emphasized by scholars of Ukraine are less consequential. The effects of nationality and language are generally much weaker than many scholars of Ukraine have assumed, once region is controlled for. Thus, while ethnic and linguistic divisions may, to a certain extent, reinforce the effects of region in Ukraine,
Rethinking Support in Ukraine for Maintaining Distance from Russia

Regional cleavages are not simply proxies for ethnonational patterns in the country. Instead, it appears that a complex set of regionally differentiated attitudes has emerged in Ukraine about important questions such as the appropriate distance from Russia, even when one controls for other demographic determinants of such attitudes. These results call into question the emphasis in Ukraine on balancing the interests of the various ethnic and linguistic groups in an attempt to develop a unifying national identity. The results indicate that, unlike other former Soviet states but like many countries in the West, the real impediments to unity in Ukraine may be related to where in the country one lives and how one is doing economically rather than who one is ethnically or what language one speaks.

These findings are particularly important today. A great deal has been written in recent years about the possibility of narrowing Ukraine's societal cleavages. Some assert that government-led efforts can heal societal rifts. Others assert that such differences are beyond the government's control and that efforts to define Ukrainian identity must seek to recognize, rather than overcome, these problems. But to make sense of any of these arguments, we must clearly understand the nature and relative strength of these cleavages in Ukraine. In particular, this means understanding the relationships among the regional, linguistic, and ethnic components of identity. If Ukraine's cleavages are based more on region than on language, then programs to increase the use of the Ukrainian language, even if successful, may not substantially enhance societal cohesion. Thus, by beginning to sort out the independent effects of ethnic, linguistic, and regional cleavages, this chapter can help to develop a clearer diagnosis of Ukraine's problems than can be found in the prevailing conventional wisdom about the country.

SUPPORT FOR DISTANCING UKRAINE FROM RUSSIA

To measure support in Ukraine for maintaining distance from Russia, a scale was constructed from the responses to questions in a late 1998 survey administered in Ukraine. The possible range of values of the scale measuring support for maintaining independence is -30 to 30. The mean score on the support for distance from Russia scale was -0.33, statistically indistinguishable from 0. While someone unfamiliar with Ukraine might be surprised that the mean of such a scale was not more strongly positive, this score actually indicates an improvement in support for maintaining independence from Russia. Using similar questions to the ones in this study, a previous investigation of attitudes in Ukraine found weaker support for independence in 1994.

THE EFFECTS OF LANGUAGE, NATIONALITY, AND REGION ON SUPPORT FOR DISTANCE FROM RUSSIA

While support for Ukrainian independence may be stronger today than it has been, such support varies in Ukraine at the individual level. What can explain this variation? What drives one person in Ukraine to support distancing the country from Russia while another opposes it?
The Potential Importance of Language in Ukraine

Much of the discussion of scholars about attitudes in Ukraine has focused on the role of language. In particular, Arel’s work has centered on the “linguistic fault line” in Ukraine, and the way that language affects politics in the country. The majority of scholars have taken for granted Arel’s claims that “language politics in Ukraine is coterminous with regional politics,” that language differences are “arguably the most important cleavage affecting Ukrainian society,” and that “the major cleavage in Ukraine is linguistic, and not primarily ethnic.” Crauser and Clem’s statement that the “Russian-speaking population of Ukrainian ethnicity [has] attitudes more like those of Russians than those of Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians” is a common sentiment among authors of works on contemporary Ukraine.7

In most countries, one would find language dividing ethnic minorities—with some in the minority speaking the language of the titular majority group. In Ukraine, however, members of the majority are divided by language. Many ethnic Ukrainians in the east, south, Kyiv, and other large cities speak Russian as their first language. Every oblast capital city in the east and south of the country has a Russian-speaking majority. In Crimea, 25% of the population are ethnic Ukrainian, but only around 4% are Ukrainian-speaking.

Since independence, the educational practices regarding language have changed, leading to the “de-Russification of schools” in the country.8 In Kyiv, for example, 80% of students were taught in Russian-language schools prior to independence, but by the early 1990s, nearly 90% of first graders were taught in Ukrainian-language schools. In addition, the language of administration in the country at the national level is now Ukrainian, though regional and local governments in many areas still function in Russian, and Russian remains the spoken language even in many central government offices. Despite the changes, the language policy of the Ukrainian government remains intentionally ambiguous, and still about half of the total population of Ukraine speak Russian as their first language.

Thus, language is an important issue in Ukraine today, and it is certainly possible that language provides a “fault line” in the country, affecting such factors as support for independence from Russia. Again, scholars have assumed that these linguistic characteristics of the population of Ukraine have important implications, even controlling for other factors. Unfortunately, while Arel associates language lines with regional and urban patterns, he has not tested the language thesis by controlling for cleavages such as region and nationality.

The Potential Importance of Nationality in Ukraine

While language lines crosscut ethnic ones in Ukraine (at least in the case of ethnic Ukrainians), the ethnic breakdown of the country supports the idea that nationality could influence attitudes toward maintaining independence. The presence of more than eleven million ethnic Russians, making up more than one-fifth of the population of Ukraine, and their concentration in the east of the country (especially Crimea), makes the development of attitudes along ethnic
lines possible. In addition, the existence of Russia as a neighbor and potential external homeland, and the perception among Russians of their bleak economic fate, adds to a possible ethnic divide. Indeed, previous studies have found differences in support for institutions in the Soviet Union along ethnic lines, and attitudinal differences between Russians and Ukrainians, before and after independence.

Yet, nationality has not been as powerful in Ukraine as the preceding discussion would indicate. Nationality has been limited as a mobilizing force in the population in part because leaders in Ukraine have emphasized the idea of Ukraine as a multinational state. Ukraine’s Law on National Minorities is typical of the Ukrainian government’s approach (see the chapters by Taras Kuzio and Craig Weller in this volume). Not only does the law guarantee rights for national minorities, including the use of their native language and exercise of their native cultural practices, but it also calls for state support for national minority groups. During the drive for independence, deputies in the Supreme Rada argued that the focus should be on the “people of Ukraine” rather than on a Ukraine for the “Ukrainian people,” and this emphasis continued after independence. A few politicians in western Ukraine spoke of a single-nation state, but none of the top leaders (including the “national democrats”) were seriously pursuing the idea of Ukraine as an ethnically defined nation-state.

The presidents of Ukraine have taken the lead in fostering interethnic harmony. During his time as president, Kravchuk pushed the idea that Ukraine was a multinational state. In criticizing those labeling the Russians as a potential fifth column in 1991, for example, Kravchuk said:

I want to point out that the Russians in Ukraine should not be compared with the Russians in the Baltic republics. Here they are indigenous residents, they have lived on this land for hundreds of years... And we will not permit any kind of discrimination against them... Our republic, pardon me for saying so, is not Latvia, Estonia or Moldova.

Thus, nationality is hypothesized to be a factor in shaping attitudes toward distancing Ukraine from Russia, though it may not be as powerful as others such as region. But, again, until one controls for other factors, it is difficult to assess the role of nationality in shaping attitudes in Ukraine.

“Regionalism” in Ukraine: East versus West, or Something More?

This chapter argues that regional divisions are more important in Ukraine than scholars who focus on ethnicity and language have assumed. The regional divide in Ukraine has not been ignored by scholars, though it is often discussed in terms of Ukraine’s east versus its west, with the Dnipro River serving as an abyss which divides Ukraine into two roughly equal parts. And, certainly, it is tempting to think of Ukraine in such a way. From the 1960s to the late 1980s, the Russian population in Ukraine increased by more than 60%; most of these Russians settled in the industrial areas of the east. During this same period a large number of Ukrainians became Russophones. Scholars have focused on the implications of an east/west split for post-independence Ukrainian politics. A
favorite example is the 1994 presidential election, in which Leonid Kuchma, running on a platform of closer ties with Russia, won in every oblast east of the Dnipro River. The incumbent, Leonid Kravchuk, who supported distancing Ukraine from Russia, won every oblast in the west. Unfortunately for Kravchuk, more people live in Ukraine’s east than in its west.

While one can make a case for discussing an east/west regional split in Ukraine, there is more to the story of regionalism in Ukraine than a line dividing the country in two. Historical experience, economic and demographic characteristics, and proximity to Russia combine to present a picture of many distinct regions in Ukraine. Seemingly every scholar who has tried to move beyond the east/west framework has chosen a different set of regions. This chapter uses a modified version of the framework established by Arel. Arel’s framework was chosen as a starting point because it is one that combines the various elements mentioned above to bring together contiguous oblasti into sensible regions.

VARIABLES EXAMINED IN THE INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL ANALYSIS OF VARIATION IN SUPPORT FOR DISTANCE FROM RUSSIA

Region, Language, and Nationality as Explanations for Individual-Level Variation in Support

To examine the role of region in individual-level analysis, a set of dummy variable terms was created by combining Ukraine’s oblasti into nine larger regions (west, west-central, central, south, south-east, north-east, east, Crimea, and Kyiv). Likewise, three dummy terms were used for nationality—Ukrainian, Russian, and “other”—based on self-reporting of nationality in the survey. The dummy terms for the language variable came from the interviewer’s labeling of the language patterns of the respondent in answering the survey questions, and were composed of three language groups (Russian, “mixed,” and Ukrainian). This form of the language variable is preferred to one based on the respondent’s discussion of his language use, since it both captures the actual use of language by the respondent and allows for the kind of mixed language use common in Ukraine.

Other Demographic Factors

While this chapter has focused on region, language, and nationality, one must consider other possible influences as well. Other factors examined in the individual-level analysis in this chapter include the respondent’s economic situation at present, whether or not the respondent is a religious believer, the sex of respondent, the age of the respondent, the size of the respondent’s locality, and the respondent’s level of education.

The Exclusion of Attitudinal Explanatory Variables

The variables examined in this chapter are thus all demographic factors. Readers familiar with other studies of mass attitudes in post-Communist states
may wonder about the exclusion of attitudinal variables such as support for economic reform, trust, efficacy, and life satisfaction. Such attitudinal factors are not included as explanatory variables in this study. They are taken to be a fundamentally different kind of variable from the variables focused on in this study. Rather than exogenous variables, as the demographic factors are, these attitudinal variables are understood here to be intervening factors in a partially mediated structure. In other words, they are presumed to fall at a different stage of a causal system from the demographic variables—located between the demographic factors and the dependent variable. Modeled in full, such a structure would contain both direct and indirect effects of the demographics on support for maintaining distance from Russia.

The model presented in this chapter thus serves as the reduced form of a more complex causal structure. As a result, the OLS coefficient estimates are estimates of the total effects of the demographic variables. Using the reduced form makes it infeasible to separate the direct and indirect effects of the demographic factors, and it makes it impossible to analyze which of the attitudinal factors that scholars have treated as exogenous in previous studies are statistically significant and substantively important when modeled as endogenous. But the purpose of this chapter is not to examine the mediating role for such attitudes or to estimate the relative strength of the direct and indirect effects of the demographic variables. Rather, given the kinds of factors that scholars have emphasized in works on Ukraine (region, language, nationality, etc.), its purpose is to examine the total effects of these factors, while holding constant the effects of other likely important demographic factors.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Employing data from a nationally representative sample of more than 1,600 respondents collected as part of the November 1998 KIIS (Kyiv International Institute of Sociology) Ukraine Omnibus Survey, the equation for the dependent variable (support for independence/distance from Russia) was estimated. The dummy variables for region, language use, nationality, size of locality, education level, religious believer status, sex of the respondent, and economic situation at present were included in the analysis. As one must do with dummy variables, at least one dummy variable term from each set (the "west" region from the group of dummy variable terms representing regions, for example) was left out of the equation. The effects of the excluded dummy terms show up as part of the value of the estimated equation's constant term, and, more important, an excluded term serves as the basis of comparison for the coefficients of the included dummy terms from the variable in question. Thus, the coefficients on the included terms of the region variable represent the difference in support between that region and the West region, other factors being constant.

The Statistical Significance of the Coefficient Estimates

Table 7.1 contains the regression coefficient estimates and other statistics from the estimation of the effects on the values of the support for distance from
Russia scale using the explanatory variables discussed above. Because arguments exist for either a positive or a negative direction of effect for some of the explanatory variables, significance levels in the tables and in the discussion below are based on two-tailed tests.

Nearly all of the variables are significant at the $p = 0.05$ level. The central region dummy variable coefficient is significant at the $p = 0.1$ level, as is religious believer status. The only variables without such statistical significance are age, and the dummy variable terms for some higher education, and for medium and large cities.

The Importance of Regional Differences

Because most of the factors analyzed are in dummy variable form, it is possible to compare the unstandardized coefficients. In doing so, the coefficients on the regional variables jump out. Compared to respondents in the far west, respondents in Crimea and the east scored more than nineteen points lower on the support for distance from Russia scale, other things constant. Since the scale has a range of only sixty points, this is a notable difference. Residents in the regions of the north-east, south-east, south, Kyiv city, and west-central averaged between thirteen and seventeen points lower. Only those in the central region came close to the level of support of those in the far west.

Not only were the coefficients on these variables impressive, but also the pattern was very interesting. Contrary to the west versus east idea common to works on Ukraine, respondents in the west-central region thought more like those in the east than like the residents to their immediate west. Those in the central region (again, excluding Kyiv City), on the other hand, were more similar to those in the far west than to residents in the regions around them. Residents in the capital city of Kyiv were also closer to those in the east than the far west, though very different from those in the central region (showing the importance of separating Kyiv City from that region in the analysis).

The Relative Weakness of Nationality and Language as Explanatory Factors

While coefficients on the regional dummy variable terms were extraordinary, the results of the nationality and language variables were less impressive. Granted, the nationality variable terms were highly significant, and their coefficients conspicuous. A Russian would score nearly six points lower on the independence scale than a Ukrainian, other things being constant, while a member of another nationality in Ukraine would be even less supportive. Thus, nationality matters, though less than region. Language matters as well, to an extent. Controlling for other factors, Russian speakers and mixed speakers were both about 3.5 points lower on the distance from Russia scale than Ukrainian speakers. But, again, when one compares the effects of the language variables with that of the regional variables, the effects are much smaller on the highly emotional issue of maintaining independence from Russia.
Table 7.1
OLS Regression Results, Support for Distance from Russia Scale

Dependent Variable: "INDSCALE" (Mean = -0.33; Min. = -30.00; Max. = 30.00)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>T-Stat</th>
<th>Signif</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regions (Comparison Region: West)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimea</td>
<td>-19.38</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>-7.13</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>-19.59</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>-10.65</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-East</td>
<td>-17.30</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>-7.45</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-East</td>
<td>-16.25</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>-8.06</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>-16.52</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>-7.77</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyiv City</td>
<td>-13.60</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>-5.07</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>-3.17</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>-1.93</td>
<td>0.0537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West-Central</td>
<td>-13.56</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>-7.76</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Language (Comparison Language: Ukrainian)** |       |        |        |        |
| Russian               | -3.57 | 1.57   | -2.27  | 0.0231 |
| Mixed                 | -3.50 | 1.53   | -2.29  | 0.0222 |

| **Nationality (Comparison Nationality: Ukrainian)** |       |        |        |        |
| Russian              | -5.79 | 1.26   | -4.60  | 0.0000 |
| Other Non-Ukrainian  | -7.20 | 2.20   | -3.28  | 0.0011 |

| **Locality Type (Comparison Locality Type: Village)** |       |        |        |        |
| Very Large City      | 7.52  | 1.50   | 5.00   | 0.0000 |
| Large City           | 1.40  | 1.36   | 1.03   | 0.3014 |
| Medium City          | 0.81  | 1.46   | 0.55   | 0.5795 |
| Small City           | 3.71  | 1.62   | 2.30   | 0.0219 |

| **Education (Comparison Education Level: Completed Higher Education)** |       |        |        |        |
| Low Education        | -4.88 | 1.48   | -3.30  | 0.0010 |
| Completed Secondary  | -3.14 | 1.27   | -2.47  | 0.0135 |
| Some Higher Education| -1.38 | 2.81   | -0.49  | 0.6229 |

| **Personal Economic Standing (Comparison Standings: Medium, High, Very High)** |       |        |        |        |
| Low                   | -4.38 | 1.73   | -2.54  | 0.0112 |
| Very Low              | -7.20 | 1.77   | -4.06  | 0.0001 |

| **Other Demographic Characteristics** |       |        |        |        |
| Religious Believer    | 1.76  | 1.00   | 1.76   | 0.0786 |
| Male                  | 2.58  | 0.92   | 2.79   | 0.0053 |
| Age                   | -0.03 | 0.03   | -1.23  | 0.2185 |

| (Constant)            | 20.48 | 2.57   | 7.97   | 0.0000 |

$$R^2 = 0.273; \text{ Adjusted } R^2 = 0.262; \text{ Standard Error } = 17.26; F = 24.19; \text{ Sig. } F = 0.0000$$

Ethnic Groups and Language Groups, or "Ethnolinguistic Groups"?

Given the assumption by scholars of the importance of ethnic and linguistic differences in Ukraine, the relatively weak effect of the language and nationality
variable coefficients will come as a surprise to many. Yet, the findings are similar to some previous findings after region and other factors are controlled for.\(^{19}\) At the same time, one could claim that the separation of nationality and language misses the point. The power of language in Ukraine, the argument goes, comes precisely when it is combined with an opposing nationality—such as Russian-speaking Ukrainians or Ukrainian-speaking Russians. While there are hardly any of the latter in Ukraine, there are many of the former, especially in the east, south, and Kyiv. Thus, one could argue that rather than entering language and nationality into the equation as separate sets of dummy variables, they should instead be combined into ethnonlinguistic groups. If the argument for the importance of language is correct, one would expect that those of the same ethnic background but different languages (Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians versus Russian-speaking Ukrainians) would have significantly different attitudes.

The “ethnonlinguistic groups” idea was tested by replacing the language and nationality dummy variables with dummy terms representing various ethnonlinguistic categories: Russian-speaking Russians, Russian-speaking Ukrainians, Russian-speaking “others,” mixed-speaking Russians, mixed-speaking Ukrainians, mixed-speaking “others,” Ukrainian-speaking Russians, and Ukrainian-speaking “others.” Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians were excluded from the equation to serve as the comparison group; thus, the coefficient estimates on the ethnonlinguistic dummy variable terms are the difference on the support scale for each group compared to Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians.

The primary concern in this version of the model is the pattern of the coefficients of the ethnonlinguistic dummy variable terms. The other coefficient estimates (and other statistics such as $R^2$) would be nearly identical to those of the previous equations, since language and nationality are still controlled for when estimating these coefficients, but in a different form.\(^ {20}\) As a result, while the other variables were included in the estimation of the three support scale equations, Table 7.2 contains only the coefficient estimates for the ethnonlinguistic dummy variable terms.\(^ {21}\)

The coefficient estimate on Russian-speaking Ukrainians achieves statistical significance at the $p = 0.1$ level, but its (negative) value is minor compared to the very large and highly statistically significant negative coefficients on the Russian-speaking Russian and Russian-speaking “other” variables. On the issue of maintaining distance from Russia, Russian-speaking Ukrainians think a lot more like Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians than like Russian-speaking members of other nationalities. Further evidence for the strength of nationality over language on this issue is the statistically significant, large, and negative coefficient on the mixed-speaking Russian variable.\(^ {22}\)

Thus, employing the ethnonlinguistic groups approach confirms that the language spoken by an individual in Ukraine is less important than many have assumed, once other social cleavages are controlled for. This finding strongly challenges the prevalent claim in the literature that Russian-speaking Ukrainians think more like Russians than like their Ukrainian-speaking coethnics. Together, the two versions of the model show the danger of not controlling for region when examining nationality and language (either as separate variables or as combined ethnonlinguistic groups) in the case of Ukraine.
Table 7.2
Coefficient Estimates for the "Ethno-linguistic" Dummy Variable Terms, OLS Analysis of the Effects of the Demographic Variables on the Support for Distance from Russia Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable: “Indscale” (Mean = -0.33; Min. = -30.00; Max. = 30.00)</th>
<th>Independent Variables: Ethno-linguistic groups</th>
<th>(Comparison Group: Ukrainian-Speaking Ukrainians)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian-Speaking Ukrainians</td>
<td>-2.64</td>
<td>1.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian-Speaking Russians</td>
<td>-8.70</td>
<td>1.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian-Speaking “Others”</td>
<td>-11.98</td>
<td>2.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed-Speaking Ukrainians</td>
<td>-2.96</td>
<td>1.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed-Speaking Russians</td>
<td>-9.63</td>
<td>2.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed-Speaking “Others”</td>
<td>-1.61</td>
<td>8.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian-Speaking Russians</td>
<td>-2.22</td>
<td>5.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian-Speaking “Others”</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>5.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR UKRAINE AND ACADEMIC STUDIES OF THE COUNTRY

It is clear that the population of Ukraine is still far from united in its attitudes toward the country’s appropriate distance from Russia. Investigating such variation through individual-level analysis of demographic differences, this chapter surveys the social, economic, and geographic “fault lines” in Ukraine. For those who study Ukraine, the analysis indicates that both linguistic and nationality factors in Ukraine have been somewhat overblown. In addition, the results suggest that the idea that Russian-speaking Ukrainians think more like ethnic Russians than like Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians needs to be reconsidered by scholars within the Ukrainian studies community.

This analysis also strongly supports the vision of “region” in Ukraine as less exact than the east-versus-west image so common in works on the country. The far west is clearly more supportive of independence than other parts of the country, but one must avoid what could be called the “Dnipro River trap” of thinking in dichotomous (west-versus-east) terms when discussing regionalism in Ukraine. Finally, while the regional story is more complex than many assume, the results presented in this chapter demonstrate that the power of regional differences in Ukraine is considerable. It is even more so since the factors scholars tend to associate with regional differences in Ukraine (e.g., language, nationality, urbanization, and standard of living) were controlled for in the statistical analysis.

For Ukraine itself, the picture painted by this analysis of support for distancing the country from Russia is a mixed one. During the mid to late 1990s, there was an apparent increase in support for independence from Russia, which is consistent with both Kravchuk’s and Kuchma’s distancing policies, as well as reflecting the reality of separation from Russia. In addition, the regional divi-
sions are not perfectly complementary of ethnic and linguistic cleavages, and these latter divisions do not appear to be as strong as many scholars of Ukraine have taken for granted.24 One's personal economic situation appears to have a greater impact on support for distancing Ukraine from Russia, for example, than either nationality or language. Thus, the prospects for a successful regional separatist movement in Ukraine along ethnic or ethnolinguistic lines seem remote (see also the chapter by Craig Weller).

But the large numbers of people who continue to oppose independence, and the statements of Communist Party officials in Ukraine about it, mean that the policies of distancing Ukraine from Russia, and even the maintenance of Ukrainian independence, are still not guaranteed.25 That differences in Ukraine remain as strong as they are along regional lines means that the country will face a certain degree of political instability in the near future.26 As Agnew argues, the state-building process involves linking regions of a country to the center.27 In addition, a central feature of nation building is creating a population that is relatively unified in its support of the political community. There is no better measure of a population's sense of unity as a political community in a newly independent state than its unity on the issue of maintaining the new independence. Thus, if mass attitudes signal difficulties in the large nation- and state-building projects, one could expect difficult political fights on a variety of fronts in the near future. However, those fights may not be based on ethnic or linguistic cleavages, as is commonly expected, but rather on regional cleavages, about which there seems to be little concern. As Taras Kuzio points out in his chapter, there is little disagreement among Ukrainian elites about the proper relationship among the regions.

During its first decade of independence, Ukraine has struggled with both the state-building and nation-building processes. Hoping to link ethnic Ukrainians to the state, the Ukrainian government has pursued certain policies designed to enhance "Ukrainianness" in the country. Yet, Ukrainian leaders have repeatedly stressed that Ukraine is a multinational state, and their fear of fostering discontent among ethnic Russians has led to unequal enforcement of language and education laws in different parts of the country and a quite inclusive Ukrainian citizenship policy. The results of the March 1998 parliamentary and October-November 1999 presidential elections in Ukraine suggest that such a tightrope act will continue. The findings of this chapter indicate, however, that the Ukrainian government's emphasis on ethnic and linguistic issues is likely misplaced. The government would be better served by finally becoming serious about fixing the country's economic problems and by adopting a regional approach to dealing with discontent in the country than it would by continuing to search for ways to balance the desires of the main ethnic and linguistic groups.

NOTES

2. Due to considerations of space, the Appendix containing the specific questions and coding used to create the support for independence scale and the explanatory variables has not been included within this chapter. The first question used to help create the scale focused on the respondent's view of independence ("How would you describe your attitude towards the independence of Ukraine today?"), while the other two asked for the respondent's views of statements about Russia and Ukraine ("Ukraine should join with Russia in one government"; "Ukraine should develop independently with minimal ties to Russia"). The wording of the other questions used in the analysis and variable coding are included in the Appendix of the larger study: L. Barrington, "Examining Rival Theories about the Effects of Demographic Factors on Political Support: Linguistic, Ethnic, and Regional Divisions in Ukraine" (2000). The manuscript is available from the author.

3. The questions relating to support for Ukrainian independence tend to focus on independence from Russia. This is reasonable, since, as Szporluk puts it, "Ukraine does not have to make a 'choice' between Russia and Poland; Poland has given up any claims to Ukraine and recognizes Ukraine's independence." See Roman Szporluk, "Ukraine: From Imperial Periphery to a Sovereign State," Daedalus, vol. 126, no. 3 (Summer 1997), p. 113.


9. Prior to Ukrainian independence, Russians were doing noticeably better than Ukrainians (if wages are used as the measure), especially in the larger cities. See Evgenii Golovakha, Natalia Panina, and Nikolai Churilov, "Russians in Ukraine," in Vladimir Shlapentokh, Munir Sendich, and Emil Payin, eds., The New Russian Diaspora: Russian Minorities in the Former Soviet Republics (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), pp. 59–71. See also the chapter by Mykola Ryabchuk in this volume.


12. Shulman interprets some of the support for close ties with Russia in the East as a desire to keep things Russian. There is more fear that a sharp break with Russia will open the door for other parts of a Ukrainian nationalist agenda than there is a genuine desire to unite with Russia into a single country. See Stephen Shulman, "Cultures in Competition: Ukrainian Foreign Policy and the 'Cultural Threat' from Abroad," Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 50, no. 2 (March 1998), pp. 287–304 and his chapter in this volume.


15. Pirie has strongly criticized the use of ethnic categories in Ukraine given the high rate of intermarriage. My 1998 survey did allow respondents to state more than one nationality. What is labeled nationality in the regression analysis is the first nationality of the respondent. While Pirie’s point about the complexity of nationality is well taken, one should not take the argument too far. In addition, his solution to create categories that employ parents’ nationality as well is at best a partial solution. It relies on the respondent’s perception of his or her parents’ nationality, and it only pushes the intermarriage problem back one generation. See Paul Pirie, "National Identity and Politics in Southern and Eastern Ukraine," *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 48, no. 7 (November 1996), pp. 1079–1104.

16. Were one interested in these things, the options include two-stage least squares (2SLS) and the estimation of the complete structural equations model (SEM), employing a statistical program such as LISREL or Amos. The latter is more powerful, but also more sensitive to specification error or quirks in the data. For a more detailed discussion of these issues, and a comparison of the OLS and SEM approaches, see Lowell Barrington and Erik Herron, "Understanding Public Opinion in Post-Communist States: The Effect of Statistical Assumptions on Substantive Results," *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 53, no. 4 (June 2001), pp. 573–594.

17. Other researchers have tended to avoid using dummy variables for things such as size of locality. Instead, they have a single size of locality variable, with an ordinal scale representing the different categories of cities, towns, and villages. This kind of variable is technically an ordinal variable, but OLS assumes that it is an interval variable. In other words, the statistical program assumes that the difference between each step of the scale is the same. But the difference between a village and a small city may not be the same as the difference between a small city and a medium-sized city. Even those using dummy variables will often have a single urban/rural variable, which stretches credibility. The idea that a small city is similarly different from a village as a very large city is different from a village is hard to believe. A similar argument can be made about numerous other demographic variables. To take education as an example, the use of a scale rather than dummy variables in OLS assumes that each step on the scale is equal. But the difference between not graduating high school and graduating may not be the same thing as the
difference between graduating college and receiving a Ph.D. The only nondummy variable in the models in this chapter is age, since its intervals are truly comparable.

18. One cannot put all the dummy variables of a particular type into the equation without violating the assumption that the explanatory variables are not exactly linearly related. See Eric Hanushek and John Jackson, *Statistical Methods for Social Scientists* (San Diego: Academic Press, 1977), p. 104.

19. Barrington, "The Geographic Component." In addition, analyses of other levels of support (for the government and for the regime) found even weaker effects for language and nationality. See Barrington, "Examining Rival Theories."

20. The coefficients are not exactly the same. While all Ukrainian-speakers and all ethnic Ukrainians provided the baseline with which to compare the language and nationality dummy variables in the first estimations, in the second set of equations (with ethnolinguistic groups replacing the language and nationality variables) the baseline comes from only Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians.

21. The full table is available from the author upon request.

22. The only support for the role of language in the ethnolinguistic analysis comes from the lack of statistical significance of the coefficients on the Ukrainian-speaking Russians, Ukrainian-speaking "others," and mixed-speaking "others." Given the small number of Russians who speak primarily Ukrainian and the prevalence of Russian language use by other nationalities in the country, these results are more likely due to the small numbers of respondents who fell into these various categories than to similarities between these different groups and Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians in the population at large.

23. Electoral evidence presented in Holdar shows most forcefully the division between the far East and the far West, with less well-defined differences in the Central part of the country. Similarly, Craumer and Clem discuss the poor showing of leftist parties in the West, and the poor showing of nationalist parties everywhere else. See Sven Holdar, "Torn Between East and West: The Regional Factor in Ukrainian Politics," *Post-Soviet Geography*, vol. 36, no. 2 (February 1995), pp. 112–132; and Craumer and Clem, "Ukraine's Emerging Electoral Geography."

24. One possibility is that the regional differences become linked to new identities, such as the Russian-speaking population discussed by Laitin (see David Laitin, *Identity in Formation: The Russian-speaking Populations in the Near Abroad*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998). Recent analysis of the strength of the Russian-speaking population label in Ukraine, however, indicates that this identity group option has little value as a mobilizing tool for anti-state elites. See Lowell Barrington, "Russian-Speakers in Ukraine and Kazakhstan: ‘Nationality,’ ‘Population,’ or Neither," *Post-Soviet Affairs*, vol. 17, no. 2 (April–June 2001), pp. 129-158.

25. As Solchanyk argues, while the earlier ideas that Ukraine was destined to collapse were obviously exaggerations, the claim that it is an “anchor of stability” in Eastern Europe is also an overstatement. R. Solchanyk, "Ukraine: The Politics of Reform," *Problems of Post-Communism*, vol. 42, no. 6 (November–December 1995), p. 46. Nahaylo adds, “But five years after achieving independence, Ukraine was still not out of the woods: numerous economic, social, political and security problems were the trees that blotted out the light.” See Bohdan Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian Resurgence* (London: Hurst, 1999), p. 549.

Nation Building in the Ukrainian Military

Andrew Fesiak

When Ukraine gained its independence in December 1991 it inherited more than 780,000 Soviet troops located in its territory. Since it was necessary to make this once-Soviet military into a Ukrainian military whose servicemen would patriotically defend Ukraine, a Ukrainianization campaign was put into action. The program immediately ran into problems, however. Although switching from the use of Russian to Ukrainian was part of the Ukrainianization program, the most important aspect of the program was to instill in the troops a sense of patriotism toward Ukraine by using historical examples of the military traditions and heroes of Ukraine. The Ukrainian population, however, is relatively divided in terms of (among other things) ideology, language, and historical perceptions. This divide basically runs between the more nationalistic Western Ukraine and the more “slavocentric” Central, Southern and Eastern Ukraine. Those groups or individuals considered heroes in Western Ukraine are often not considered heroes to people living in other parts of the country and vice-versa. Creating an all-encompassing patriotism based on historical examples of military traditions and heroes thus has been next to impossible.

The effort to instill Ukrainian patriotism in the armed forces is an important test of state-led nation building efforts in general. Systematic Ukrainianization has been pursued with more resolve in the military than in any other aspect of Ukrainian society. By looking at this program, we can evaluate the validity of the assumptions that underlie most of the arguments about nation building in Ukraine. Is it the case, as many assume, that a thorough nation-building program can overcome the nation’s ethnic, linguistic, and regional divisions? To what extent is it true, as others assert, that such a program is likely to exacerbate rather than heal Ukraine’s societal cleavages?

Evidence from the military’s Ukrainianization program supports the assertion that an assertive nationalization campaign is likely to backfire. Initially the Ukrainianization campaign in the military alienated many non-Western Ukrainians due to its glorification of such anti-Russian and anti-Soviet military formations as the SS Galician Division and OUN-UPA (Organization of Ukrainian
Nationalists-Ukrainian Insurgent Army). More recently, Western Ukrainians have felt alienated due to the continuous celebration and glorification of Soviet historical events and heroes. Since the Ukrainianization program in the military is used not only for instilling loyalty in the troops but also as a nation-building tool, anything that happens in the military will, and is intended to, affect society. The result so far thus has been a further polarization of not only military servicemen but also Ukrainian society in general. This signifies not only a failure of the Ukrainianization program but even its backfiring, which is having an adverse effect on Ukrainian nation building.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND NATION BUILDING

Inculcating Ukrainian Nationalism

When Ukraine became independent, the work of instilling the troops with patriotism which the Main Political Administration (MPA) of the Soviet Ministry of Defense had conducted was taken over by the Social Psychological Service (SPS) of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. The idea for the SPS was originally developed in 1986–1987 by a civilian philosophy professor, Volodymyr Muliava, a member of Rukh. Following Ukraine's independence, Muliava was made an honorary major-general. Originally the SPS was not intended for use in the armed forces but rather among the Ukrainian population in general.

A central aim of the Union of Ukrainian Officers (UVO) program was a need to carry out a Ukrainianization program in the military. As a result, Muliava's SPS program was put into action. The SPS was implemented on 5 March 1992 with Muliava as its first head after the Ministry of Defense and the Supreme Rada came to an agreement regarding the direction and objectives the SPS was to assume. Part of the objectives of the SPS read as follows: “To rally the servicemen around the ideal of an independent Ukrainian state, instilling in them a consciousness of the historical development of Ukrainian independence . . . and a deep sense of respect and love for Ukraine, its people, culture, traditions and churches.”

Major-General Muliava defended the SPS against accusations that it was exactly like the MPA:

The idea of self-sufficient value of human individuality, respect of the solitude and dignity of every person, have always been a component of the Ukrainian “national idea,” which attracted and naturally included in to the Ukrainian socium representatives of other nations, peoples and ethnic groups, who lived on the territory of Ukraine and sincerely took part in the national-liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people. And the Social-Psychological Service strives to realize exactly this idea.

Historiography, Nation Building, and the Military

However, Muliava's SPS, which was also supposed to teach “nonrepressive relations” and “non-violent conflict resolution,” did more to create conflicts and
repression in the Ukrainian armed forces than any other organization since independence. Under Muliaiva’s control, the SPS was instructed to espouse the Ukrainian “national idea.” Furthermore, the teaching of the “national-liberation struggle” meant that the SPS was to teach a Ukrainian nationalist version of history and glorify all the anti-Russian and anti-Soviet military formations that had existed until then. There was a legal basis for their actions. The UUO interpreted section 11 of the Law on the Armed Forces of Ukraine that “the military-patriotic education of military servicemen is to be realized using the national-historical traditions of the people of Ukraine” in its own manner. This included the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), and the SS Galician Division.

Muliava believed that the best way to implement the Ukrainian “national idea” was through the ideology of the Ukrainian Cossacks:

We don’t look at the Cossacks as simply a military formation or a social entity, but as a state of the soul, as a way of life and a method of behavior. Through analysis we have found that Ukrainians are in essence a Cossack nation. The Cossacks were the highest embodiment of “national patriotism.”

Muliava also extended his Cossack myth to include the Sichovi Striltsi (Sharpshooters from the Austrian army who became the backbone of the Ukrainian People’s Republic armed forces of 1917–1920), the OUN-UPA, and even the SS Galician Division, all of which he has said were Cossack military formations. Muliava considered all of these military forces to be heroic military formations in the national liberation struggle.

His treatment of the UPA was especially antagonistic to some sections of society who had been instilled for decades by the Soviet state with hatred for these “Nazi collaborators.” Muliava glorified the UPA for its desire for the: “complete liberation of the Ukrainian people from the Russian-Bolshevik yoke and for their wish to unify all ethnic Ukrainian lands in an independent Ukrainian state without wealthy landowners, capitalists, and without Bolshevik magnates, KGB spies and Communist party parasites.”

Muliava also glorified the OUN-UPA for its “multi-ethnic character” and belief in the “equality of all nations inhabiting Ukraine;” and for its “democratic ideals” and “humanitarian principles.” Muliava portrayed the OUN-UPA as an organization with highly democratic principles, regardless of its integral nationalist ideology.

The SPS went out of its way to support and glorify nationalist military organizations of the Second World War. For example, the SPS was the initiator and organizer of a fiftieth anniversary celebration of the UPA in Kyiv in 1992 to which UPA veterans from the West were invited. The UPA veterans were overjoyed at their treatment as heroes by the SPS.

The SPS’s relations with Ukrainian nationalist émigrés were quite close. Ukrainian nationalist organizations in the United States and especially Canada actively supported the SPS by donating various books, literature, and even computers. Much of the donated literature and books portrayed their idealized na-
tionalist view of Ukrainian history, which typically demonizes the enemies of Ukraine, glorifies their own exploits, and omits their excesses. Muliava said: "I would not be able to name one Ukrainian organization in Canada which did not strive to help the Ukrainian armed forces." However, Muliava also admitted that many people in the Ukrainian armed forces were against this help and did not want to accept it, an attitude which he claims he removed.

In the Vanguard of Ukrainianization: The Union of Ukrainian Officers (Uuo)

At this point it is necessary to comment on one organization which was closely linked to the SPS and its Ukrainianization campaign: the Uuo. The work of the SPS was aided by the Uuo because it was favored by the first defense minister of Ukraine, Konstantyn Morozov. In fact, most SPS officers were members of the Uuo, including Muliava himself, and the Uuo itself had close ties to center-right political groups, such as Rukh. Morozov openly admitted that he would support and cooperate with the Uuo, a statement which certainly added to its initial growth and popularity. The Uuo claimed a membership of 20,000 individuals throughout Ukraine, most of whom were middle-ranking officers between the ranks of major and colonel.

The ranks of the Uuo became filled with ethnic Ukrainians, and from the outset it included anti-communist and anti-Russian sentiment. Over 85% of its members were ethnic Ukrainians. However, a more telling statistic is that over 70% of its members were Western Ukrainians, the main base of Rukh and other national democratic parties.

One of the Uuo's goals was to eliminate from the ranks of the Ukrainian armed forces any servicemen considered to be disloyal and unpatriotic to the Ukrainian state. At the time, the Uuo claimed that 90% of the Ukrainian armed force's higher officer corps and 70% of the general officer ranks were composed of non-ethnic Ukrainians, most of whom were ethnic Russians. The Uuo was highly suspicious of the loyalty and patriotism of the officer corps and felt that many officers who swore allegiance to Ukraine were insincere. According to one survey, 60% of officers who had sworn allegiance had done so because of the promise of housing, the stable social situation, and better access to foodstuffs in Ukraine. Even Morozov complained that some officers had sworn allegiance believing that eventually the armed forces of Ukraine would be united again with Russia in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

Unofficial surveys confirmed that the majority of officers would not fight in a conflict with Russia. The Uuo claimed that only 30% of Ukrainian officers were prepared to defend Ukrainian independence while another poll which asked "Are you ready to defend Ukraine with arms in hand?" was answered positively by only 8% of respondents.

Morozov, with a mixed Russian-Ukrainian ethnic background from Luhans'k, became quite involved with the Uuo and even took part in its congresses. The defense minister, following in Muliava's tracks, also promised Ukrainian nationalist émigrés that the Ukrainian military would learn, among
others, the glorious traditions of the armies of the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UNR), the UPA, and the SS Galician Division. Morozov also made membership in the UUO a precondition for any promotion in the Ukrainian armed forces, a move that was bound to cause dissent among the officer corps.

The way in which the UUO tried to realize its goal of eliminating what it felt were disloyal officers from the Ukrainian armed forces’ ranks resembled a witch-hunt. It gathered intelligence on units considered hostile to Ukraine, conducted political campaigns, and tried to control personnel policy and appointments. In reality, the UUO used tactics that were rather similar to those used by Soviet political commissars during the Stalinist period. People could be denounced and thus removed because of what the UUO considered disloyal. The UUO even began pressing then-President Leonid Kravchuk and the Defense Ministry to launch a purge of non-Ukrainians and former high-ranking communists from the Ukrainian armed forces. Though no such purge took place, discrimination against non-Ukrainians—and especially ethnic Russian officers—did take place. The UUO’s actions led to the undeserved dismissal of many ethnic Russian officers and prompted more than 200 officers of various ethnic backgrounds to file applications for voluntary dismissal from the Ukrainian armed forces. The union was also known to defend its members against disciplinary actions regardless of whether the person in question was at fault or not.

Another goal of the UUO was to replace ethnic Russian officers with ethnic Ukrainians who were serving in other parts of the former Soviet Union, although this policy seems largely to have failed. Many Ukrainian officers serving in the Russian military decided not to return due to the inferior economic situation in Ukraine, and especially due to the relatively higher standard of living enjoyed by officers in the Russian armed forces.

Throughout the Kravchuk era the UUO became increasingly politicized, moving from the far-right to the extreme right and came to be criticized for being a war party. It criticized the Ukrainian government for giving up the Soviet nuclear weapons on its soil and for making concessions to Russia with regard to the Black Sea Fleet, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), or any other issues.

The UUO’s anti-Russian orientation has been strengthened by its close relations with Ukrainian nationalist émigré groups. The British-based Association of Former Ukrainian Combatants, which is mainly composed of UPA and SS Galician Division veterans, actually wrote the UUO statute and provided it with financial and educational support. At least twenty UPA veterans even officially joined the UUO; as have an unspecified number of SS Galician Division veterans.

The UUO also had close contacts with other Ukrainian nationalist émigré organizations in North America and Europe who provide funds and supplied the UUO with office equipment. The greatest help has come in the form of nationalist literature of which it received a large amount. A large amount of this literature consisted of books and journals that glorify the SS Galician Division and the OUN-UPA. This orientation was consistent with the view that the official ideology of the Ukrainian armed forces should be Ukrainian nationalism.
One of the UUO’s goals was to promote Ukrainian nationalist military traditions by which it aided the SPS through distributing this nationalist literature. The UUO was also heavily represented in the various Ukrainian military newspapers and journals which would publish articles glorifying the nationalist views of history along with their various military formations and nationalist ideology. However, the UUO’s demand that former Soviet Zampolits (Political Officers) be forcibly retired was not implemented.

Growing Dissension toward the Use of Nationalism in the Armed Forces

Many members of the SPS staff were former Soviet army officers who had been discharged for nationalist activity. The other officers who were to carry out the work of the SPS were former Zampolits from the MPA who, instead of taking guidance from MPA headquarters in Moscow, would now take orders from the SPS in Kyiv. However, this practically ensured that there would be problems because the leadership of the SPS was the most staunchly Ukrainian nationalist component of the Ukrainian armed forces and the Zampolits were formerly the staunchest Communists and Soviet patriots. Not all Zampolits were openly opposed to the SPS, because Defense Minister Morozov had made it clear that membership in the UUO was a precondition for any promotion, and therefore many Zampolits also became “nationalists” overnight.

In essence, the MPA method of using “otherness” as a tool to instill patriotism into servicemen was used by the SPS, though in a slightly more subtle way. By glorifying the Ukrainian “national liberation struggle” the SPS accused Russians of having been the enemy and a negative “other.” But if that were not enough, the SPS and UUO espoused an anti-Russian ideology that had limited appeal outside Western Ukraine. Since Russians are not, and have never been, considered the enemy by the majority of Ukrainians, the policy eventually backfired.

These efforts to instill a particular notion of patriotism caused a great deal of dissension within Ukrainian military and political circles. The SPS’s Ukrainianization program was therefore bound to fail. In early 1993, 155 left-wing parliamentary deputies officially complained about the growing politicization of the UUO, including its glorification of the OUN-UPA and depiction of Russia as Ukraine’s main enemy. Muliava was often criticized by the left for turning the SPS into an organization resembling the Gestapo and inculcating Petliurite and Banderivtsi (supporters of past nationalist leaders Simon Petliura and Stepan Bandera) ideology into the Ukrainian armed forces.

The last straw came in October 1993 when, after facing increasing opposition in the Supreme Rada and openly criticizing President Kravchuk and the Massandra Accord signed between Russia and Ukraine, Morozov was forced to resign. Morozov was replaced on 8 October 1993 by Vitaliy Radets’kyii, the Commander of the Odesa Military District, who quickly acted to defuse the problems with the UUO and SPS. Radets’kyi agreed that the SPS was a very important component of the armed forces and thus wanted to make it more professional. After meetings with SPS staff, Radets’kyi finally replaced Muliava
with Anatoli Kobzar and renamed the SPS the “Main Administration for Educational and Social-Psychological Work of the Ministry of Defense.”

According to General Muliava, the real reason for restructuring the SPS and his replacement was that “anti-Ukrainian” forces could see that he and the SPS were establishing “real” Ukrainian Armed Forces and this scared them. Muliava believes that another reason was because he attacked Communists who were serving in the Ukrainian armed forces and had them removed. However, it is more likely that the most important reason for Muliava’s dismissal was that his nationalism, anti-Russian views, glorification of nationalist armies, and attack on Soviet army traditions were alienating the officer corps. Radets’kyi made it clear that the process of “Ukrainianizing” the armed forces would be slowed down.

The nonnationalist Radets’kyi also pursued the radical UUO. Officially Radets’kyi was opposed to military personnel involving themselves in politics and thus began to clamp down on the UUO. According to UUO sources, the union barely survived Radets’kyi’s term in office as defense minister. The once-powerful union began to rapidly lose members until its numbers hit approximately 4,000 people. The UUO claimed that people dropped out of the union for fear of losing apartments, jobs, and retirement pensions.35 However, other sources state that the union had already begun to lose members prior to Radets’kyi’s appointment because it failed to pursue the protection of the social, economic, and legal interests of military servicemen.36

After the June–July 1994 presidential elections, Radets’kyi was replaced by a civilian by newly elected President Leonid Kuchma. The new defense minister, former Deputy Prime Minister Valeriy Shmarov, was as critical of nationalist policies as his predecessor and is said to have even removed the portraits of famous Cossack Hetmans from the walls of the General Staff’s headquarters.37 Although Shmarov did a great deal to enhance Ukraine’s cooperation with the West through NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, he, like Radets’kyi, was criticized by nationalists for having also brought Ukraine closer to the CIS. According to former Defense Minister Morozov, this “halted the processes of Ukrainianization of the Army, and . . . is depriving the Ukrainian Army of the possibility of becoming Ukrainian.”38

The UUO was highly critical of Shmarov for his “anti-Ukrainian” attitude and the “selling out” of Ukraine to Russia. The UUO was even more critical of Shmarov than it was of Radets’kyi who they believe “at least confronted the Russian Ministry of Defense.”39 The UUO even attempted to organize an officer’s rally in mid-July 1995, but it failed to attract more than a few dozen listeners.40 It was obvious that the UUO was no longer the force it once was.

In February 1995 Shmarov replaced Kobzar, the head of the SPS’s successor, the “Main Administration for Educational and Social-Psychological Work” (MAEW) for “misconduct” (he had also supported Kravchuk during the 1994 presidential election campaign). His replacement was Major-General Vолодимyr Sytnyk, who maintained his position until the beginning of 1998, when he was replaced by Lieutenant-General Oleksiy Protsenko.

Shmarov himself was unpopular within military circles and especially so
among nationalists both in the armed forces and the Supreme Rada. His plans to reform the armed forces were viewed by nationalists and by many in the military as too "dovish." It did not help that he was the first civilian minister of defense, and many considered him unqualified to deal with military issues. In July 1996, Shmarov was removed and replaced by the commander of the National Guard, Lieutenant-General Oleksandr Kuzmuk.

THE UKRAINIANIZATION PROGRAM

Ukrainianization and military-patriotic education have continued in the Ukrainian military under every defense minister, although the levels of officially sanctioned nationalist education have varied. From 1994 the Ukrainianization program has slowed and become less radical and divisive, placing less emphasis upon nationalist military formations. The MAEW determines what is taught in the military educational system. The Ukrainianization work by the MAEW is carried out through "humanities preparation," lectures, museums, svitytsi (reading rooms), and the military media.

"Humanities Preparation"

During the Soviet period, the MPA held centralized control over everything that was taught in the military, and every military unit in the Soviet Armed Forces received the same education regardless of its location. The "Military Publishing House" prepared and produced most of the materials used by the Zampolit. Today, Ukraine’s situation is quite different. The Ukrainian military has its own publishing house, Varta, which, instead of publishing educational materials, is used by the Ministry of Defense to publish military-legal handbooks. These include volumes such as Military Legislation and Laws of Ukraine: Short Reference-Book for Officers and Acting Statutes of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Financial difficulties inhibit the Ministry of Defense and the MAEW from publishing a history textbook that could be used in its Ukrainianization, although there is also some reluctance to publish officially what would certainly be a controversial history text. What is taught in the military can—and is—affect ed by outside interest groups providing their own materials for use in propaganda in the military. Therefore, nationalists especially concerned with patriotism in the military can attempt to exert their influence on the Ukrainianization program.

The work of the MAEW covers all branches of the Ukrainian security forces—the Ukrainian armed forces, Border Troops, and National Guard. In theory, all branches should be taught the same subjects. Humanities preparation is carried out by giving lectures and conducting seminars and through individual study. Twice per year, the MAEW publishes a Thematic Plan of Humanities Preparation of Military Servicemen and Workers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the various publications of the security forces.

The Thematic Plan is divided into sections for each category of military servicemen in the following manner:41
1. General and Staff Officers (eighty hours of study per year);
2. Officers of Formations and Units (eighty hours of study per year);
3. Warrant Officers and Contract Military Servicemen (eighty hours of study per year);
4. Workers of the Ukrainian armed forces (twenty hours of study per year);
5. Conscripted Military Servicemen (136 hours of study per year).

Five main subjects are studied:

1. History of Ukraine;
2. History of the Ukrainian Armed Forces;
3. Military Law;
4. Pedagogy and Psychology;

Each subject area in the Thematic Plan contains various themes and questions that are to be studied. Thus, according to the plan published in a June 1998 edition of Vartovi Nebra, the official newspaper of the Air Defense Forces, the questions and themes for Conscripted Military Servicemen for the summer period were as follows:

2. Courage and heroism of the defenders of the Fatherland during World War II (two hours of study).
3. Social protection and the main directions of its actualization. (two hours of study);
4. You are the hope of the Fatherland, people and President. Love of Ukraine, of your own people, is the source of the spiritual strength of a soldier (two hours of study).
5. What do you know about the culture of mutual relations and military etiquette? Do you know how to conduct yourself in society and in your collective? (role training: two hours of study).
6. Undivided Authority—an important principle in the recruitment and development of the contemporary armed forces of Ukraine. The educational meaning of disciplinary practice (six hours of study).
7. Statutory interrelations—an important condition in the solidarity of military collectives, the strengthening of highly moral humane norms in the interrelations of military servicemen (six hours of study).
8. The international legal regulation of military conflicts. The code of conduct of participants in military activities (six hours of study).
9. The main periods in the formation of the Ukrainian nation, stages in the formation of statehood, and the molding of the modern territory of Ukraine (in honor of Ukrainian Independence Day: six hours of study).
10. History and the contemporary situation of Ukrainian Cossacks (two hours of study);
11. The Ukrainian Revolution. The Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) and its military formations (four hours of study).
12. Ukraine and Ukrainians in the Second World War. The fight against fascism and contribution to victory (six hours of study).
13. Historical influence of contemporary material culture of the Ukrainian people: cus-
14. The Ukrainian language—basis of the spiritual and artistic culture, science and education of the Ukrainian nation (two hours of study).
15. History and prominent cultural monuments of the region where you are serving (two hours of study).
16. Religion and the church in the history of the Ukrainian people (two hours of study).
17. Fine arts of Ukraine: history and its contemporary status (four hours of study).
18. Medical enlightenment work in the military unit. Prophylaxis of drug addiction and AIDS sickness (two hours of study).
19. Examinations for the winter term (two -hour exam).

Once per year, students are given a test related to these themes and questions in which a commission from the MAEW takes part. Since the days of the SPS, the themes and questions have changed considerably, are now less provocative, and contain considerably less nationalist history. An example of SPS historical questions during 1993 included:

1. Kyiv Rus’, and its role in the historical fate of the Ukrainian people. The Galician-Volhynian state—continuing the traditions of the Kyiv state.
2. The military campaigns of the Kyivan princes.
3. Objective and subjective reasons for the origins of Ukrainian Cossacks as a separate societal state. The Cossack army and its martial arts.
4. The Ukrainian Cossack state.
5. The Western Ukrainian lands between 1900 and 1919. The creation of military formations. The Ukrainian Sichovi Striltsi. The Ukrainian Galician Army.
6. The military forces of the Central Rada and Hetman P. Skoropadsky. The Ukrainian Navy.
8. Ukraine in the plans of the totalitarian regimes and the development of the Ukrainian national idea during World War II.
9. The UPA struggle for a Ukrainian state independent of German and Communist occupation.
10. Ukrainians during World War II in the Soviet Army and the armies of the Allies.

The MAEW also publishes articles in the various Ukrainian military newspapers under the heading “Aid to Humanities Preparation Group Leaders,” that deal with the previously mentioned themes and questions. Each article begins with the stated theme or question. A short bibliography is provided at the end of the article for each Humanities Preparation Group Leader or, as they are more commonly referred to, Educational Work Assistant. This is supposed to be used in formulate lecture and seminar notes on the given topic. Often, much of the background information that is used by the Educational Work Assistants comes from other sources published in either a variety of newspapers or journals on the initiative of their editors or from books that are found in libraries located on military bases.

This is where the greatest problems begin. During the Gorbachev era, the
government admitted that much of Soviet history was tainted with omissions of facts, or were even utter falsifications of the truth. This led to a backlash in which all Soviet historiography was criticized and assumed to be false. For this reason, Soviet history books have, for the most part, been discarded. Because neither the Ukrainian government nor most academic institutions have the financial resources available to publish new literature to actually replace the Soviet books, the outcome has been to rely on foreign sources of information. With few exceptions, the majority of these books are supplied by Ukrainian nationalist émigrés living in the West who, for the most part, have some connection to the three branches of the OUN. The result is that the Soviet falsifications of history have been replaced by a Ukrainian nationalist version that glorifies the exploits of the UNR, the OUN-UPA, and the SS Galician Division. Leaving aside questions of historical accuracy, such works are considered controversial and even offensive to many in Ukraine, and hence tend not to build national unity, but to deepen existing divisions.

Émigré Literature: Its Influence on “Humanities Preparation”

Among the organizations sending literature to Ukraine is the journal Visti Kombatantia which is the official bimonthly published by the veterans of the SS Galician Division (or, as they now prefer to be called, the “First Ukrainian Division of the Ukrainian National Army”). The journal itself is funded by advertisements from a wide range of some of the most well-known and successful businesses in the North American Ukrainian émigré community. Not only the journal but also books on the SS Galician Division are sent either directly to the libraries of Ukrainian military units or to nationalist organizations in Ukraine such as the UUO, which then distribute the materials to the security forces throughout Ukraine. However, the literature sent by Visti Kombatantia can hardly be considered academic let alone unbiased. Most of the literature is actually written by former veterans and tends to glorify the SS Galician Division as a heroic military formation which took part in the “national liberation struggle” for independence against the Soviet and German occupation of Ukraine. Such views are bound to be divisive in Ukraine.

A considerable volume of Ukrainian nationalist historical literature is distributed and sold in Ukraine by nationalist émigré organizations. In fact, as happened during World War II, the various nationalist groups compete for historical and political influence in Ukraine. Everyone from supporters of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky (1918) to World War II figures, such as Hetman Taras Bulba-Borovets, and the Andrii Melnyk and Stepan Bandera factions of the OUN attempt to glorify their own heroes. The most powerful organization is the Bandera faction of the OUN (OUN-B), which has also been the most successful in publishing books that glorify Bandera, the OUN-B and UPA.

The great majority of books that are used in teaching history by the Ukrainian military are published by the Ukrainian diaspora. Because the Ukrainian economy is in a poor condition, most Ukrainian scholars are hard-pressed to find funding and thus the Ukrainian military is forced to rely on foreign sources and
their version of history. However, some books which have been published in Ukraine recently deal with certain periods of Ukrainian history differently than foreign nationalist publications. Various interviews conducted by this author have confirmed that the majority of books that are used or have been written by foreign nationals are viewed in a quite negative manner by many Ukrainian servicemen. Some educational assistants still use Soviet history books in the preparation of their lectures. How often this is the case and whether this is due to opposition to nationalist literature are not known.

THE MEDIA OF THE SECURITY FORCES AND NATION BUILDING

One of the most important sources of information for the educational assistants is the military newspapers and journals, which often publish their own historical materials which are not submitted by the MAEW. In fact, most articles related to Ukrainian history are published on the initiative of the editors themselves. Following is a list of the most important Ukrainian military publications available to educational assistants, with a short description of their viewpoints.

*Narodna Armiya*

This daily is the most important, influential, and widely distributed military newspaper and was previously known as *Leninskoye Znamye*. It was renamed *Narodna Armiya* on 1 October 1991 when it was established as the central organ of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. The creation of *Narodna Armiya* was Defense Minister Morozov’s very first directive. When *Narodna Armiya* was first published, it was entirely in Russian. This was also the language stated in its application for registration. However, it now publishes articles only in Ukrainian.

*Narodna Armiya* has published articles that have glorified various nationalist military forces such as the OUN-UPA and even the SS Galician Division, though most historical articles initially dealt with the Cossacks, Ukraine’s borders, and Ukrainians in the Crimea. Ukrainian nationalist émigrés have been influential in what is published and have often been the authors of articles that deal with World War II Ukrainian nationalist military formations. As with most émigré publications, these articles do not address negative concerns about the history of these formations. Nationalist émigrés, in a manner similar to everywhere else, have also been very helpful in providing *Narodna Armiya* with financial aid, nationalist literature, and office equipment.

Although *Narodna Armiya* was initially ardently nationalist and was initially edited by a member of the UUO, its position changed under Kuchma to a more liberal form of nationalism. A large number of the historical articles that have been published under Kuchma for the most part deal with less controversial subjects, such as the Ukrainian Cossacks or even Ukrainian participation in the Russian Imperial army during Napoleon’s attack on Russia. *Narodna Armiya* has harshly criticized not only the actions of the Russian government in relation to Ukraine but also the Ukrainian government itself. One article stated that Rus-
sian citizens were being "psychologically prepared for war" with Ukraine and criticized the Ukrainian government for being too soft on Russia.⁴⁶ Regardless of the still somewhat nationalist perspective of Narodna Armiya, the overwhelming majority of historical articles that are published deal with the heroic exploits of the Soviet armed forces and Ukrainian servicemen during World War II, which, in fact, is the case with most Ukrainian military publications. This does not mean that the articles give the Soviet view of the war by glorifying Jozef Stalin or making any excuses for his mistakes. A great variety of articles deal with lesser known heroes involved in the liberation of Ukraine from the Nazis. Narodna Armiya has even begun to publish articles by authors who have criticized the OUN-UPA for its activities during the war.⁴⁷

Flot Ukrainy

This is the official newspaper of the Ukrainian navy and is published in the city of Sevastopol, Crimea, on a weekly basis. The newspaper publishes some articles in Ukrainian and some in Russian, most likely because it is located in the Russophone Crimea. There is an information war between Ukrainian and Russian military newspapers (i.e., Flag Rodiny) who seem to be trying to influence not only each other's military personnel but also the local population.⁴⁸ Flot Ukrainy has often carried the most nationalistic articles relating to twentieth-century Ukrainian nationalist military formations of all Ukrainian military newspapers. Because the Russophone population of Crimea is located in a place where the exploits of the Red Army were among the most heroic during the Revolution, the Civil War, and World War II, any glorification of Ukrainian nationalist militaries or criticism of the Soviet army is seen as especially provocative.

Flot Ukrainy is also extremely critical of the Russian government and the Russian Black Sea Fleet and often publishes articles attacking both. The newspaper typically attacks the stationing of the Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine and often publishes articles to suggest that by doing this Russia is breaking international law and is therefore imperialistic. Flot Ukrainy is also known often to publish articles that attack the record of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the USSR itself.⁴⁹ One issue of Flot Ukrainy featured a front-page interview with Ukrainian nationalist émigrés who visited Sevastopol and complained about the usage of the Russian language in Crimea and in the Ukrainian navy.

Prykordonnyk Ukrainy

This is the official weekly publication of the State Committee in Affairs of the Protection of the State Border of Ukraine, more commonly known as the Border Troops. Though most articles are published in Ukrainian, Russian is also frequently used. The Border Troops were among the most elite troops among all Soviet military formations and were a division of the KGB.

With this in mind, it is understandable that the official newspaper of the Ukrainian Border Troops is also among the least nationalistic. According to its
former editor, Vasyl Klymenko, it would be impossible to change the minds of people who worked in such an elite force as the Border Troops for so many years overnight. The newspaper therefore refrains from publishing any articles that glorify nationalist armed formations. In fact, under its old editor, S. F. Volkov, who retired in early 1995, Prykordonnyk Ukrainy often published historical articles that criticized the OUN-UPA as traitors, Nazi collaborators and war criminals.

Prykordonnyk Ukrainy, like most other security force newspapers, also publishes articles that glorify the exploits of the Soviet armed forces, especially the Soviet Border Troops. However, whereas during the Soviet period these articles would mention “nationalist bandits” who illegally tried to cross the Soviet border, now the articles speak of “border trespassers.”

**Vartovi Neba**

This is the official weekly newspaper of the Air Defense Forces, which is published for the most part in Ukrainian. Vartovi Neba does publish articles in relation to certain episodes of nationalist history such as the Ukrainian revolutionary period, though the articles are more factual than propagandistic. Furthermore, it is not typical of Vartovi Neba to engage in political debates criticizing Russia, Ukraine’s communists, or other groups. The most important indicator of where Vartovi Neba stands in regard to Ukrainian nationalism is displayed directly on the front cover of every issue where it proudly displays the diploma of honor with the hammer and sickle emblem of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

**Surma/Viysko Ukrayiny**

Surma, formerly Viysko Ukrayiny, was the official journal of the National Guard. The journal is no longer in publication, though its back issues are still widely used. In 1995, after Viysko Ukrayiny was transferred to the Ministry of Defense to become the main magazine of the military, the National Guard briefly launched Surma. As the journal of the National Guard, Viysko Ukrayiny/Surma was nationalistic and went much further in glorifying Ukrainian nationalist militaries such as the OUN-UPA and the SS Galician Division than any other official military publication in the country.

The journal not only received financial support from the Ukrainian nationalist émigré community but also initially even had nationalist émigrés on its editorial board, which could at least partially explain its political outlook. Among the organizations that sponsored the journal were the U.S.-based Society of UPA Soldiers and the UUO (the editor, Colonel Volodymyr Korkodym, was a UUO member). Among the three non-Ukrainian citizens who were on the editorial board were two retired U.S. military officers of Ukrainian origin and Rutgers University Professor Taras Hunczak, author of a volume in Ukraine on the SS Galician Division. The journal tended to publish articles in support of keeping Ukraine’s nuclear arsenal, about the evils of the Soviet Union and Russia in
general, and other highly nationalistic views.

In general, the Ukrainian military press is rather varied in its ideological and political viewpoints. This suggests that there is little control by official organs over what is published and that the military press is not used to its full potential as an instrument of nation building or to propagate the views of the Ukrainian government. This may be a potentially destabilizing factor for Ukrainian nation building, since some of the more nationalistic views of these newspapers may be accepted as the official government viewpoint (which they are not) by military servicemen and the population at large. The nationalistic views of some of these publications are not widely supported and might alienate large sections of the Ukrainian population, which would have an adverse effect on Ukrainian nation building.

THE MILITARY AND NATION BUILDING UNDER KUCHMA

From the SPS to the MAEW

The educational assistant’s job in offering an objective view (as is supposed to be the case according to the MAEW) is extremely difficult. The reactions of the educational assistants to what they are supposed to teach is quite varied. Since many educational assistants do not believe in the content of the lectures, they either simply briefly mention the topic in passing without comment or make comments with harsh remarks to the historical information which is presented. However, it is clear that the security forces, like Ukrainian society in general, are quite divided about what is taught. This division has a great deal to do with where the educational assistant was raised.

According to Alexander Besedin, head of the Department of Psychology at Kharkiv’s Armed Forces University, because Ukraine is multiethnic the Ukrainian Armed Forces University teaches patriotic and internationalist education. This, Besedin believes, is one and the same goal: “you cannot teach people patriotism and to also hate other nations . . . practice has shown that this approach leads to fascism.”52 Instead, Besedin states that they teach people to respect the traditions and cultures of the many peoples of Ukraine.

However, in Western Ukraine the situation is somewhat more complicated. At the Military Institute of the L’viv State Polytechnic University, the local city council and nationalist organizations constantly attempt to influence the affairs of the Military Institute, which, as the sole center in Ukraine that produces educational assistants, gives Western Ukraine a great deal of influence over Ukrainianization efforts in the armed forces. The result has been to provide a more nationalistic look to the institute, with museums and posters depicting nationalist military groups such as the UPA. The institute also invites both Soviet Army veterans and UPA veterans to give lectures on their activities during the war to military cadets. Nationalist groups also play a very active role in supplying the institute with historical literature. According to some of the Institute’s officers, representatives of the L’viv City Council also inspect the institute to make certain the institute is fully “Ukrainianized.” Although the institute does
not take orders from the L'viv City Council per se and therefore does not even have to allow them access to the institute, the institute nonetheless prefers to maintain good relations with the city and thus allows itself to be influenced by it.

Reactions by students to the MAEW lectures vary from those who are genuinely interested in and accept what they are being taught to those who find the nationalist history and viewpoint humorous and those who are outright hostile to the glorification of nationalist history. Major-General Hryboriy Temko, the former deputy head of the MAEW who was in charge of formulating its program, recalled giving a lecture in Odessa on the OUN-UPA and the audience reacting in a hostile manner.53

There is a struggle being conducted among various individuals in the Ukrainian military over influence in the military-patriotic education program. Although the UOO has lost influence and is now almost invisible as a player in the Ukrainian military, it still has many members in influential positions, including the editors of some of the security force publications and Major-General Temko himself.

Temko believes that the OUN-UPA and the SS Galician Division were heroic formations in the Ukrainian “liberation struggle” and that the history of the Soviet army should not be taught. According to his interpretation, any teaching of Soviet traditions would be contrary to statute 11 of the Law on the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which states that the education of the armed forces should be based on the “national-historic” traditions of the Ukrainian people. Temko admits, however, that his interpretation is not supported by the Ministry of Defense or by many members of the Supreme Rada, though this had not stopped him from continuing to glorify Ukrainian nationalist military formations.54

Temko also admitted that the MAEW in 1995 had prepared a textbook on Ukrainian military history, though the Ministry of Defense refused to publish it officially due to a lack of funds. Temko believed that the real reason for not publishing the textbook was the ministry’s “opposition to the teaching of national-historic traditions.”55 Temko also claims that the large number of ethnic Russians in the ministry is an important source of opposition to the textbook.56 A more likely reason for the Ministry of Defense’s refusal to publish the textbook was the fact that it deified organizations such as the OUN-UPA and the SS Galician Division while omitting the Soviet army’s place in Ukrainian history.

Other Forms of Ukrainization

After the Ukrainian military was initially created, among the first things changed were the names of various military objects, military symbols, and medals. In order not to offend anyone, many of the names in the Ukrainian armed forces were changed to reflect the Cossack period, with the most common name used being that of Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nits'kyi. Although the government has attempted to be as balanced as possible in the use of names and symbols, Ukrainian nationalist symbols of the World War II era are completely omitted. This is not the case when it comes to Soviet names and symbols or even those of
the Tsarist era. Defense Minister Kuzmuk more than once awarded the title "Hero of the Soviet Union" to distinguished veterans of the "Great Patriotic War."

Kuzmuk also often congratulated such military units as the "24th Mechanized Samaro-Ulyanov, Berdichev Iron, Order of the October Revolution, Thrice Red Flag, Order of Suvorov, and Bohdan Khmel’nts’kyi Division" on the eightieth anniversary of their creation.

President Kuchma also often awards such medals as the Georgi Zhukov Medal for participants of the "Great Patriotic War." All famous dates of the Soviet army’s liberation of Ukraine and even the USSR, such as the liberation of Kyiv and the Battle of Kursk, are celebrated annually by orders of the president and the minister of defense. This positive attitude towards Soviet symbol and names has caused many nationalists to complain that the military is not Ukrainian. The fact that the OUN-UPA and the SS Galician Division traditions, symbols, and names are not used, whereas the Soviet ones are, has many nationalists wondering why the Ukrainian military holds these “foreign” traditions so close to their hearts while it rejects “Ukrainian” traditions.

Museums and Svitytsi (reading rooms) are another way in which the Ukrainianization process is being carried out. Outside Western Ukraine, little has changed in the museums themselves, with images of Lenin simply being replaced with images of the Ukrainian flag and the state symbol, the Tryzub (Trident). All other exhibits that show the exploits of the Soviet army are largely still intact. However, this is not the case in Western Ukraine, where many museum exhibits now include or are solely dedicated to the “national liberation struggle” of Ukraine conducted by such organizations as the OUN-UPA or even the SS Galician Division.

The Svitytsi are usually decorated with the Ukrainian flag, state symbols, poems by well known Ukrainian poets such as Taras Shevchenko, and images of local war heroes. Of course, books are a major part of the Svitytsi, consisting of the same nationalist publications as in the military libraries. Another way in which the Ukrainianization program has been implemented is through the use of posters and signs found on the grounds of military bases. These posters and signs have been hung up all over bases in place of Soviet posters. Themes include excerpts from the Ukrainian military codes and laws, the Oath of Allegiance to Ukraine, and quotes by Ukrainian authors such as Shevchenko, Ivan Krypiakevich, and the historian and leader of the Central Rada, Mykhailo Hrushevs’kyi. Other themes include the Ukrainian national anthem, “Shche ne vmerla Ukraina” (Ukraine Has Not Yet Perished). The themes are always about loving one’s country or defending the independence of Ukraine (quotes by Krypiakevich).

When asked whether military people actually read these posters, one officer replied that if they were paid enough and received apartments, maybe they would. Because they have to think about more important things, such as buying food and clothing for their families or paying for living quarters, there is little time or interest to be thinking about these posters. The existence of such patriotic posters and signs depends on the location of the base. There are reports that old Soviet posters and signs still exist on some military bases, though in fewer
numbers, and they are now mixed in with new Ukrainian ones.\textsuperscript{62}

Language is one of the most important aspects of the Ukrainianization program. The Ukrainian language is no longer being taught in the Ukrainian armed forces since it is supposed to be learned in school before a recruit serves in the military. All lectures and seminars are also supposed to be conducted in Ukrainian. However, because many educational assistants are not fully fluent in Ukrainian, many switch to Russian or use interpreters. Most of the time, Russian is the language used in the Ukrainian military because this is the language most widely known by the officer corps. This has provoked widespread condemnation from Ukrainian nationalists both in Ukraine and among Ukrainian émigrés who often do not consider the Ukrainian military to be truly Ukrainian. One commentator wrote: “Today in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, those who consider their native tongue not to be the Ukrainian language (and therefore it must be understood, nor do they consider the Ukrainian state as theirs) make up 90 per cent of all senior officers.”\textsuperscript{63}

Measuring the Success of Ukrainianization

The only historical figures that were equally well-received by all of Ukraine’s regions and can be considered as promoting national integration are Khmel’nićkyi, Suvorov, Kutuzov,\textsuperscript{64} the armies of Kyivan Rus’, and the Cossacks. Almost all other individuals and armies (for example, the OUN-UPA and the SS Galician Division) are viewed differently by Western Ukrainians on one hand, and Central, Southern, and Eastern Ukrainians on the other hand.

A sociological survey from 1994 by Edward Afonin of the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, on order from the Ministry of Defense, brings these divisions to the surface. In a poll conducted among 260 officers and warrant officers, Afonin found that 45.8% of respondents felt that the lack of patriotism in the Ukrainian armed forces was an important problem, while another 37.1% felt it was a very important problem.\textsuperscript{65} He also found that 47.7% of respondents felt it was advisable to use the traditions of the Russian Tsarist army in the construction of Ukrainian armed forces, while 27.7% felt it was fully advisable. Only 18% of the officers felt that it was advisable to use UPA traditions while 4.4% felt it was fully advisable. The Soviet army fared far better with 41.1% of respondents feeling it advisable and 13.6% fully advisable to use these traditions. A total of 36.1% of officers felt that it was advisable to use Cossack traditions while 11.5% felt it was fully advisable.\textsuperscript{66}

This survey suggests that many Ukrainian military servicemen are not in favor of using the traditions of nationalist militaries in the Ukrainian military. Even Major General Temko, who is a great supporter of nationalist military traditions, when asked whether the teaching and glorification of OUN-UPA and the SS Galician Division can divide the armed forces, admitted that “this can create a ‘fifth column’ to a certain degree.”\textsuperscript{67} Temko also agreed that it is possible that by glorifying nationalist traditions, many Ukrainian citizens, especially Russians, will feel insulted and would refuse to defend Ukraine. In fact, he admitted that if Russia invaded Ukraine, “half of Ukraine would defend it and the other
half would greet them (the Russians) with flowers." Ultimately, it appears impossible to build Ukrainian national identity on a notion of "Ukrainian" that sees Russia as an "other."

CONCLUSION

The Ukrainian security forces have found themselves in an extremely difficult situation following the breakup of the Soviet Union. There is no money to buy new weapons systems or even to provide housing for the officer corps. Needless to say, morale is at an all-time low. Thus it is quite understandable that the Ukrainianization program is by no means the military's greatest concern at the present time.

Most Ukrainian citizens, including military servicemen, voted for independence believing that their standard of living would improve. Instead, their standard of living has significantly worsened. In addition, the glorification of nationalist armed forces has not only failed to instill Ukrainian servicemen with a sense of nationalism but has actually generated opposition to their policies.

The differences between the regions and especially between Western Ukraine and the other regions are quite significant and may be growing as time passes. Although separatist movements have existed in Southern and Eastern Ukraine since independence, a more recent phenomenon has been the growth of separatist movements in Western Ukraine with calls for Western Ukrainian, or even Galician, independence. Although these separatist groups are not widely supported and are still in their infancy, the fact that such movements have actually taken root should be a cause for serious concern. One of the reasons for the growth of such movements has been the Western Ukrainian perception that Ukraine is not truly independent but simply a Soviet reincarnation that still celebrates Soviet heroes, victories, and events. Thus the Ukrainian state's efforts at nation building seem to be not only failing but also even backfiring.

The most widely supported individuals and periods in Ukrainian history, which could be used in the Ukrainianization program, are Khmel'nits'kyi, Kutuzov, Suvorov, and the Kyivan Rus' and Cossack periods. Therefore it would be wise for the Ukrainian military to focus more on these individuals and two periods and less on the more divisive eras in Ukraine's history. However, whether a Ukrainianization program which is intended to instill patriotism into the troops can omit the Soviet period (which is important for non-Western Ukrainians) and the history of the OUN-UPA (which is important for many Western Ukrainians) and actually achieve its goals is rather unlikely.

The history that is taught as part of the Ukrainianization program must be as objective and truthful as possible and based on facts. Due to its almost total lack of objectivity and truthfulness, Soviet citizens almost always largely disbelieved the Soviet version of history. The Ukrainianization program will not succeed in instilling patriotism into its troops if it is based on half-truths or lies.

Furthermore, the Ukrainian military must take more control over the Ukrainianization program and not allow it to be controlled and influenced by outside interests. This also means that the military must instill more discipline
into the military press to follow the official views and policies of the Ukrainian government.

The answers to Ukraine’s patriotic problems in the security forces are basically twofold. First, an improvement of the standard of living will give Ukraine’s citizens and servicemen a reason to be proud of their country and a will to defend a system that brings them prosperity. Second, a Ukrainianization education program within the military that is less divisive and reflects Ukraine’s different regional, cultural, and historical traditions might create a common ground on which national identity can unite, rather than causing further division.

NOTES

1. The study of civil-military relations in Ukraine is still underdeveloped. See Anatoliy S. Grytsenko, Civil-Military Relations in Ukraine: A System Emerging from Chaos, Harmonie Papers (Groningen: Center for European Security Studies, 1997).

2. In fact, a very important part of the State Youth Policy in Ukraine is the National Program of Patriotic Education which is intended to instill patriotism in Ukrainian citizens through the military. See Armia Ukrainy, 22 August 2000.


6. The reason for using the term national idea instead of nationalism is that the Ukrainian population views nationalism in a negative light. Nationalists argue that this is due to decades of Soviet propaganda against the term.

7. The OUN divided in 1940 into a radical wing under Bandera and a more conservative one under Melnyk. The Melnyk wing was more predisposed to co-operating with the Germans in World War II. After the Bandera wing of OUN (OUN-B) declared independence in L’viv on 30 June 1941, its leaders (Bandera and Yaroslav Stetsko) were arrested by the Nazis and spent most of the war in German camps. In 1952 a second split occurred in OUN-B in the diaspora between the radical right under Bandera/Stetsko and a national democratic wing under Mykola Lebed and Lev Rebet. This third OUN wing came to be called OUN-Z (OUN zakordonno or OUN-Z). Only OUN-B and OUN-M are active in Ukraine, particularly the former, which established a political party, the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN). See Taras Kuzio, “Radical Nationalist Parties and Movements in Contemporary Ukraine Before and After Independence: The Right and its Politics, 1989-1994,” Nationalities Papers, vol. 25, no. 2 (June 1997), pp. 211–242.

8. The UPA was created in early 1942 by Hetman Taras Bulba-Borovets and then was forcefully taken over by the OUN-B, which was then led after the arrest of Bandera and Stetsko by Lebed. Lebed went on to become a leading figure in the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR), created by UPA and OUN-B in 1944 as a surrogate underground parliament. The UHVR established an émigré division led by Lebed, which was backed by OUN-Z.


12. Ukrainian nationalists usually support their claim that the UPA was multiethnic and/or not anti-Semitic by pointing to the fact that the organization had Jewish doctors in its ranks. However, they fail to state that these same doctors were eliminated by the UPA once the Germans retreated from Ukraine. See Aharon Weiss, “Jewish-Ukrainian Rela-
tions in Western Ukraine During the Holocaust” in Peter J. Pothichnyj and Howard Aster, eds., Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective. (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1988), p. 417.

13. Ibid.


16. Ibid.


20. Ibid.


27. According to one ethnic Russian officer, upon graduation from his military academy in 1992 he was ordered to return to Russia by his SPS officer regardless of the fact that he was born and raised in Kharkiv. Anonymous personal interview, 7 September 1999. Another officer who was to take part in a training visit to Canada complained that once Muliava learned that he was an ethnic Russian, his trip was cancelled. Anonymous personal interview, 1 September 1999.


40. Baev and Bukkvol, "Ukraine’s Army," p. 10.

42. This is certainly not the official Ukrainian position, which still considers members of the SS Galician Division to have been traitors and many of them as war criminals. See Visti Kombatanta, no. 2 (1997) p. 69; and Visti Kombatanta, no. 5-6 (1997) p. 116.

43. Vitaliy Nepytaylenko, captain, educational assistant in the National Guard, personal interview, 3 June 1995; and H. Temko, personal interview, 13 June 1995. See H. D. Temko, Osnovy Formuvannia Systemy Vykhovannia Voina v Ukraini u Period Utverzhennia Derzhavnosti (Kyiv: Varta, 1997).

44. Anonymous personal interview, 10 August 1998.

48. See, for example, Flag Rodiny, 20 June 1995.

50. According to the editor, Colonel Volodymyr Korkodym, Surma decided that the editorial board would consist of only people who live in Ukraine. Volodymyr Korkodym, Editor of Surma, personal interview, 7 June 1995.

51. For an example of an émigré professor publishing a book on the SS Galician Division specifically for Ukraine see Taras Hunczak, U Mundurakh Voroha (Kyiv: Chas Ukrainy, 1993).

52. Alexander Besedin, head of the Department of Psychology, University of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Kharkiv, personal interview, 20 June 1995.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.

57. See Vartovii Neba, nos. 32–34, March 1998, where President Kuchma awarded the Order of Alexander Nevsky 223rd Rocket Brigade the honorary status of "Terebovolansk." 

60. Visti Kombatanta, nos. 5–6, 1996, p. 41.
64. Ukrainians played a large role in the victories of Suvorov and Kutuzov.
66. Ibid., p. 223.
68. Ibid.

69. This prompted Defense Minister Kuzmuk to sarcastically note that, “after 2005 we may be left with national consciousness and Kalashnikovs” (Narodna Armiya, 18 January 1997).

Identity Construction and Education: The History of Ukraine in Soviet and Post-Soviet Schoolbooks

Jan G. Janmaat

History has always played a pivotal role in the formation or disintegration of national identities. To promote group cohesion and give citizens a sense of self-esteem, political entrepreneurs emphasize common ancestry and experiences, and exaggerate the significance of certain historical events to such an extent that these assume mythical proportions.¹ To achieve group breakdown the opposite is stressed: inter/intra group conflict, suppression and injustice. Given Ukraine’s considerable linguistic and religious differences, it is not surprising to find the present-day authorities turning to history to enhance national unity.²

This chapter examines the introduction of a new state-propagated version of history in the school system. What selection of historical events does this version make and how are these events portrayed? How successful is the state in disseminating new teaching materials over Ukraine? Is one standard version propagated, or do schools, teachers, and parents have a certain freedom of choice? Given the potential impact of a new version of school history in educating a whole generation of school children, it is surprising to find so little academic attention being devoted to this issue. Because education is one of the main vehicles by which the state can purposefully seek to alter citizens’ notions of national identity, the issue is crucial to the broader question of the state’s role in nationalizing the population.

In their use of history strengthen national identity, the authorities may be said to be faced with two major problems. First, the heroic moments or periods in history from which Ukrainians can derive a feeling of pride appear to be sparse. Ever since the collapse of the medieval state of Kyiv Rus’ in the thirteenth century, the Ukrainian lands were dominated by neighboring powers and the Ukrainian population subjugated to foreign noblemen and administrators. This is not to say that Ukrainians have nothing to fall back on. Ukrainian historians, for instance, appropriate the legacy of Kyiv Rus’ by seeing contemporary Ukraine as the direct successor of that empire. Likewise, the Cossacks of the sixteenth century are considered brave Ukrainians who fought a national liberation war against the Poles and Tatars.³

However, it is precisely on these few moments of glory that Ukrainian historiography clashes with the Russian/Soviet one. In the Russian imperial scheme,
Kyiv Rus' was the precursor of the Russian Tsarist empire. It was seen as the first state governed by and dominated by Russians, with Ukrainians and Belarusians not being recognized as distinct peoples. The Soviet view basically endorsed this idea. It only departed from it to the extent that the inhabitants of the Kyiv Rus' state were seen as East Slavs, who consisted of proto-Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians. Soviet historians acknowledged these proto-Ukranians as having been a separate people since the fourteenth century, but asserted that the one and only aim of the Ukrainians was to be reunified with their "elder" Russian brethren. For them, the Pereiaslav Treaty of 1654, in which the Cossack Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi recognized the suzerainty of the Muscovite Tsar in exchange for autonomy, served as convenient proof of this endeavor. In the Soviet view, the Cossack military campaigns of the sixteenth century thus represented merely an effort to re-unite with Russia, not a national liberation struggle.

Second the contradictions between the Ukrainian and the Russian/Soviet view on history place nation-building architects in a dilemma. On one hand, state officials may find it hard to communicate a radical Ukrainian nationalist version of history that could well be unacceptable to the Russian-speaking population of the East and South, who may still feel themselves part of the Russian cultural world. On the other hand, the propagation of a historical scheme much closer to the Russian/Soviet version would undermine the claim that Ukraine is a territory with a history and population distinct from that of Russia. Given the centrality of this claim for the legitimacy of independent Ukraine, it seems that the latter scheme enjoys little popularity among Ukrainian elites.

THE STRUCTURE OF HISTORY EDUCATION IN SCHOOLS

It is important to note that school education has remained highly centralized in post-independence Ukraine, with schools operating on the programs and recommended textbooks of the Ministry of Education. For the obligatory course of history of Ukraine, the ministry offers schools a small choice of two recommended textbooks per grade, books that are also available in a Russian translation for Russian schools. However, all schools—both Russian and Ukrainian—that the author visited on his fieldwork travels throughout Ukraine use one and the same textbook for a certain grade, because only this particular textbook closely follows the program in structure and content. This uniform use of a limited number of textbooks, which is reminiscent of the Soviet era, facilitates the task of a content analysis, because only a few books have to be same time the widespread use of these books underlines the relevance of analyzing them. One has to keep in mind, however, that no matter how uniform their geographical distribution, their dispersal in time may vary, as the Ministry sometimes issues a limited number of new textbooks for trial in specially selected schools in two of Ukraine's twenty-six oblasti. After having used these books for a year, the teachers give their comments, which (at least in theory) are taken into account and integrated into the new books. Subsequently, these books are distributed to all schools. It further has to be noted that history teachers are now free
to use all sorts of books as additional materials in their lessons. In this respect there has been some structural change.

A COMPARATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS OF HISTORY TEXTBOOKS

Schools in Soviet times also had separate textbooks on history of Ukraine, a subject that was included in the general history course. This enables us to do a comparative content analysis of the old and new textbooks. The advantage of such a comparison is that we can assess the extent to which the current textbooks have departed from the Soviet ones in their presentation of historical events. Topics specifically worthy of attention are Kyiv Rus', the Cossack era, the rise of national consciousness in the late nineteenth century, the attempts to establish independence after the February 1917 revolution, the famine of the 1930s, and World War II and the role of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationals (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). Do the new textbooks portray Ukrainians consistently as victims of Russian/Soviet rule? Is the Bolshevik revolution presented as something foreign and hostile, or is it considered a partly domestically induced turn of events with Ukrainians participating in it? Are Ukraine and its population described as neutral victims of both warring parties in World War II, or are they seen as active participants in the Soviet forces and as subjects of German aggression only? Are the OUN and UPA seen as Ukrainian patriots or as Nazi collaborators?

The following textbooks were used in the Soviet era:


The textbooks used in post-Soviet Ukraine are:

- Grades 7–8: H. Ya Serhienko and V. A. Smolyi, *Istoriia Ukraïny: s drevenishkiv vremen do kontsa XVIII veka* (Kyiv: Osvita, 1985), 256 pp. This is a history of Ukraine from ancient times to the end of the eighteenth century.

It is to these six books that a comparative content analysis will be applied. Two things come immediately to mind when the books are compared. First,
three of the authors (Sarbei, Serhienko and Smolyi) wrote both old and new textbooks. This may indicate the difficulties the Ministry of Education faces in finding experts to write the new textbooks. More important, it may also testify to the ministry's approval of letting scholars associated with the old regime participate in the teaching of a new history of Ukraine. Other postcommunist states were not as tolerant in their treatment of scholars and officials that occupied important positions in the communist era. In East Berlin, for instance, almost all school directors were changed after "Die Wende." Yet, a continuity of personnel need not by itself, of course, stand in the way of a revised content of the history books. Much will depend on the stringency of ministerial prescriptions and on the flexibility of the authors. In view of these considerations, it will be interesting to see to what extent the authors of the Soviet textbooks have adjusted the content of the new books to the new political circumstances.

Second, the study load has increased dramatically. Not only did the number of textbooks expand from two to four in the school period of a pupil, the number of pages of each textbook has also almost doubled.

KYIV' RUS

Beginning with Kyiv Rus', we see that the old textbook for grades 7–8 indeed echoes the Soviet notion of the (pursuit of) unity, brotherhood and friendship of the three East Slavic peoples:

Since the creation of the state [Kyiv Rus'], the differences between the Slavic tribes quickly faded away. Their intensive contacts were greatly aided by the development of the Old Russian language, which was understandable for the whole population of Kyiv Rus'. . . . The Old Russian proto-nation was based on a communality of economic relations, territory, language and culture. In addition to this, certain particularities remained in the language, culture and customs of people living in the northeastern, western and southwestern parts of the territory of Kyiv Rus'. Later these particularities became more pronounced and formed the basis for the evolution of the Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian proto-nations. Subsequently, out of these old Russian proto-nations crystallized the three brotherly nations—Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians, who forever retained a feeling of relatedness, communality and historical unity.13

This passage was thoroughly revised in the new textbook for grades 7–8. Instead, we now read that:

The main state, political, religious and cultural center of Kyiv Rus' developed, of all places, on the territory of present-day Ukraine, and the Slavic tribes living on these lands founded political alliances, constituted the Ukrainian proto-nation, and were at that time the state-building force of Kyiv Rus'. Kyiv, as the historical center of the Ukrainian proto-nation, became the unifying beginning for the other tribes of the Russian lands, as well. For this reason, many scholars consider Kyiv Rus', where the leading role was taken by one ethnic community in particular—the Ukrainian proto-nation, to be a Ukrainian state. . . . Each proto-nation living on the territory of Kyiv Rus' developed in isolation and aspired independent state life. Moreover, as we shall see, the union of East Slavic tribal alliances in the state of Kyiv Rus' was far from voluntary: often the Kyivan kings had to subjugate them by means of military force.14
Claiming that the Ukrainian proto-nation was in fact the ruling people of Kyiv Rus' and stating that many experts label Kyiv Rus' as a Ukrainian state clearly appeal to modern Ukrainian historiography, which considers Kyiv Rus' to be the forerunner of present-day Ukraine. Moreover, in another contrast to the first extract, not the brotherhood but the animosity between the East Slavic proto-nations is stressed. The problematic relationship with Russia is also highlighted when the Russian imperialist view of Kyiv Rus' is implicitly attacked: "All this leads to the proper conclusion that the Russian empire in later times did not have the right to present itself as the sole successor of Kyiv Rus' and to subject Ukraine and Belarus to Tsarist rule." To underline the Ukrainian scheme, Hrushevs'kyi, the doyen of twentieth century Ukrainian historiography, is quoted: "Kyiv Rus' appears to be the first form of Ukrainian statehood."

Another difference with the old textbook is the way the introduction of Christianity is evaluated. Although the new book admits that Christianity strengthened the authoritarian power of the king, it generally appreciates it as a positive phenomenon, bringing civilization, literacy, and culture to Ukraine and giving it closer ties with Western Europe. Later in the book, the Orthodox Church is even mentioned as "the spiritual base of the Ukrainian proto-nation." The Soviet book, in contrast, views Christianity as bringing more harm than good. It is said to have contributed to the "exploitation of the popular masses" by the king and the nobles and to have been unable to stop the feudal quarrels, which significantly weakened Kyiv Rus'. Moreover, literacy is claimed to have preceded Christianity.

In addition to these differences, the books also show remarkable similarities. For example, much of the content of the old book was copied literally in the new book, especially—and quite surprisingly—the section on the origin of the names Rus' and Russkaia zemlia as alternative names for the Kyivan state. Like the old book, the new book (in its Russian translation) simply uses the adjectival form russkii (Russian) in, for instance, Russkaia zemlia. Although Serbyn argues that russkii is indeed the appropriate adjective for Rus' in the Russian language, the term could lead to confusion, because it refers to things ethnically Russian in normal usage. The pupils reading the Russian translation could thus interpret Russkaia zemlia as "Russian land," (i.e., the land inhabited by ethnic Russians). Surely this is not the interpretation the Ministry of Education would like pupils to make. Moreover, as Serbyn points out, the terms russkii and rossiiskii (the adjective for Rossiia—Russia) are often used interchangeably in Russian literature, which undermines the distinction between Russia and Rus'. In view of the confusion russkii evokes, it seems strange the authors did not choose (or invent) another Russian term as an adjective for Rus'. Incidentally, the Ukrainian equivalent—rus'kiy—does not lead to misunderstandings as it only refers to Rus' and not to Russia or Russian ethnicity—the adjective for the latter two being rosiis'kyi.

A second remarkable similarity concerns the new book's focus on issues of social injustice and class conflict. Mimicking the old book, the new book asserts that "the king and nobles conquered community land and acres and violently forced the peasant serfs not only to pay tribute but also to work a certain amount of days on their country estates," and that "the city poor paid the king heavy
taxes, fulfilled several duties and had to maintain churches and monasteries. The most cruel exploitation was suffered by the serfs, who did not own land.\textsuperscript{22} It continues, "Profitiers and merchants thrived on the destruction and poverty of the people. All this led to explosions of popular rage."\textsuperscript{23} These and other excerpts show that the new book was still to a certain extent written in a spirit of class conflict. Given that the authors (Serhiienko and Smolyi) of the new edition were also coauthors of the Soviet book, one has to conclude that they certainly did not change all of their historical views with the arrival of Ukraine's independence.

THE COSSACK ERA AND HETMAN IVAN MEZEPÄ

The account of the Zaporizhzhian Cossacks, the Pereiaslav Treaty, and the controversial Cossack leader Mazepa in the Soviet textbook is predictably in line with the Soviet scheme of Ukrainian history. In brief, it argues that in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Ukrainian popular masses were suppressed by Polish nobles and Tatar warlords, and that due to the courageous military campaigns of the Cossacks (free farmer-soldiers who had fled serfdom) and the unconditional support of their Russian brethren, the Ukrainians managed to cast off the foreign yoke and realize their long-cherished dream of uniting with Russia. Mazepa, the Cossack Hetman who in the early eighteenth century sided with Charles XII from Sweden in his power struggle with Russia's Peter I, is depicted as a traitor who received only minimal support from his own troops. In particular the making of the Pereiaslav Agreement of 1654, which united the Cossack lands with Russia in exchange for autonomy, is exalted as a wonderful display of Russian-Ukrainian friendship: "Along the whole way the population of Ukraine greeted the ambassadors of the brotherly Russian people with festivities and happiness. . . . All the participants of the council unanimously voted for the union of the brotherly nations into one state. . . . The oath [that all forever be one] was supported by the whole Ukrainian nation."\textsuperscript{24}

In its discussion of early modern times, the old textbook continues to stress social issues. It contends that only during the war of liberation of 1648–1654 did the "popular masses" of peasants and lower-class Cossacks manage to abolish serfdom and take large areas of land for their own use. Very soon afterward, the Cossack higher circles (the so-called starshyna) "began attacking the social conquests of the laborers."\textsuperscript{25} With the passing of time, peasants and workers, it is argued, were deprived of more and more rights and were pushed back to serfdom and conditions of slavery. The book considers the destruction of the Zaporizhzhian Sich, the most important Cossack stronghold, by Tsarina Catherine II in 1775, as another lamentable victory of the Tsarist regime over the "revolutionary anti-feudal" forces. No reference is made to the Zaporizhzhian Cossacks or to the several peasant uprisings of the eighteenth century as specific Ukrainian phenomena. Similarly, the book makes no mention of the Ukrainian language, leaving the reader mystified about its fate. Only on two occasions does the book give examples of a specific cultural interference by foreign powers: "[in eighteenth-century Polish-held Ukraine] Ukrainian schools, which were persecuted by the Catholic church and the royal powers, led a pitiful exis-
tence,"\textsuperscript{26} while "German, Austrian and Hungarian nobles introduced languages that were foreign to the Ukrainian people."\textsuperscript{27} Thus, if we are to believe this book, only powers other than Russia culturally oppressed Ukrainians.

Understandably, the new textbook has a rather different view on the events of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Liberation War is presented not only as a social but also as a national uprising, with the Cossacks identified as Ukrainian freedom fighters who attempted to shed Polish rule and found an independent Ukrainian state. It follows that the Pereiaslav Treaty with Russia is described as an unfortunate but necessary event, as it meant that the young Cossack state had to surrender some authority in order to safeguard the attainments of the Liberation War:

The Pereiaslav Treaty and the subordination to Russia was not at all a coincidental step, but a painful decision by Hetman [Khmel'nyts'kyi] after long contemplation. He realized that the temporary respite for the young Ukrainian state could not be long, taking into account the temporary nature of the alliance with the Crimean Khan, the unreliability of the Sultan of Turkey and the still powerful Polish kingdom.\textsuperscript{28}

To justify why in particular Russia was chosen as a protector, the book says that "Ukraine and Russia were bound together by long historical ties, the ethnic closeness of both peoples and the orthodox faith."\textsuperscript{29}

A similar, rather subtle account is given of Hetman Mazepa. Calling him neither a traitor nor a national hero, the book presents him as an educated man who came to his decision after much deliberation: "restlessness and contradicting feelings tore his soul."\textsuperscript{30} The increasing demands of the Tsar on the Hetman to deliver soldiers and food, the high tax burden on the peasants and on the lower-ranking Cossacks and the lack of respect with which the Tsarist governors treated the Cossacks are seen as the direct causes for the switch in Mazepa’s allegiance. Yet the textbook does not leave unmentioned that Mazepa received only minimal support from the Ukrainian people and that the population began resisting the pillaging army of Charles XII (as in the old book, there is an account of how bravely the citizens of L'viv defended their city against the Swedes). This rather balanced version of the Mazepa years is surprising if one realizes that nation-building architects could use Hetman Mazepa to present evidence of the "eternal endeavor of the Ukrainian nation to achieve state independence."

Another, perhaps remarkable aspect of the new edition is that Ukraine under Cossack rule is not idealized. In a straight copy from the old book, the social situation that developed after 1654 is criticized, with the Cossacks higher circles being accused of enriching themselves at the expense of the lower classes by taking much of their lands and increasing their duties. Similarly, examples can be found of the terminology that can typically be associated with a Soviet account of history: "toiling masses,"\textsuperscript{31} "social oppression," "exploitation by entrepreneurs," and "social struggle of the laboring masses."\textsuperscript{32}

Yet, in clear contrast to the Soviet textbook, the new book does address the issue of the Ukrainian language. More than once it mentions how in the eighteenth century the Ukrainian language was pushed out of the public domain by a conscious policy of Russification on left-bank Ukraine, and of Polonization on
right-bank Ukraine: “the spiritual state of mind of the community was negatively affected by the policy of Russification, which was enforced by the Tsarist government”\textsuperscript{33} and “Gradually, the Ukrainian language was driven not only from the administration, but also from literature and from schools. In its place, Russian was introduced everywhere.”\textsuperscript{34} Interestingly, by focusing on the introduction of Russian and Polish on Ukrainian territory by neighboring powers, the book clearly implies that these languages are foreign to Ukrainians and that only the Ukrainian language can rightfully be called a constituent element of Ukrainian national identity. Although this stance strongly supports the claim of Ukrainian distinctiveness, it may also lead to feelings of estrangement among Russian-speaking pupils, as they might start to ask themselves whether they are in fact true Ukrainians if they speak the language of the “elder brother.”

THE AWAKENING OF THE UKRAINIAN NATION IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

As expected, the old Soviet textbook interprets the growing dissatisfaction with Tsarist rule in Ukraine in the second half of the nineteenth century as, above all, a class struggle of the Ukrainian proletariat and peasantry against the bourgeoisie and the nobility. Nonetheless, the old textbook argues that, as a result of the development of capitalism, the Ukrainian “capitalist” nation came into being: “Because of the development of capitalism, the accelerated process of the economic, territorial, linguistic and cultural unification of the population of the Ukrainian lands created the conditions for the completion of the long process of the formation of the Ukrainian nation.”\textsuperscript{35} The book continues by contending that the Ukrainian nation can truly be called capitalist, with all its inherent conflicts, since there were many Ukrainians, either Ukrainian or Russian speaking, that entered the ranks of the industrial-commercial bourgeoisie. Consequently, it is argued, these Ukrainians found themselves in a class struggle with fellow Ukrainians of the lower classes. The book claims that local Ukrainian dialects gradually merged into a literary and nationwide language and that the evolution of this language was greatly aided by the works of the classical authors of Ukrainian literature. These authors, Taras Shevchenko and Ivan Franko especially, are portrayed as anti-Tsarist/Habsburg (not anti-Russian) social revolutionaries.

Quite surprisingly, the old textbook does mention the Tsarist crackdown on the Ukrainian language and culture: “by means of a special order, Tsar Alexander II prohibited the publication of books in the Ukrainian language, and theatre plays for a Ukrainian audience could only be performed in Ukraine by special permission of the governor.”\textsuperscript{36} Yet, the old textbook fails to note that as a consequence of this Tsarist ban there may have been pronounced not only anti-Tsarist sentiments among Ukrainian intelligentsia circles, but also a strong desire to separate from Russia and found an independent Ukrainian state. Instead, the book takes every opportunity to underlie the “eternal striving of the Ukrainian nation to unite with their Russian brethren.” In this respect, the Galician writer Ivan Franko is singled out as a “great revolutionary democrat” that dedicated his life and works to the unification of the West Ukrainian popu-
lation (which was under Austrian rule) with the Tsarist-ruled Ukrainians "within the structure of Russia." The textbook quotes him as saying that "we love the Russian people and wish it all the best, we love and learn its language."³⁷

In contrast to the old Soviet textbook, the new book (for the ninth grade) attributes the awakening of the Ukrainian nation not to the growth of capitalist economic relations but to the abolition of serfdom and the incessant efforts of the Ukrainian intelligentsia to spread the Ukrainian national idea among the peasantry. These peasants are regarded as the "bearers of the ethnic features of the Ukrainian nation,"³⁸ and the Ukrainian language as the "Cementing force of unity of the national culture."³⁹ In fact, the new textbook argues that imperialism and capitalism actually frustrated the consolidation of the Ukrainian nation and the creation of a national economy. It states that "The road to a normal development of the Ukrainian nation was closed because of the merciless colonizing exploitation of the national economies of the Russian and Austrian-Hungarian empires."⁴⁰ To illustrate this point, the new textbook contends that Ukraine traded at an unfavorable exchange rate with Russia, exchanging cheap raw materials for expensive finished products. Moreover, it is asserted that the trade sector in Ukraine fell almost completely into the hands of Russians, Jews, Armenians, and Greeks, "who often did not operate as civilized merchants, but as barbaric-predatory wholesale buyers and sellers."⁴¹ Thus, the new book refutes the old textbook's claim that Ukrainians participated in the emerging bourgeoisie.

Not surprisingly, the new textbook sees the particular Tsarist policy towards the Ukrainian language and culture as another obstacle to the development of the Ukrainian nation. In a full four pages, the new textbook recounts how the Tsar successively issued orders forbidding Ukrainian textbooks, education, literature, theatre plays, and songs, and how the imperial authorities started persecuting members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia. A last impediment to the full realization of Ukrainian nationhood is seen in the Russian-Austrian border, which separated Ukrainians into two halves and significantly hampered their economic, political, and cultural ties.

Proceeding from the carefully reasoned economic and cultural "exploitation" of the Ukrainian lands by foreign peoples and powers, the new book considers the anti-Tsarist movement of the late nineteenth century to be not only social-revolutionary in character but also, and above all, national-emancipatory in outlook. It provides eleven pages on a discussion of the Ukrainian intelligentsia circles in both the Russian and the Austrian empire and describes how these intellectuals sought to disseminate the idea of an independent Ukrainian state under the threat of deportation. Yet, in an echo of the old textbook, the new volume concedes that the advocates of Ukrainian independence were much inspired by the revolutionary appeal of Marxism. In a similar vein, using typical Soviet phraseology, the new textbook more than once recalls how the Ukrainian peasants and laborers were exploited by foreign nobles and industrials.

Comparing the two textbooks, we can conclude that, despite being written by one and the same author, the old and the new volume show remarkable contrasts in their accounts of the late nineteenth century. As we have seen, these contradictions concern the participation of Ukrainians in "the oppressing
classes” and the particular outlook of the Ukrainian intellectual circles. However, the differences with the old textbook notwithstanding, the new book to a significant extent continues the Soviet tradition of interpreting historical events in a materialist way.

THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION AND THE UKRAINIANIZATION OF THE 1920s

In the Soviet textbook for grades nine and ten, the narrative on the October revolution and the ensuing Bolshevik conquest of Ukraine is equally straightforward. The Bolsheviks are presented as heroes who liberated the Ukrainian workers and peasants from the tyranny of the bourgeoisie, the nobles, and the Central Rada that took control over most of Ukraine in the months after the revolution and demanded an autonomous status for Ukraine within a federal Russia. The participation of the Ukrainian proletariat in the revolution is stressed more than once. The rebellion of the Arsenal factory workers in enemy-occupied Kyiv is given as a particularly illustrative example: “The Arsenal workers fought bravely, although there was not enough ammunition and food. Women and children helped by providing the workers with food and first aid equipment for the seriously wounded, which were brought in under heavy fire.” Yet the old textbook admits that the transition to Bolshevik power was not always easy. It even concedes that in a number of city soviets the Bolsheviks captured only a minority of seats:

In Ukraine the struggle for the victory of the proletarian revolution met with different rates of success in the various regions, and depended on the actual class relationships. Thus, Soviet power was established without armed struggle in the Donbas, where the Bolsheviks predominated in the soviets and the proletariat was more organized. But a fierce and tense battle evolved in Kharkiv, Ekaterinoslav (Dnipropetrov's'k), Vinnytsia and Odessa, where the majority of seats in the soviets was captured by Mensheviks, SR's (Socialist Revolutionaries) and bourgeois nationalists.43

There is also an implicit acknowledgment that initially not all of Ukraine’s workers supported the Bolsheviks until they confirmed the right of the Ukrainian people for self-determination up to the point of secession. This was described as “encouraging the workers of Ukraine to take the side of the Bolshevik party.”44

Quite noteworthy is the old book’s complete omission of the Bolshevik-induced Ukrainianization campaign of the 1920s. Although there is mention of the mass-scale operation to combat illiteracy, there is no reference to the indigenization of administrative and party executives or to the growing number of Ukrainian-language schools, vuzy (institutions of higher education), and periodicals. On the other hand, the book does report the communist alternative to the Tsarist “cultural oppression.” It discloses that “On the tenth session [of the Russian Communist Party] much attention was paid to the national question. The October Revolution had proclaimed the equality of all nations inhabiting Russia. The task consisted of eliminating the economic and cultural arrears of the nations that had been oppressed by the Tsars.”45
The question that comes to mind is why the book fails to address the Ukrainianization of the 1920s when it could serve as an outstanding illustration of the proclaimed endeavor to establish the equality of all Soviet nations. Considering the time the book was published—1987, the year that saw the beginning of national revival movements in the Baltics—one could postulate that the Soviet educational authorities wanted to direct attention away from the sensitive nationality issue. Another reason could be that educational powers sought to make pupils believe that from day one of the existence of the Soviet Union the constituent nations were actually in the process of merging into a larger Soviet nation. A confirmation of this argument can be found:

The common economy and culture, which was international in spirit and character, provided the conditions for an intensification of the friendship and brotherly cooperation of the Soviet Republics. This contributed to the creation of a new historical community of people—the Soviet Nation.\(^{46}\)

As could be expected, the new edition for the tenth grade presents an entirely different picture of the Bolshevik period. The Bolshevik ideal of absolute equality, social harmony, and economic prosperity is portrayed as a utopian dream for which there was not even enough support among the population of Russia. It is also seen as an ideological movement \textit{foreign} to Ukraine, as reportedly only a small minority of Ukrainians sided with the Bolsheviks. Very cleverly, the book quotes V. Zatonskii, an early Bolshevik leader, as saying that “The Bolshevik party had the Russian or Russified proletariat as its backbone.”\(^{47}\)

The book continues by asserting that given these circumstances, Soviet power could be established only by force in Ukraine. To underline this, it is stressed that, “the social base of the Bolsheviks was weak, and their authority insignificant,”\(^{48}\) with the sole exception of the Donbas where the Bolsheviks captured power peacefully. Moreover, to corroborate the claim that the Central \textit{Rada} was the only political body that legitimately represented the Ukrainian population, the book discloses the results of the November 1917 elections for the first session, which purportedly show that the Ukrainian national parties captured about 75% of the votes, while the Bolsheviks received only 10%.

Yet, the Central \textit{Rada} is also criticized for not addressing the critical issue of land reform. Although it is admitted that a radical redistribution of land would have had disastrous consequences for agrarian productivity, its postponement is seen as the principal reason why the rural poor turned its back on the Central \textit{Rada}. Interestingly, by quoting the historian Viacheslav Lypins’kyi, who “with bitterness stated that the ‘notion of Ukraine’... was replaced by the notion of the ‘desiatina zemli’ [a specific measure of land],”\(^{49}\) the book quite explicitly acknowledges that a Ukrainian national consciousness appears to have been quite shallow among the peasantry. Likewise, it is conceded that most of the \textit{urban} poor chose the Bolshevik side. The textbook even mentions the Arsenal uprising and how it contributed to the defeat of the army of the Central \textit{Rada} in its defense of Kyiv. Taken as a whole, however, the work maintains its position that the arrival of Soviet power in Ukraine is deplorable, accusing the Bolsheviks of eliminating democracy, indulging in cruel terror, persecuting Ukrainian culture, and confiscating food and other products. It ends a section with a strong
condemnation: “the establishment of Bolshevik power in Ukraine, by means of deceit, violence and direct interference from abroad, inevitably had to become and became the object of nationwide opposition.”

Given the new textbooks’ preoccupation with the Ukrainian language—the book for the ninth grade even explicitly states that “the membership of which [the Ukrainian nation] was above all determined by the native [i.e., Ukrainian] language” — it is interesting to see how the Ukrainianization of the 1920s is portrayed. Yet, the book for the tenth grade is ambiguous about this period. On the one hand, Ukrainianization is appreciated, as it “attracted many representatives of the national intelligentsia to the process of cultural rebuilding, who sincerely attempted to serve the nation and to contribute to its social-economic and spiritual revival.” In a similar manner, the book values achievements such as the reduction of illiteracy, the increase of Ukrainian-language schools, vuzy and publications, and the mass admission of Ukrainians into the student population. On the other hand, it is argued that Ukrainianization was not strong enough to have a lasting impact on the language regime in the most important sphere of public life, the Communist Party bureaucracy, where Russian remained the dominant language. However, the harshest criticism on the policy of Ukrainianization was that its initiators did not see it as a goal in itself:

From the very first beginning this process was subordinated . . . to the construction of a culture on the ideological foundation of Marxism. Ukrainianization . . . was only permitted to the extent that it did not collide with the interests and ideological orientations of the leadership of the highest state and party organs.

THE COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE AND THE 1930s FAMINE

Obviously, the old and the new textbook completely differ in their narratives of the collectivization of agriculture and its consequences. The Soviet textbook appreciates the collectivization drive as the campaign that broke the last elements of capitalist, anti-revolutionary resistance. It argues that “The socialist restructuring of the countryside eliminated the class stratification of the peasantry, humiliation, and poverty,” and it claims that people valued the expression that “people live well on those places where they sow and harvest together.” The kulaks are blamed for all the wrongs on the collective farms: the low morale of the workers, the lack of discipline, theft and sabotage of Kolkhoz/Sovkhoz property, and even terror against party activists and farm personnel. Yet there is an acknowledgment that the authorities were responsible for certain excesses as well: “In some places, the principle of voluntary cooperation was violated. . . The exaggerations in the Kolkhoz campaign led to dissatisfaction among some peasants, which had a negative influence on the solidarity of the union of the working class with the peasantry.” The book is quick to point out that the Communist Party took appropriate measures to prevent similar mistakes from happening again. However, it is completely silent about the consequence of these “exaggerations”—the 1930s Famine.
As would be expected, the new textbook strongly condemns the collectivization and the ensuing famine. It asserts that the former can be equated with a “pillaging of the countryside,”57 which served to speed up industrialization. Detailed accounts are given of the confiscation of food and private property, of the forceful incorporation of peasants into kolkhozes, and of the dramatic decline in production levels. All this is said to have resulted in the artificial famine of 1932–1933, which is characterized as “One of the most cruel crimes organized by Stalinism against the Ukrainian nation.”58 The book even claims that the authorities deliberately induced the famine to crush the resistance of peasants and nationalist forces. To substantiate this statement, the textbook quotes a communist official who reportedly said, “A bloody war is fought between the peasants and our powers. This is a war of life and death. This year was a test of our strength and their endurance. The hunger showed them who is the boss here. It cost millions of lives, but the kolkhoz system will exist forever. We won the war.”59 Nonetheless, the book does not go so far as to accuse the authorities of specifically targeting the Ukrainians with the famine, as it discloses how the hunger affected not only the Ukrainian lands but also other regions of intensive agriculture, such as the northern Caucasus, the Kuban and Volga regions, and northern Kazakhstan.

WORLD WAR II AND THE ROLE OF THE ORGANIZATION OF UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS (OUN)

In its account of World War II, the Soviet textbook pictures the Ukrainians as a people that greatly suffered from the German occupational regime and who supported and participated in the Soviet army’s struggle against the “fascist aggressor.” For instance, to give the impression that the people of Western Ukraine welcomed the Soviet invasion of Poland in September 1939, the book reports the local population as saying that “when the Red Army crossed the river Zbruch, the sun started shining over the Galicians.”60 It is stressed that Ukrainians, both on Soviet territory and in other countries, both as partisans and as regular Soviet Army servicemen, courageously fought on the Soviet side to defeat the German occupiers:

Under terrible wartime conditions, the Ukrainian people together with all nations of the USSR honorably fulfilled its holy obligation towards the Socialist Fatherland. For their participation in the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945, about 2.5 million Ukrainian servicemen were awarded with combat medals and more than a thousand among them were granted the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.61

The book pays remarkably little attention to the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), a branch the Stepan Bandera wing of which fought both the Soviet and the German armies. It states only briefly that the German forces relied on, “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists, former Kulaks and criminals . . . for the pillaging of the Ukrainian lands.”62 The Uniate Church in Western Ukraine, under Metropolitan Andriy Sheptyts’kyi, is singled out as having particularly ardently collaborated with the Germans. According to the book, it played an active role in the creation of the fascist army division SS-Halychyna.
The new textbook's version of World War II matches the Soviet version on two occasions. The first concerns the presentation of the Soviet invasion in Poland: in an echo of the Soviet volume, it is argued that the "West Ukrainian population met the Red Army with enthusiasm and hope." However, the new edition is quick to point out that this reaction was quite understandable in view of the preceding period of Polish oppression and the widespread Soviet propaganda, which explained the Soviet attack as a successful attempt to ward off a German occupation of Galicia. It holds that this sympathy quickly turned into hate once the Soviets started disbanding political parties and cultural associations and began persecuting members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia. The second case of resemblance between the Soviet and post-Soviet volumes constitutes the presentation of life in the German occupied zone, which is reported to be full of suffering and hardship: "It [the German occupation] brought such agony, terror on such a scale . . . that the recent Soviet past appeared almost like paradise."

Nonetheless, the pronounced contradictions of the Soviet scheme of events are most conspicuous. One of these pertains to the participation of Ukrainians in the Soviet army. In contrast to the Soviet textbook, the new book is completely silent about the inclusion of large numbers of Ukrainians in the regular Soviet forces, although it does admit that many Ukrainians were active as partisans in the Soviet underground. Similarly, the narrative on the OUN is entirely different. Upon reading it one obtains the impression that the new textbook makes a conscious effort to rehabilitate this organization — and its military wing, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) — as it dedicates many pages (eight out of a total of thirty that deal with World War II) to the Bandera-led underground wing, which turned against the German army in the early stages of the war. The volume emphasizes a secret German order of December 1941 that reportedly said that "Except for the OUN-Bandera group, there is not one resistance movement in Ukraine that is capable of presenting a serious danger to us." The book even claims that the OUN-Bandera forces were far more effective in combating the Germans than the Soviet underground. In addition to this, the OUN is portrayed as an organization that embraced democratic values (freedom of speech, press, and religion, and the equality of all nationalities living on Ukrainian territory). In another contrast with the Soviet textbook, no mention is made of any possible collaboration between the Uniate Church and the Germans. The new book only acknowledges that another wing of the OUN, headed by Andriy Melnyk, did cooperate with the Germans, as it mentions that the Melnyk branch supported the creation of the Waffen SS Halychyna division.

It is perhaps surprising to find the new account of World War II differing so radically from the old version. The complete lack of any reference to the participation of Ukrainians in the Soviet Army is likely to give these veterans the impression that they are denied a role as the liberators of Ukraine. Moreover, the attempt to rehabilitate the OUN and UPA could give veterans the idea that this new historiography actually portrays them as the "bad guys," who, as servicemen of a foreign army, fought the "good guys" of the OUN and UPA. What is more, this perception of having been part of a foreign army is actually reinforced by excerpts in the book that accuse the Soviet authorities, after their re-
capture of the Ukrainian lands, of forcefully confiscating food and other products, sending millions of Ukrainian youth to the front as cannon fodder, and reestablishing the totalitarian regime of the past. To make matters even worse, the new book says the following:

After the 20th session of the CPSU (in 1956), it became known that (Jozef) Stalin had very seriously considered a plan to deport all Ukrainians, in addition to Crimean Tatars, Kalmyks and some Caucasian peoples. And, as (Nikita) Khrushchev remarked . . . the only reason that this had not happened was that there were too many Ukrainians, there were no places to send them to, otherwise Stalin would have deported them too.

Clearly, this extract leaves the reader no other impression than that the Soviet army was part of a regime that was alien and hostile to Ukraine and Ukrainians.

CONCLUSION

The Ukrainian government clearly considers history to be a vital tool for the nation-building project. This is a conclusion one has to arrive at judging from the costly but successful distribution of the new history textbooks to the farthest corners of Ukraine and the significantly increased study load these books represent. The standardization of history teaching, with all (types of) schools using the same textbooks, is another sign that education in the national history is a serious matter for the authorities.

The Ukrainian state ideology toward nation and state reveals itself in the content of history textbooks. Five conclusions can be made about this content. First, the new accounts of Ukrainian history are clearly more balanced than the version laid down in the Soviet editions. The new textbooks, for instance, do not hesitate to point to the shortcomings, especially in the socioeconomic sphere, of the regimes that are seen as the predecessors of contemporary Ukraine (i.e., Kyiv Rus', the Cossack state, and the different governments attempting to found an independent Ukrainian state after the Bolshevik revolution). The Soviet editions lack this element of self-criticism.

Second, the Soviet textbooks miss a certain individuality of character. Among the new textbooks, there is a quite a difference between the book for grades 7–8 and that for grade 10. Whereas the book for grades 7–8 dedicates many pages to class conflict and uses some of the terminology and even whole extracts from the old textbook, the book for grade 10 presents a chronicle of Ukrainian history that sharply contrasts with the old version on most points. It appears, therefore, that the educational authorities in postindependence Ukraine granted the authors of schoolbooks more individual freedom of maneuver than the authorities of the Soviet times did. This comparison of books also shows us that Serhiienko and Smolyi, as the authors of the new book for grades 7–8, did not change all the content and outlook of the old textbook. One can therefore conclude that the continuity of personnel (remember that both authors also wrote the Soviet textbook) did indeed result in a perpetuation of content and interpretation. In this light, it may not be a coincidence that the present educational authorities ordered that the textbooks dealing with twentieth-century history be written by new authors. They may well have considered the modern pe-
riod too crucial, and too sensitive for authors associated with the old regime (notably Sarbei) to write them.

Third, the old and the new editions diverge most strongly in their accounts of matters that are related to the sensitive topics of Ukrainian national identity or Ukrainian statehood. The old textbooks, for instance, hardly touch upon the issue of the Ukrainian language, and when they do, it is only to accuse other imperial powers (Poland, Tsarist Russia, and Austria-Hungary) of culturally subduing the Ukrainians. In fact, the old book for grades 9–10 is completely silent about the fate of the Ukrainian language in Soviet times. In the new books, on the other hand, the Ukrainian language is a much-discussed topic. It is asserted that the Ukrainian language is the principal determinant of Ukrainian national identity, and it is implied that Russian and Polish are foreign languages, introduced by neighboring powers bent on eliminating the use of Ukrainian in public spheres.59

Fourth, another noteworthy difference of opinion concerns the degree of involvement of Ukrainians in the Bolshevik conquest of Ukraine and in the Soviet army fight against the German invaders. According to the Soviet textbook, Ukrainians fully participated in both struggles, side by side with their Russian “brethren.” The message the book sends is clear: the Bolshevik revolution is as much a Ukrainian phenomenon as a Russian one, and it further strengthened the “bonds of friendship between the two brotherly nations.” In contrast, the new textbook argues that only a small minority of Ukrainians supported the Bolshevik revolution, and it makes no mention of Ukrainians as regular Soviet army servicemen. Consequently, the new edition portrays the Bolshevik regime as a foreign power, in which Ukrainians had no part. Moreover, its hostility toward the Ukrainians is stressed, as the book seizes every opportunity to discredit the Soviet regime.

Finally, an important contrast can be also found in the narratives on the role of the OUN in World War II. While the Soviet textbook considers the OUN a “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist” organization that “shamelessly” collaborated with the Nazis, the new book makes a calculated effort to rehabilitate the OUN. Among other things, it presents the Bandera-led wing of the OUN as an underground group that combated the Germans quite effectively and stood up for democratic values and the ideal of an independent Ukrainian state.

To a certain extent, the particular version of history advanced by the new textbooks is understandable. After all, the emphasis on Ukrainian as the sole native language, on the Bolshevik regime as a foreign power, and on the OUN as a genuine national liberation movement firmly upholds claims of Ukrainian distinctiveness. However, at the same time, this version runs the risk of alienating both the Russian-speaking part of the population and people who cherish the Soviet past, such as Soviet army veterans. The former are likely to ask themselves whether they can ever call themselves—and be accepted as—authentic Ukrainians if they continue to speak Russian. The latter may very well take the new historiography as an insult, because it degrades the status of Soviet army veterans. They used to be portrayed as soldiers who “courageously fought to liberate Ukraine from fascist occupation” but are now presented as soldiers who “contributed to the reinstitution of a foreign and oppressive regime that denied
the Ukrainian nation its sacred right of self-determination." An intriguing question for further study, therefore, is whether Russian-speakers and people with communist sympathies will accept the new scheme of history (in which their children are being instructed) or will reject it.

NOTES


2. Stephan Velychenko argues that the "poorer, authoritarian" societies "east of the Elbe" assign much greater weight to national historiography than the "wealthier, pluralist and constitutional societies" of the West. In his view, this is because the eastern societies consider national identity, which heavily relies on historiography, an end in itself, rather than a means to pursue their material interests. Thus, "insofar as historiography preserves collective national memory, it becomes essential for group survival [for the societies of the East] (p. 18)." See Stephan Velychenko, Shaping Identity in Eastern Europe and Russia: Soviet-Russian and Polish Accounts of Ukrainian History, 1914–1991 (New York: St. Martin's, 1993).

The discussion on the use of historiography is a reflection of the wider debate on the distinction between an ethnic and a civic variety of nationalism. According to Kuzio, this distinction serves no empirical purpose since historically both varieties have become intricately intertwined in the nation-building programs of liberal democratic states, homogenizing the societies internally and accentuating the differences between these societies. See T. Kuzio, "'Nationalizing States' or Nation Building: A Review of the Theoretical Literature and Empirical Evidence," Nations and Nationalism, vol. 7, part 2, pp. 135-154 and "Europe or Eurasia? The Ideology of 'Kuchnism': A Review Article," Journal of Ukrainian Studies 22, nos. 1–2 (Summer–Winter 1997), pp. 145–163.


In a comment on this paper Kuzio argued that it is inappropriate to consider language to be the main cleavage in Ukrainian society. In his opinion, political attitude and generation are at least as important dividing lines, with reform-minded people and the younger generation (who are generally pro-Western, anticommunist, and proreform in outlook) much more likely to support the Ukrainian scheme of events than people with communist sympathies and the elderly. See T. Kuzio, "Defining the Political Community

6. Naturally, the Russian imperial and Soviet versions of history are not any less nationalist than the Ukrainian scheme as they also served to forge specific national identities. I owe this point to Joanna Paraszczuk.

7. In Soviet times, the history of Ukraine was taught as part of a general history course.

8. See *Informatsiiniyi Zbirnyk Ministerstva Osvity Ukrainy*, no. 12, 1996. This issue presents a list of recommended textbooks for order.

9. In the years 1996, 1997, and 1998, the author made several fieldwork trips to the cities of Kyiv, Odessa, L'viv, and Donets'k. In each of these cities, he visited twelve schools and simply asked the teachers to show him the books that were used. On one of these travels, Simferopol, the capital of the Crimea, was visited. To the author's surprise, even the schools there had begun to use the programs and recommended textbooks of the Ministry of Education. The efforts to consolidate the state thus appear successful (at least in the sphere of education), which is remarkable given the depth of the economic crisis.


11. Grades 7, 8, 9, and 10 in the Soviet era equal grades 8, 9, 10, and 11 of post-Soviet Ukraine, respectively. The attentive reader will have noticed that titles are given in a transcription from Russian. This is because the author read the Russian translations. Remarkably, the Russian translation of the grade 11 textbook has a section on the Ukrainian diaspora, which the Ukrainian original does not have. No reason is given for the inclusion of this section in the Russian translation.

12. Interview with Frank den Hertog, Ph.D. candidate at the AGIDS research institute of the University of Amsterdam, February 1999. In Ukraine, the author found significant personnel changes only in the schools in the Western Ukrainian city of L'viv.

13. Sarbei et al., grades 7–8, p. 19.

14. Serhienko and Smolyi, grades 7–8, p. 47.

15. Ibid., pp. 75, 76.

16. Ibid., p. 76.

17. Ibid., p. 97.


19. Ibid., p. 7.

20. Ibid., p. 7.

21. Serhienko and Smolyi, grades 7–8, p. 49.

22. Ibid., p. 53.

23. Ibid., p. 61.

24. Sarbei et al., grades 7–8, p. 64.

25. Ibid., p. 70.

26. Ibid., p. 102.

27. Ibid., p. 101.

28. Serhienko and Smolyi, grades 7–8, p. 169.

29. Ibid., p. 169.

30. Serhienko and Smolyi, grades 7–8, p. 203.

31. Ibid., p. 195.

32. Ibid., p. 236.

33. Ibid., p. 197.
34. Ibid., p. 243.
35. Sarbei et al., grades 7–8, p. 144.
36. Ibid., p. 155.
37. Ibid., p. 144.
38. Sarbei, grade 9, p. 104.
39. Ibid., p. 106.
40. Ibid., p. 107.
41. Ibid., p. 108.
42. Sarbei and Spytskyi, grades 9–10, p. 48.
43. Ibid., p. 45.
44. Ibid., p. 47.
45. Ibid., p. 74.
46. Ibid., p. 96.
47. Turchenko, grade 10, p. 35.
48. Ibid., p. 36.
49. Ibid., p. 41. The land measure refers to the heated debate on whether estates of less than 40 desiatina would be subject to redistribution as well.
50. Ibid., p. 58.
52. Turchenko, grade 10, p. 194.
53. Ibid.
54. Sarbei and Spytskyi, grades 9–10, p. 87.
55. Ibid., p. 85.
56. Ibid., p. 87.
57. Turchenko, grade 10, p. 221.
58. Ibid., p. 225.
59. Ibid., p. 227.
60. Sarbei and Spytskyi, grades 9–10, p. 105.
61. Ibid., p. 124.
62. Ibid., p. 113.
63. Turchenko, grade 10, p. 278.
64. Ibid., p. 296.
65. Ibid., p. 302.
66. Ibid., p. 316.
67. Ibid., pp. 310, 311.
68. Ibid., p. 325.
69. Motyl asserts that after independence Ukrainian elites began propagating the image of the Ukrainian nation as a multiethnic people that has internalized the Cossack-ascribed values of freedom, equality, and democracy. See Alexander J. Motyl, Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), p. 84. Although the spread of this image may have occurred in some policy areas, it certainly, as we have seen, has not touched the teaching of history in schools. Instead, a rather narrow conception of the Ukrainian nation is communicated; it is implied that only those who speak Ukrainian are “real Ukrainians.” The new textbooks make no reference to particular Cossack virtues as constituent elements of Ukrainian national identity.
Conclusion: Regionalism and Nation Building in a Divided Society
Nancy Popson

The chapters collected in this volume present various perspectives on the role of the state in Ukraine's identity politics. They provide a range of answers to questions of the nature and implications of cleavages in Ukrainian society and the role of the state in dealing with those cleavages. As noted by D'Anieri in his introduction, this volume does not attempt to give definitive answers to these questions. Rather, the authors and editors have aimed to provide empirical data and analysis that can be used to clarify the issues at hand and indicate where further research may be necessary. This final chapter will therefore not draw conclusions per se, but will illustrate how the work in this volume can further our understanding of nation building by focusing on one aspect of identity politics in contemporary Ukraine—regionalism.

One of the most salient questions laced throughout the chapters is the nature of the cleavages in Ukrainian society. From the late eighteenth century to the early part of the twentieth, Ukrainians (people living in the territory of what is now Ukraine, regardless of ethnicity) were ruled by two different states centered in Moscow and Vienna. After World War I and the Communist revolution in the Tsarist Russian empire, they found themselves split among the new states of Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union. The Uzhhorod region was not added to the territory of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic until 1939; the Chernivtsi region was annexed in 1940, and the regions of Galicia and the Crimea were joined only in 1945 and 1954, respectively. This means that not only do sections of the Ukrainian population have collective historical memories linking them to what are now foreign states, but also, in some cases, individuals remember life in the same geographic location but under different political rule.

The country can be characterized as ethnically divided as well. Although Soviet population policies after World War II included broad exchanges of ethnic Ukrainians with ethnic Poles and other nationalities across the newly formed borders, Ukraine was then, and remains, a heterogeneous state. According to the 1989 Soviet census, Ukrainians made up 73% of the population, with the largest ethnic minority being the Russians, with 22%. Although Russians form a majority only in the Crimean Autonomous Republic (67% according to the 1989 census), they are far more numerous in those districts that were part of the Tsarist Russian empire. Moreover, linguistically the country is split between those individuals who, regard-
There has been a large volume of literature to date that invokes these divisions as critical factors in the development of Ukraine in the post-Soviet era. As several of the chapters in this volume indicate, the debate continues over societal divisions that reveal disparity in the way the population views Ukrainian domestic and foreign policy. These divisions can, at the most extreme, make the process of state and nation building treacherous, if not impossible. Many of the contributors to this volume take up the question of the salience of these divisions and the trends that may exert unifying influences over the territory of Ukraine.

Perhaps the most long-standing thesis on Ukraine’s division revolves around ethnicity. In the first years after Ukraine’s declaration of independence, the ethnic divide was seen as a likely obstacle to nation-building efforts. It was assumed that the Russian minority would reject Ukrainian independence and would be manipulated by Russian foreign policy aimed at reconstructing some form of empire. However, Russians have been remarkably quiet. They have not mobilized in great numbers against Kyiv’s nation-building policies. Crimea, although considered a hot spot prior to 1995, has become a “dog that did not bark.” Moreover, there is some suggestion that reidentification may be underway in Ukraine, with more members of the population identifying themselves as Ukrainian and a growing number of children from mixed marriages being registered as Ukrainian.¹

The chapter by Weller in this volume goes further to show that the ethnic card has not been as contentious as some had predicted, illustrating the absence of ethnic conflict and the very low level of ethnic distance between Ukraine’s Russian and Ukrainian nationalities. Using surveys from 1993, 1995, and 1998, Weller has been able to gauge perceived levels of conflict between the two groups as they have evolved over time. His data confirm that ethnic conflict is the exception—rather than the norm—in Ukraine. By comparing survey results across several variables, Weller is able to conclude that regardless of region of residence, ethnicity, or language, Ukrainian citizens do not feel that ethnic conflict is likely. Moreover, Weller’s analysis confirms earlier work by Ian Bremmer on ethnic distance, or the perception of a significant divide between those who call themselves Russians and those who identify as Ukrainians.² Weller’s data indicate that although it may vary by region (see the following), on the whole there is a low level of ethnic distance in Ukraine.

This lack of ethnic distance or mobilization along ethnic lines has led many scholars to argue that Ukraine is divided by more than just ethnic identifications. Riaabchuk (in this volume as well as in earlier work) has argued that language use must be assessed as well in order to fully comprehend the divisions of Ukrainian society today. Riaabchuk contends that it is the language factor that truly determines public attitudes, and that Ukraine’s population can be divided into three groups: Ukrainophone Ukrainians, Russophone Ukrainians, and Russophone Russians. In his chapter in this volume, Riaabchuk argues that the number of Russophones and Ukrainophones in Ukraine are more or less equal in number, and that this divide is therefore more salient than ethnicity alone. This is especially true given the post-colonial environment within which Ukraine must determine and implement cultural policy. He points to Ukrainophones as an underprivileged minority and describes the policies emerging from Kyiv as remarkably laissez-faire in the arenas of language and culture. The current government in Kyiv, he contends, implements af-
firmative action policies that are remarkably weak and unlikely to heighten the status of the Ukrainian language or of its speakers. Given this, Riabchuk characterizes Ukraine as a "creolic state" (one that supports Ukrainian independence but is linguistically and culturally Russian).

Other scholars have found this ethnolinguistic divide to be important in shaping public opinion in Ukraine, especially in the first half of the 1990s. Khmelko and Wilson concluded that it was most salient in predicting voting behavior in the 1994 presidential election, noting that Russophone Ukrainians had the potential to act as a swing group given their mixed identity. In surveys taken in May, April, and June of 1994, Arel and Khmelko found that the ethnolinguistic divide was also important in more general attitudes of the population regarding sociopolitical orientations and Ukraine's relations with Russia.

Some newer studies suggest that as Ukraine enters its second decade as an independent state, observers may be moving away from the view that ethnolinguistic cleavages are most significant. The chapter by Kuzio in this volume goes furthest in this regard, arguing that Ukraine is marked by political consensus rather than division. Through an investigation of elite politics, Kuzio illustrates that the Ukrainian elite, regardless of ethnic background or language spoken at home, has come to agree on most of the fundamentals of Ukrainian nation building. Kuzio's research shows that there is no longer significant debate over the form and content of institution building, the country's territorial integrity, its structure (as a federal or unitary state), the goal of civic nationalism, or the consolidation of a national idea. Kuzio does not discount continued societal cleavages, however. He notes that despite the unity of the elite shown in his chapter, a corresponding mass consensus in Ukraine has yet to emerge.

Other scholars are also looking beyond rifts of ethnicity and language to explain divisions in Ukrainian society. For example, survey research presented by Arthur Miller in December 2000 suggests that the extent of the economic crisis in Ukraine—the fact that a majority of the population struggles to get by day to day in the new economy—has significantly lessened the impact of previously divisive ethnic identities. Andrew Wilson's most recent book, while not discounting ethno-linguistic factors, highlights the historical legacy that has left a wide variety of cleavages in Ukraine, including religious and regional divides. Sarah Birch's volume on elections in independent Ukraine also suggests that ethnolinguistic cleavages have not been most salient in determining voter preferences. Birch's work stresses instead a divide in the population between those who support statehood and those who are against it. According to her analysis, this cleavage overrides issues of ethnicity or language, but may be related to region.

Birch's connection of the pro- versus anti-statehood divide to region supports the work by several scholars in this collection who indicate that regional and local identities are important factors in variations of population attitudes. Interpretation of Ukraine as a country divided into discrete regions is not new. Definition of regions in and of themselves is often tricky, however. Scholars who have focused on the ethnolinguistic makeup of the population, for example, often use ethnicity or language groupings coterminously with regional categories. This should not be surprising, as many of the most easily recognizable regional divisions such as
"East" and "West" correspond with majority populations in either the category of ethnicity or language (or, in some cases, both). For this reason, many scholars who utilize regional categories in their work are using them as another way to group ethnolinguistic communities.

Another aspect of social divisions that is often linked to region, making the situation more complex, is that of religion. The simplistic division of Ukraine's east and west has also been associated with religious conviction: the Ukrainian, Catholic west and the Russian, Orthodox east. Although not covered in this volume, the complexities surrounding religion and the structures of the Orthodox and Catholic churches throughout Ukraine deserve further study. The recently released Atlas of Ukraine indicates that the percentage of Orthodox believers is 30% or greater throughout Ukraine, making up the majority in all oblasti except L'viv, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Crimea. Western oblasti show higher percentages of believers than those in the east or the south. However, the breakdown of the population by religion is further complicated by a surge in Protestantism: with the exception of L'viv, Ternopil, and Ivano-Frankivsk, Protestants make up between 19% and 50% of the population throughout Ukraine.

However, newer studies are beginning to specifically distinguish local and regional identities from ethnic, religious, and linguistic identities. They suggest that economic, social, and historical variation across region overpowers ethnolinguistic identification. For example, ethnic Russians living in L'viv may not necessarily have similar sociopolitical outlooks as ethnic Russians living in Kyiv or the Crimea. Local or regional populations may share historical memories and daily experiences that transcend divisive identities. Weller's conclusions about the importance of regional variation in ethnic distance over other variables such as language and ethnicity may support the idea that Ukraine's main divide has been formed through shared historical and lifetime experiences. Weller's surveys indicate that the largest and growing divide regarding who people view as "us" and "them" was found in the Western region, while other regions were far lower.

The findings of Barrington further develop this position. Barrington analyzes mass survey data collected in Ukraine in November 1998 testing the effects of region, language, and ethnicity on support for the Ukrainian political system as an institution, for its leaders in particular, and for Ukraine's continued independent status. Barrington's data indicate that nationality and language are less consequential variables in shaping popular support, while region emerges as a critical factor. Barrington's regressions show that nationality variables were significant for both support of leaders and support of the system writ large (what he terms the "regime"), while language figured prominently only in support for leaders. In both cases regional factors have far more impact than either nationality or language. Barrington shows significant links among nationality, language, and public opinion in regard to perceptions of the importance of Ukraine's continued independence. Even here, however, the regional variable is far stronger.

Barrington's results demonstrate that region is more complicated than has been assumed by many observers, as regional cleavages do not coincide with ethnic or linguistic divides. Barrington uses a nine-region model through which to study regional variation in Ukraine. Other studies have also emphasized this complexity. Several scholars employ a four-region paradigm that includes West, Central, Southern, and Eastern regions. Sherman Garnett has suggested that one could identify
seven regions by splitting the Central region into East-Central, West-Central, and Kyiv. While these divisions are in some ways devices to facilitate data manipulation, the very range of possibilities reveals much about regional and local identities: like other forms of identification, they are fluid; moreover, they do not necessarily fit into district boundaries, nor may they always fit into national boundaries.

As noted earlier, the importance of these divisions for the Ukrainian population is a continuing debate and requires further analysis. The lines between region, religion, ethnicity, and language remain blurred. Kuzio is not alone in his conclusion that the regional divide (as well as the ethnolinguistic thesis) may be overcome by growing consensus on many issues. For example, research conducted by Hinich, Khmelko, and Ordehook on the 1998 parliamentary elections point to the conclusion that these divisions in Ukraine have been overemphasized. Their analysis indicates that although electoral preferences vary, “the eastern and western parts of the Ukrainian electorate perceive things in similar ways and evaluate the alternatives that confront them using equivalent criteria.”

However, the suggestion (supported in particular by Barrington in this volume) that regional identities created by shared historical and lived experiences may create stronger “us” and “them” groups than ethnicity or language could have important implications for Ukraine’s development. While the possible ramifications of a Ukraine divided by ethnolinguistic variation has been addressed in several of the works cited above, those of regionalism have been less developed. It is those to which this chapter will turn, in particular because the collected chapters in this volume, despite varied perspectives and modes of analysis, lend unique insight into these issues.

IMPLICATIONS OF REGIONALISM IN UKRAINE

If we accept the hypothesis of Barrington and the assumption of Weller that the most important of Ukraine’s fissures is that which is formed by historical and lived experience, we must turn to another question set forth in this volume: does this cleavage negatively impact Ukraine’s prospects for political stability and development? Regionalism could have significant implications for the ability of the Ukrainian state to maintain its political structure and pursue coherent domestic and foreign policy agendas. Moreover, these divides present important challenges to the creation of a national identity and the role of the state in nation building.

Sub- and Transnational Regionalism

The complexity of regional identity is one important aspect of regionalism in Ukraine. The definition of regional identity employed here draws on both Barrington and on Catherine Wanner: shared experience, both within an individual’s lifetime and the historical memories passed down over generations, leads individuals to identify in-groups and out-groups based on region. These identifications in turn lead to shared values and perceptions. This concept of identity is not absolute. It borrows from the work of Paul Pirie and others, who see identity (in Pirie’s case ethnic identity) as a dynamic association that is not fixed by birth but is chosen and
can therefore be shifted under different circumstances. In this way no one identity is all-encompassing; individuals can and do hold several overlapping identities, and these can also change over time.

Given this definition, it is clear that regions in Ukraine are more complex than just East and West. It is instructive to look at both the larger and smaller scale. As Louise Jackson showed in 1998 in her case study of Zaporizhzhia, there are subtler differences and dynamics that exist on a smaller scale than the more usually highlighted East-West divide. The importance of this smaller scale—that Zaporizhzhians may not share the perceptions or characteristics of the Donbas, for example—can have both advantages and disadvantages in Ukraine's development. The multiple nature of Ukraine's regional divisions makes the country less polar and therefore possibly more stable. However, without significant leeway for regional and local governments to respond to the demands of their populations, these smaller-scale variations pose potentially difficult problems for the powers in Kyiv. It is therefore important for the unity of the state that individuals who identify with their region are also able to identify with the state as a whole.

In looking at regionalism in Ukraine (or in any state), one must also consider the forces of transnationalism. Patterns of rationalization and regional identity do not always coincide with national borders. Patterns of migration and availability of common economic markets can create a form of "transnational regionalism," where the divides that separate identity, economic groups, or social communities cross borders. According to Hurrell, this form of regionalism can also be based on high levels of social interaction across borders. Regionalism that extends beyond state borders is not necessarily a negative phenomenon. In some cases it has been encouraged, such as in the European Union and the Carpathian Euro-region. Regional identifications can have a calming effect on international relations and can enhance the overall economy through increased trade flow.

For a state that is attempting to bridge internal divides through state and nation building, the presence of regional identities and networks that extend beyond the state borders also present significant challenges. In Ukraine this was underlined during the October–November 1999 Ukrainian presidential elections, when a survey taken in a border town near Belarus showed many Ukrainian citizens were prepared to vote for Belarusian President Alyaksander Lukashenka. Living on the border where they regularly received Belarusian television signals and communicated with their Belarusian counterparts, these individuals' ties to the Ukrainian state were weak enough that they were confused over the identities of their national leaders. Ukraine, in attempting to create a shared identity for all of its citizens, must therefore compete with their regional and transnational regional identities at one and the same time.

Foreign Policy Formation and Implementation

The importance of regionalism and identities based on shared experience may also have implications for Ukraine's ability to create and implement a foreign policy agenda. D'Anieri has noted that Ukrainian institutions have been unable to resolve underlying societal divisions, and are in fact as, if not more, divided than their constituencies. This, in D'Anieri's opinion, has led to a "weak state" that is unable to implement foreign policy. James Sherr has also discussed the impact of
what he calls the “cultural factor” on Ukraine’s foreign policy—in particular on the decision to pursue a multivector strategy that looks both to Europe and to Russia.21

In this volume, Shulman suggests that the conflict over national identity in Ukraine influences and is in turn influenced by foreign policy debates. Shulman stresses that foreign policy affects identity by creating in-groups and out-groups; this leads to the possibility of a state’s foreign policy creating an out-group of a country with whom some of that state’s citizens may identify. He warns that a state pursuing a foreign policy agenda that is contrary to the values of a large section of the population will weaken national identity. Given surveys showing that a large portion of the Ukrainian population supports some sort of unification with Russia, Shulman concludes that the best way to strengthen national identity is to promote an East-Slavic identity and concurrently provide for closer relations with Russia and Belarus.

Although Shulman notes that region is a factor, his analysis concentrates on the divide between ethnic Ukrainian and Eastern Slavic identities. However, such concerns raise questions that are pertinent to the regionalism paradigm as well. If foreign policy indeed is both shaped by and shapes domestic identities, regionalism (and especially the sort of transnational regionalism noted earlier) can become a significant obstacle to coherent policy making. Foreign policy that creates out-groups will, as Shulman predicts, alienate segments of the population. Shulman suggests that the best exit from this dilemma with both a strong national identity and targeted foreign policy intact is to choose the East-Slavic or Russia-Belarus vector. Although Shulman notes that this would alienate the ethnic Ukrainian identity group, he explains that their strong ties to the notion of an independent Ukrainian state would ensure their continued loyalty to Kyiv. This exit option may become more complicated if, indeed, regional identities are stronger than ethnolinguistic. The problem here lies in those groups whose regional identities and transnational regional identities are close to Central Europe. If their main source of identification is their shared experience and history, it is feasible that they could build enough pride into that regional level identification to significantly challenge Kyiv should closer ties with Russia be deemed unpalatable.

It should be noted, however, that there is some skepticism regarding the influence of such societal groups on foreign policy creation and implementation in Ukraine. D’Anieri, Kuzio, and Kravchuk have illustrated that the policy-making process in Ukraine remains unclear. In particular, the role of public opinion, the media, and interest groups or lobbies are difficult to evaluate.22

Another aspect to regionalism has the potential to affect Ukraine’s ability to implement a cohesive foreign policy in the future. Should the regional identities remain strong or grow even stronger in Ukraine, it is possible that we will see regions conducting their own foreign policy. This has been the case in Russia, where regional administrations make policy statements normally within the realm of national security and conduct negotiations with foreign trade partners in the absence of strong central control.23 The current centralized nature of the Ukrainian state makes this unlikely in the near term. Yet there are signs that the desire exists for districts in Ukraine to pursue relationships that can lead to foreign direct investment and increased economic activity, though well within the realm created by the
central powers. There are also regional initiatives now supported by the state encouraging regional administrators and legislators to closely cooperate with their counterparts in Central Europe. Should Kyiv decide to shift vectors to one that concentrates on Russia and Belarus, these contacts would be difficult to sever. They would provide access and opportunity for regional actors to conduct their own foreign policy alongside or outside the state.

Regionalism and the Federalism Question

Regionalism may also have serious implications for the very structure of Ukraine. Article 2 of the Ukrainian constitution declares Ukraine to be a unitary state. However, in designing the constitution, Ukrainian legislatures were attuned to the regional variation across Ukraine. Article 132 therefore notes that “The territorial structure of Ukraine is based on the principles of unity and indivisibility of the state territory, the combination of centralization and decentralization in the exercise of state power, and the balanced socio-economic development of regions that takes into account their historical, economic, ecological, geographical and demographic characteristics, and ethnic and cultural traditions.” Moreover, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea was given special status, including the right to form its own parliament and council of ministers and to adopt its own constitution with the approval of the Parliament of Ukraine.

This semi-unitary structure is important in that it (in theory) maintains central control while allowing for regional variation. If regional identities are, and continue to be, the prevalent source of identification and of in- and out-group formation among the Ukrainian population, however, there is the danger that regional demands will turn to requests for more autonomy than the center is willing to consider. This has already occurred in the area of language use, with some Eastern Ukrainian cities declaring Russian to be their official language, in defiance of Article 10 of the Constitution.

It seems unlikely that the regional factor in Ukraine will seriously threaten the established constitutional structure of the country in the short term. A federal structure in Ukraine would allow more freedom of decision making and therefore could give regions a greater stake in state building. On the other hand, as Roeder points out (regarding the Soviet context), federalism institutionalizes regional differences and can provide the infrastructure for regional elites to more easily mobilize the population against the central state. This has certainly been the case in Russia, Ukraine’s close neighbor and an easy subject of popular comparison.

Ukraine’s elite seem to have taken this lesson to heart. As the chapter by Kuzio indicates, there appears to be agreement among at least the elite levels of the population in Ukraine regarding Ukraine’s structural integrity. However, given that Ukraine currently is neither a completely unitary nor a completely federal state, regions have some room to exert their authority and demand concessions that take into account their different life experiences. In order to handle these variations and maintain a nonfederal state, the Ukrainian elite must find a way to convince its population to identify not only with their region, but first and foremost with an overarching set of all-Ukrainian symbols and structures.
NATION BUILDING AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

We now turn to the issue of the reaction of the state to the challenges posed by regionalism. How has the state attempted to bridge regional divides? The state in Ukraine has embarked on policies aimed at creating an overarching civic Ukrainian (i.e., nonethnic) identity. By focusing on civic values, polyethnic rights, and patriotism, the nation-building campaign may be able to forge a new layer of identity for citizens of Ukraine. It is important to remember that no single identity is absolute. Nation building therefore does not need to replace existing identities, whether they be regional, ethnic, linguistic, or a variety of other possibilities. Rather, it must only design a mosaic of symbols, structure, and values with which citizens can identify at a level equal to or greater than the regional or local.

Critical in this respect are policies that serve to unite the population despite regional variations in life experience, economic well-being, and social identities. Several of the contributors to this volume investigate the creation of new identities and the process of nation building in contemporary Ukraine. Their research outlines both successes and continuing challenges and can help us to understand the implications of Ukraine’s regional divide on the process of nation building.

Regionalism as Challenge to Nation Building: The Case of the Military

As Barrington suggests in his conclusions, the prevalence of regional disparity in Ukraine has the potential to significantly complicate nation-building efforts. The chapter by Fesiak depicts one attempt to create an overarching identity to consolidate the nation’s military patriotism. At the same time, Fesiak’s chapter points out the severe difficulties in overcoming regional disparity and successfully creating overarching symbols, myths, and constructs with which all Ukrainian citizens can identify.

Fesiak illustrates how the center attempted to utilize the military as a socialization tool, instilling common myths and symbols linked to the new nation that could be accepted by servicemen in the Ukrainian armed forces. In particular, he describes a campaign implemented between 1991 and 1993 that was spearheaded by the Social Psychological Service of the military and aided by the Union of Ukrainian Officers. Fesiak notes that the Union of Ukrainian Officers was made up mostly of officers from the Western regions of Ukraine, and aided by ex-military émigré personnel. His extensive interviews with servicemen and officers in the Ukrainian military show that attempts to focus on the symbols of the Ukrainian “national-liberation struggle” (spearheaded by Western Ukrainian anti-Soviet and anti-Russian organizations such as the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) during and after World War II) have been largely unsuccessful. In Fesiak’s words, these symbols “had limited appeal outside western Ukraine” and were rejected by the majority of military personnel.

Even after 1993, when Fesiak shows a moderation in “Ukrainianization” the success of the campaign to instill patriotism in Ukraine’s servicemen, this time with Cossack symbols rather than those of the UPA, was mixed. A lack of textbooks and the question of teachers able and willing to present the material in the same manner
regardless of region remains a problem. In effect, Fesiak’s research shows that the creation of a military identity that supports Ukrainian state and nation building was made more complicated by regional differences. That is not to say that the endeavor to build a civic national identity has failed. However, the ramifications of regionalism have been instrumental in slowing the process.

**Historical Myth and Nation Building: Building Cross-Regional Bridges**

While regionalism has posed a challenge to some nation building endeavors, in other areas the state seems to have successfully navigated the regional maze. One of the most interesting conclusions of the research collected in this volume is what appears to be the lack of division caused by the introduction of a national historiography.

Zenon Kohut has noted that questions of “deimperialization” or “the adjustment of structures and intellectual concepts to the dissolution of an empire” is one of the driving forces in new perceptions of history in the post-Soviet era. These new perceptions of history are in turn essential to the struggles over identity in postcolonial states such as Ukraine. It is not surprising that reinterpretations of history have been central to the process of nation building in the past decade in Ukraine. The two chapters in this volume that deal with history, myth, and the creation of national identity indicate that in this area the nation-building process has not been opposed by regional groups. This is despite the fact that the shared historical and life experiences that make up a regional identity do not fully coincide with the historical narratives being promoted by historians, educators, and the media. This bears further investigation, as it goes against what one might expect given the divisions that exist in Ukrainian society—not only regional divisions, but ethnic and linguistic as well.

The contribution of Kasianov, for example, investigates the new trends in Ukrainian historiography since the fall of the Soviet Union. While in some Western countries we may expect to find less controversy at the level of scholarly historiography, given its removal from mass understandings, in Ukraine historiography is very much tied into historical perceptions evident in more popular histories, the press, and the media. With the lack of national histories in Ukraine, these scholars are being called on to write more popular historical pieces, and their work garners a much larger popular audience.

It is therefore interesting that Kasianov finds the development of historiographic models that emphasize the longevity of the Ukrainian nation as largely harmonious across Ukraine. Kasianov illustrates that Ukrainian social science is intensively involved in the process of nation building: all historians are searching for links to a past incarnation of the Ukrainian nation, all uphold the idea of a nineteenth-century national renaissance (thereby implying an earlier nation), and all agree that the nation has taken shape through a process of organic evolution. Kasianov characterizes the main difference between historians in Ukraine as relating to how far back they look to identify the precursors of the modern Ukrainian nation. Most fall into what he calls the primordialists, who link the concepts of ethnos, people, and nation and trace the evolution of the modern nation back to ancient times. The others, or modernists, identify a premorden and a modern nation, noting that the modern nation’s roots extend only to the sixteenth century, parallel-
ing the development of European nations. In his survey, Kasianov does not find significant opposition to these paradigms.

The Janmaat chapter brings the discussion down a level: from that of the science of history to the teaching of it, or its use as a tool of socialization in Ukrainian schools. Janmaat's chapter focuses on the new textbooks for history in the older grades of Ukrainian secondary school and the points at which they differ from those used in the Soviet period. Textbooks are particularly important for socializing a new generation, instilling in them belief in a Ukrainian narrative that can sustain national identification despite different historical memories and myths across region. Socialization through education is often a highly contentious process, as individuals seem more likely to mobilize in defense of values taught to their children than many other issues. Interestingly, Janmaat's research shows that despite the fact that various textbooks are available to schools and that teachers are able to choose from a list of accepted texts, in representative areas of the country the same texts are being used. This indicates that there is little opposition to the introduction of a more national history for Ukrainian youth education.

The set of textbooks studied by Janmaat covers the entire period of Ukrainian history, from the beginnings of Kyivan Rus' through the twentieth century. They therefore include what might be considered more regionally controversial periods of history, such as the UPA movement in World War II that caused such division in the military programs described by Fesiak. Interestingly, Janmaat is able to show that important changes have been made to sections pertaining to the Ukrainian role in the 1917 revolution and during World War II. At the same time, there is much continuity between the texts, two of which were written by the same author in both the Soviet and post-Soviet periods. Janmaat's findings correspond to the work of education scholar Apple, who has noted in Western settings that unless there is a wholesale change of government and elites, as new narratives are introduced into the educational system and very little tends to be dropped from textbooks there is very rarely change in major ideological frameworks. Rather, progressive items are mentioned but not developed, or simply grafted onto old text. This has interesting implications for ways in which new perceptions of history may be able to be introduced successfully in a regionally divided state. Since incremental change does not seem to engender significant mobilization of the society and also is unlikely to contradict the lived experience or garnered historical knowledge of the pupils, introducing minor changes might make it easier to create a new base of agreed-upon knowledge spanning the entire country.

The work of these authors on new historical narratives and historiographic paradigms is instructive in and of itself. If we approach their findings with an eye to determining the implications of a salient regional divide in Ukraine, it is clear that nation builders (in this case this term must be applied to a wide range of citizens, including scholars, politicians, journalists, and teachers) have so far been able to avoid the very real possibility of different regional identities failing to accept new historical narratives and myths. In this sense the history building project has been more successful than attempts to structure a unifying set of military myths and symbols.

Their work also suggests a new question: what will be the effect of the proc-
esses of transnational regionalism on mythmaking and on the acceptance of national historical narratives by the society? Regional identities, as noted above, do not necessarily follow border lines drawn on a map. It is conceivable that the shared experiences that made individuals in Eastern and Southern regions of Ukraine think similarly about sociopolitical questions in Barrington’s study may also be shared with Russian citizens across the border. The borders are porous and open, making for significant cross-border socialization of the type described by Hurrell in other countries. Therefore, Ukrainian historical narratives are not insulated. They may compete—even among a new generation of pupils—with contradictory myths and narratives prevalent in Russia. The lack of mobilization against the Ukrainian national Rus’ myth suggests that this has so far not been the case. As these regional processes grow, it will be interesting to gauge the continued strength of the Ukrainian narrative across Ukraine.

**JUDGING THE ROLE OF THE STATE**

The debate over whether the policies described above should be considered the agenda of a nationalizing state has raged in the Ukrainian studies field since Brubaker published his well-known study in 1995.29 Brubaker defined a nationalizing state as one that is ethnically heterogeneous, but whose elites promote the language, culture, and political and economic success of the dominant ethnic group. He noted that the policies of nationalizing states are implemented in a situation where organized and self-conscious national minorities exist and where the minorities’ external homelands may seek to protect them. Central to Brubaker’s thesis is the importance of perception. Brubaker claimed that a state can be perceived to be nationalizing by the minority groups even if it does not actually adopt nationalizing policies.

Several scholars of post-Soviet Ukraine have presented evidence that suggests Ukraine can be considered a nationalizing state of the type that Brubaker describes.30 While their arguments vary slightly, they all claim that while Ukraine officially endorses the concept of creating a civic, multi-ethnic state, its policies give the impression that the goal is actually quite different. In particular, they point to issues of language policy, the introduction of a national historiography, and Ukraine’s foreign policy toward Russia. These policies, as viewed by the Russian national minority, suggest that the state’s goal is to build a “Ukraine for Ukrainians” rather than a civic Ukraine.

Many of the contributors to this volume address this debate as well. The chapter by Fesiak suggests that between 1991 and 1993 Ukraine can be characterized as a nationalizing state (or, perhaps, a nationalizing military). Fesiak’s outline of the “Ukrainianization” campaign in the military carries overtones of nationalizing tendencies, with the Union of Ukrainian Officers conducting what he has termed a “witch hunt” for servicemen in their ranks who were not sufficiently patriotic.

On the other hand, Kuzio (in this volume and elsewhere31) proposes an important question: what exactly is the difference between the nationalizing state and processes of nation building as they are defined in western liberal nations? Kuzio argues that the characterization of a “civic west” and “ethnic east” is overly simplistic and does not take into account nation-building policies in the west that are similar to those in Ukraine. All states are to some extent ethnic and civic, and the
attempt to create an overarching cultural identity that includes such factors as a common language, symbols, and historical myths does not necessarily negate regional or ethnolinguistic pluralism.

Weller’s work is especially interesting because it asks how the salience of regional identities might affect the potential for Ukrainian elites to pursue nationalizing policies. Given the importance of perceptions in Brubaker’s definition of a nationalizing state, the wide variation of lived experiences across Ukraine suggests that we should consider that the way segments of the population perceive nation-building policies may also vary. Weller’s research attempts to get at this variable by gauging perceptions of relations between people (i.e., whether ethnic conflict between groups is likely and how much one group feels it has in common with others). However, Weller’s research is unable to determine the perceptions of these groups toward state policies in particular. While there may not be a likelihood of ethnic conflict between Russians and Ukrainians in Crimea, the Russian population there may still feel that the elites in Kyiv are attempting to create a nation for Ukrainians that excludes them. Further research into this area, added to Weller’s work, would round out our understanding of regional perceptions of the potentially nationalizing state.

For example, the salience of regional identity may mitigate against mobilization by the Russian and Russophone population. Variation in economic position, social situations, and historical traditions may prompt Russians in different parts of Ukraine to view the same policy in different ways. Russians in Luhans’k, for instance, may perceive the state’s actions as nationalizing, but their counterparts in Poltava may not. Again, it is the perception here that is most important. Given these regional divisions, the state can pursue policies that some may perceive as nationalizing without risking a widespread uproar from the Russian or Russophone population. Regional differences in perception also suggest that classification of a state as nationalizing is more complex. If only a portion of the minority perceives policies as discriminatory, how would this fit into Brubaker’s definition?

The debate over whether or not Ukraine is a nationalizing state will continue as long as there are groups of Russians and Russophones who perceive state policies to be unfair. This volume suggests, however, that important research that moves beyond this debate is underway. By focusing on what can be learned from the state’s role in Ukraine in the past ten years rather than trying to characterize it as positive or negative, we might gain insight into state and nation building that can inform political science theory. In addition, the research here indicates that despite questions of perception, a consensus is forming regardless of region, ethnicity, or native tongue around building an independent Ukraine based on civic values and marked by ethnic peace. The salience of regional identities may be important in maintaining that peace by differentiating the perceptions of possible mobilization groups. Additional research into the actual perceptions of the population and how they vary by region may be able to further clarify these issues.

BY WAY OF CONCLUSION

The focus of this chapter on the implications of shared historical and life ex-
periences that create strong regional identities in Ukraine should not be taken to mean that regionalism is the best model through which to view all vectors of Ukrainian domestic and foreign policy. As the preceding chapters in this volume illustrate, the interconnectedness of the many identifications that divide Ukraine remain unclear, and the dynamic nature of identity formation and re-formation can make this type of research a moving target. More investigation is needed to determine the salience of the regional identity in Ukrainian politics and nation building vis-à-vis ethnolinguistic identities.

This chapter has attempted to show that regionalism’s rise as a separate factor from ethnicity, language, and religion in the debate over what divides Ukraine has important implications for Ukraine’s ability to pursue domestic reform, consolidate a national identity, and conduct effective foreign policy. In particular, it has implications for the way in which the themes of this volume have developed in the past decade and will continue to develop in the twenty-first century. Regionalism and transnational regionalism have the potential to push the limits of Ukraine’s semi-unitary state structure, especially as local self government becomes a stronger force in Ukraine. These identities as forces may also play a role in the formation of what Ukrainian officials define as the “vectors” of the foreign policy agenda. The extent to which this is the case depends on one’s view of the importance of domestic factors in the development of policy in the international arena, but in either case the potential exists. Transnational regional tendencies are a potential weakening force on Ukraine’s attempt to build a cohesive civic nation within its present boundaries. At the same time, they may mitigate against ethnic mobilization toward state policies that may be perceived as nationalizing. They also complicate attempts to build overarching national identities in such areas as military symbols and myths.

While the exact ramifications of strong regionalism in Ukraine remain unclear, this chapter has tried to suggest areas in which further research may prove fruitful in determining regionalism’s salience and effect on the transition process. Regionalism studies in other countries illustrate the growing prevalence of cross-border relations and the creation of transnational regions and regional identities. The historical closeness of Ukraine to its neighbors Russia and Belarus during the Soviet era and with Central Europe in the nineteenth century and interwar years indicates that Ukrainian citizens may still identify themselves with individuals now living in other states.32 More research is needed, however, to determine if transnational regional identities at a level below the Central European, Eurasian or pan-Slavic still exist and to what extent these are important to Ukraine’s transition and its foreign policy agenda.

Regionalism may also take on increased meaning as Ukraine becomes more and more connected with digital technology and feels the effects of globalization on its ability to govern and maintain identities. Processes of globalization transnationalize the formation of identities and loyalties among various segments of the population, resulting in a shift away from the concept of nation-state as their principal source of identification.33 Growing globalism may open new avenues to scholars who can study global processes rather than confining themselves to dynamics within individual countries such as Ukraine. Further research into the extent to which Ukraine is feeling the effects of globalism and what this may mean for Ukraine’s nation-building endeavor is necessary.

The importance of regionalism in the historical debates and creation of national
myths may be an intriguing avenue of research as well. There is an argument to be made for the absence of mobilization of the Russian population against the new emphasis on Ukraine’s national history with its roots in Kyivan Rus’. Still, it would be interesting to determine the reasons behind the lack of regional mobilization against more contemporary changes in the historical narrative prevalent in the fields of education, the media, and historiography.

Regionalism as a separate factor from ethnicity and language use may also provide insights into the debate over whether to classify Ukraine as a nationalizing state. Further study into the way in which regional identities affect perceptions of state nation building policies could be informative in two ways. First, such data combined with the work of Weller on ethnic distance and potential conflict would provide a more complete picture of the population’s view of nation-building policies across the country. In addition, they could help to explain why the perceptions of discrimination among portions of the Russian minority (detailed by Arel and others) have not caused the expected civil strife or ethnic mobilization suggested by the Brubaker model.

The chapters collected in this volume highlight many of the most important debates now underway in Ukrainian studies. This conclusion has concentrated on the contributions that those chapters can provide to our understanding of regionalism in Ukraine. Beyond this, the volume also makes important additions to debates that were touched on only briefly here—such as discussions over the role of domestic politics in foreign policy decision making and the nature of the nation-building process in Ukraine. The most important contribution of this volume to the field, however, is the breadth and depth of the research included. This research will not only further enhance our understanding of the state’s role in Ukrainian identity politics, but will also augment comparative studies of nation building, nationalism, and identity in other environments.

NOTES


8. Wilson moves the field in this direction by including a chapter on religious divides in
his book *The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation."

9. Atlas of Ukraine (Kyiv, Institute of Geography of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, 1999–2000), on CD ROM. In the case of L’viv, Ternopil, and Ivano-Frankivsk, the majority was Catholic; in Crimea there was a similar percentage of Orthodox as persons who claimed “other.”

10. “Relihiijnij vybіr naselennya Ukrainy: za danymi opytuvannya hromads’koj dumky,” information from a roundtable held at the Institute of Sociology, Kyiv, 6 November 2000, published by Democratic Initiatives Foundation (Kyiv, 2000), p. 9 and Table 5.

11. For example, Weller’s chapter in this volume employs a four-region classification scheme; Andrew Wilson uses a similar classification in *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1997.


23. For more on the foreign policy agenda of Russia’s regions, see Bradshaw and Makarychev, “Globalization and Fragmentation.” On this trend more generally, see Brian Hocking, *Localizing Foreign Policy: Non-Central Governments and Multilayered Diplomacy* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993).


Conclusion

27. For example, Yaroslav Hrytsak, who figures prominently as a “modernist” in Kasianov’s chapter, is author of one of two volumes on Ukrainian history aimed at the non-historian audience. Yaroslav Hrytsak, Narys Istorii Ukrajiny: Formuvannya Modernoi Ukrainskoi Natsii XIX–XX Stolitsya (Kyiv: Heneza, 1996). In addition, in 1999 a volume on the historical relationship between Ukraine and Russia was published in Ukraine for mass audiences with short articles, colorful graphics, and an introduction by President Kuchma emphasizing the need to study Ukrainian and Russian history closely as each country establishes its independence. See Rossiia i Ukraina: Vekhi Istorii, Special Issue of Rodina, no. 8, 1999.


32. For example, the prevalence of the pan-Slavic identity supports this hypothesis. Reference to the pan-Slavic identity is most often found in work dealing with international relations and the future of Ukrainian-Russian relations. The chapter on foreign policy in this volume is no exception: Shulman refers to it as the “East-Slavic” identity. For an overview of pan-Slavism and other possible cross-regional identities see the paper presented by A. Wilson, “Elements of a Theory of Ukrainian National Identity,” the Kennan Institute, 6 December 1999.

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LOWELL W. BARRINGTON is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Marquette University in Milwaukee and Senior Associate at the Eurasia Group in New York. He has served as Editor-in-Chief of *Analysis of Current Events* and was Vice President of the Association for the Study of Nationalities. Barrington's publications include articles in the *European Journal of Political Research, Post-Soviet Affairs*, and *Europe-Asia Studies*, and he is the editor of the forthcoming book *Nationalism after Independence* (University of Michigan Press).

PAUL D'ANIERI is Associate Professor of Political Science and Associate Dean of International Programs at the University of Kansas. He is author of *Economic Interdependence in Ukrainian-Russian Relations* (SUNY, 1999), and co-author of *Politics and Society in Ukraine* (Westview, 1999), as well as articles and chapters on Ukrainian and Russian politics and foreign policy. He has been Visiting Professor at Harvard and at Lviv State University in Ukraine. He is Editor of *European Security*.

ANDREW FESIAK is a consultant specializing in the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

JAN G. JANMAAT is a policy worker in sustainable energy at the province of Noord-Holland in the Netherlands, and is a member of the editorial board of "Oost-Europa Verkenningen", a journal which focuses on political and social issues in the former communist countries. He is author of Nation-Building in Post-Soviet Ukraine: Educational Policy and the Response of the Russian-Speaking Population (University of Amsterdam, 2000).

GEORGI KASIANOV is Leading Research Fellow, Institute of Ukrainian History, Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences. He is author or co-author of several books, including *Theories of Nations and Nationalism* (Lybid', 1995) and *The Dissidents: The Ukrainian Intelligentsia in Non-Conformist Movements, 1960-1980* (Lybid', 1999).
TARAS KUZIO is formerly a Senior Research Fellow, Center for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham; Post Doctoral Fellow, Yale University; and Visiting Fellow, Brown University. He was also head of the NATO Information Office in Kyiv. Currently he is Resident Fellow at the Center for Russian and East European Studies, University of Toronto. He is author of Ukraine Under Kuchma (MacMillan, 1997), Ukraine: State and Nation Building (Routledge, 1998), and co-author of Politics and Society in Ukraine (Westview, 1999).

NANCY POPSON is Deputy Director of the Kennan Institute in Washington, DC. She has been at the Kennan Institute since 1996, where she has coordinated the institute’s program on Ukraine. Her research interests include nation building in Ukraine, questions of ethnicity and migration in Ukraine (particularly in Kyiv), women in politics in the NIS, and assistance programs in the NIS. Her most recent articles appeared in Urban Anthropology and Nationalities Papers.

MYKOLA RIABCHUK is a research associate at the University of "Kyiv-Mohyla Academy" and co-editor of the Ukrainian literary review “Krytyka.” He is an author of five books, including a two-volume study on Civil Society and State-Nation Building in Ukraine (From 'Little Russia' to Ukraine, and Dilemmas of the Ukrainian Faustus, 2000).

STEPHEN SHULMAN is Assistant Professor in Department of Political Science at Southern Illinois University, where he teaches international relations, comparative politics, and ethnic politics. His research interests include nationalism and national identity, the relationship between ethnicity and foreign policy, and the role of culture in international affairs. His research appears in journals such as Comparative Political Studies, Europe-Asia Studies, Nationalities Papers, and International Studies Quarterly.

CRAIG A. WELLER was Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Public Policy at the University of Strathclyde from 2000 to 2002.